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X   PREFATORY NOTE 
. . . there is no escape from history into romance. 
~Lee Patterson, Chaucer and the Subject of History 
. . . stultus in tenebras ambulat [the fool walks in darkness] 
~Ecclesiastes 2:14 
. . . by the shadwe he took his wit 
~Chaucer, The Man of Law’s Tale 
This little book had its genesis over a dinner shared with 
friends — Nicola Masciandaro, Öykü Tekten, Karl Steel, and 
Eileen Joy — in a restaurant in Brooklyn on April Fool’s Day 
in 2011, the same day that saw the launch of punctum books. 
As we were sharing some food and wine and joking around 
about this and that, Nicola mentioned that he had always 
wanted to write a book or edit a collection of essays that 
would focus on all of the dark and melancholic places in 
Chaucer (of which there are many, once you start paying 
attention), and while teaching Chaucer over the years, he has 
been collecting these dark moments in his head and 
ruminating them like small black pearls. This also recalled to 
Nicola how frequently Lee Patterson uses the term “dark” in 
his book Chaucer and the Subject of History. Chaucer is, of 
course, widely beloved for his playfulness and comic 
sensibility, but his poetry is also rife with scenes and events 
and passing, brief instances where everything could possibly 
!
go horribly wrong or where everything that matters seems, if 
even momentarily, altogether and irretrievably lost. And then 
sometimes, things really do go wrong. 
 It struck us that evening that in order to do justice to these 
moments, which are more numerous than you realize when 
you start looking for them, that you would have to be willing 
to fall into these abyssal passages without ropes and without 
worrying how everything ultimately turns out (this would be a 
rogue journey against the teleological tides of the narratives 
and over the beachheads of certain comforting scholarly 
“resolutions”). The idea would be to undertake something like 
soundings in the darker recesses of the Chaucerian lakes and 
to bring back palm- or bite-sized pieces (black jewels) of bitter 
Chaucer that could be shared with others — an “assortment,” 
if you will. It could be productive (and hell, interesting), we 
thought, to gather together some shipmates who would be 
willing to explore Chaucer’s darker topographies, and even get 
lost there, not so much making sense of these dark passages, 
or referring them to how things ultimately turn out, but 
rather, making them more rich and more strange, like the 
pearls that were in Alonso’s eyes as he sank to the bottom of 
Shakespeare’s ocean in The Tempest. Myra Seaman stepped in 
to help steer; others were impressed into service. 
 Opting to dilate rather than cordon off this darkness, this 
volume assembles a variety of attempts to follow such 
moments into their folds of blackness and horror, to chart 
their endless sorrows and recursive gloom . . . as if there were 
no way (back) out. Not that this collection finds only 
emptiness and non-meaning there. You never know what you 
will discover in the dark. 
Eileen A. Joy and Nicola Masciandaro 
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g  and here we are as on a darkling plain 
 
Gary J. Shipley 
 
 
§ (BARRINGTON) THE OLD MAN IS DARK IN LIGHT AND  
 
blackening, like a corpse-reanimate, lost in nights of stars of 
heaven’s sick white light. And there are hilts wired to the 
widening grip of bleached palms, the edges remaining white 
beneath a spill of blood carved black. And each love and 
loveless seed of rot is white, leeching lignin and degrading and 
decolorizing all past worlds of woods of tar-black trees rooted 
in some foreign shame. And though the fox of this wood is 
black and the cabbages white in which it lays, there is no 
peroxide in the throat that trolls the art of stories of old things.  
 
§ (BRYANT & ALIA) THERE BEFORE HILARITY AND LOVE, DARK 
STRATAGEMS  
 
eating (fetal earth and rock from under towers), entombing 
navvies in the rubble of inestimable black skies — like poor 
Arcita crushed inside the shadow of his horse. Out from the 
obscurity of their cells that discordant love, itself as all love 
born of mutilation, reigns an exalted illness of human meat. 
Saturnian remembrances of gold oiled with broken necks, and 
saturate lungs with poison-strangled hearts, and quod bodies 
rotting into walls, of leonine interment with tongues black 
with disease and eyes and men blotted by duplicity, by 
genocidal plagues and buried breathing: the succoured whims 
of justice from a father’s hundred hands.  
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§ (EVANS) THE SOGGY FLESH OF DREAMS 
 
tears like the crepe of sleep between the fingers of the sun, 
waking half-alive to the feel of mourning crepe that still eludes 
her untouched arm. The sea fills him in a way that sleep 
cannot, making cold dark shipwrecks of his organs and hard 
blind barnacles of his eyes. For though the worm of sleep 
ingeminates the husband’s airless cadaver, no solution may be 
concocted with his wife. When he speaks his words are 
sounded senseless black inside black ears, in a language made 
of wounds made shed of bodies that cannot wake, so that all 
the wife can see before she dies are water lines of shadows 
drowning in icy silences of noise.   
 
§ (GILBERT) THE DISLOCATION SHEDS FALSE LIGHT 
 
into tarnished muscle transported vertically outside a wink. 
And so for all sick faces of this fair the book is the only mask 
prescribed, empyreal eyes the only glue. The devil up and like 
his tongue spreads outwards, squirming shapeless through 
endless bodies of the dead and living made again for earthly 
torment. That summoner dragged to Hell to know a true 
fiend’s measure… But enough now of gallows fruit and war, 
and instead a modish sun dripping through them vaulted 
cracks. And to conclude, all ends are porous bones, skeletons 
sucked clean and dipped in fire, each scrap of marrow 
absorbed and lit eternally by the raging firestorms of some 
long-spurious glow.   
 
§ (HARRISON) OF THESE MANY KINDS OF MURDER 
 
this poet’s see-through suicide is one. The knife goes in 
without a sound, so old and harrowed is the flesh it turns. 
Behind the words, then, an evacuee, from some sweaty 
industry of bloodless tongues. And with no alterity to fill the 
gap, the wounds are left to pile, up with little notion of return 
like rotten cityscapes bloated black and windowless with some 
unspent and poisoned coin. This voiceless livestock, once 
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made of caves and unwalled hearts, will soon grow fat enough 
to eat, and the factory they made of human life will consume 
them whole and over inside the noise of war.      
 
§ (MASCIANDARO) A DAY FOR EACH BUNGLED STROKE 
 
her body and her head remain, annexed by the yawning neck 
of some adamantine law. A bath of fire leaves her skin 
untouched; and three desperate slashes, of one annihilator’s 
knife, fail to carve the martyr from the meat. Her lungs in this 
half-lived hinterland, inflated with a mesial air, find veins in 
stasis congruent, a doomed division having left them half-
measured with her blood. St. Cecilia in her semi-death, a 
torture made by God and shadows into nothing, lives this way 
aborted by her theomorphic spine, until the hour when 
emptied of the earth they bear her cold concluded corpse to it.   
 
§ (MITCHELL) FROM THE SLICK SALIVA OF THE SEA 
 
black mangling rocks protrude like diabolic teeth. The 
Franklin, with an eye forever in his stomach, makes her distant 
husband into food. The devil’s jagged mouth has no reason to 
exist. And should she find a reason, it too could just as readily 
dissolve. Maybe the rigidities that terrorized could flow again 
in blood, dripping off the handle of the dagger in her chest. 
She and the tale might flow again, the lithic impasse having 
been repulsed for good, by the silent horror of a graveyard 
stone. Tension grows like sediment, congealing, the tale 
poising to prorogue, until alteration remains unchanged and 
what was rock begins to move. 
 
§ (NEEL & RICHMOND) IT SPREAD ITS WINGS IN BLOOD 
 
across Arcita’s face: a bird of ill portent gesturing toward 
man’s inevitable black flight. Once white it sang of love’s 
betrayal, of a man-shaped insect that crawled inside a wife, 
and was seen by him betrayed to be tainted by the song, and so 
with an arrow in his spouse he turned his fury on the bird. 
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This crow’s demise, from pure unpigmented songbird to 
muted blot of smut, is itself the omen, both well and ill, of all 
that love can be. To the devil scorched and mumchance: the 
bleak and vicious course of failing in the game constructed 
from the lustre that it maims. 
 
§ (PRIEST) THE GRIEF EXACTED BY ABSENT MEN —  
 
the impalements, the drownings, the lovers and the children 
strung up by the neck — is, in Custance, itself embroidered in 
absentia. The sea is at its kindest when corroding, like rain at 
night, and her eyes once lacrimal are rusted shut to wake. 
Unused she drifts and shipwrecks, her mind as her virtue 
bleached as white as teeth, with no red stain of massacre 
conjectured by the snake. Her face so often bloodless barely 
masks its void, and any promised colour as vain and flimsy as 
the Arab satin that scooped her out and set her on her way, 
some crude vessel rudderless and lost.      
 
§ (SCHAMESS) THE THING’S FAILURE TO ERASE ITSELF 
 
is detailed in a florid gore, in scars and burns — eroticized in 
spastic horror and vicarious omnipotence — and jerk 
responses to its pain. The gall will colonize its bodies and rule 
them mostly from within. (It infiltrates at places felt but never 
seen, and fucks its victim in the arse to perpetrate its dream.) 
Each kneeling orifice is the fantasmatic embodiment of an 
other, and all intestines left, nothing but raw and weeping 
cankers on some obscene coagulate of jelly. With this tension 
like a palimpsest’s surface script forever scraped away, the 
cohabitation veers towards a sinless carcass, rigid and 
insensible. 
 
§ (SEAMAN) LIFE ABDUCTED AND PRESERVED,  
 
in headless, burnt or flooded animation, does not belie the 
trauma that it was, but serves instead to reaffirm the grip of its 
myopia. Like the Fairy King’s mutilated horde, some limbless 
Shipley :: Poetic Preface v 
!
some insane, we live fortified in drowsiness and in gold, and 
yet suspended ask again for further deadening. A corpse with 
the merest purpose has more art and life than those that 
though still living stand enervated by the air they breathe. In 
suffering, as in death, man is torn small; and makes his art (a 
narcotic catch basin) from the pieces that remain, his eyes 
averted from the crudity of origins or the aqueous dissolution 
of their fate.  
   
§ (STEEL) DREAMS OF KINDNESS, LUST OR JUSTICE, EITHER ONE,  
 
can and do inseminate the wombs of death and life and purity. 
And they poison with external purpose that which, untainted 
and autonomous, was coded in ambivalence toward anything 
but its own elusion. Like this they’re made solutions to the 
quandaries that have locked them in: whether stuck in the 
sand of a life that will not otherwise recede to sea, or finding 
one’s identity preserved in that which ends it, or else as fair 
prize in a skirmish to the death. Each one of these three saintly 
women is made pinion of a story; stories, each of which, 
remorseless and determined to rot her from the outside in.       
 
§ (TREHARNE) THE VESTAL’S HEAD, HAVING MOURNED ITSELF, 
IMPLORED  
 
to be removed from the site of its proposed corruption. That 
way in her father’s hand, suspended by her hair, she’d never be 
unmade, maculate and breathing. The fanatic vigilance, 
preached by the physician and found reflexive in the virgin, 
looks out to put the law inside – yet still too readily is she 
dirtied from without. Her headless corpse, its heart once warm 
now tepid and disabled, is the fate of this unyielding celibate, 
whose passion to preserve was the match of any to defile, but 
alas the pull of death’s the same for martyr as for rogue. If the 
sinful must always find their due — disembowelled, their 
blackened insides out — then the sinless, to remain it seems, 
must find their equal spilled in white. 
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§ (VALASEK) EVEN WELL-INTENTIONED SCHEMERS  
 
must squirrel sickness in the dark: his gift for rhetoric and 
murky stratagems finds sport in others, in the very 
claustrophobia of desire. Manipulative and seeking wings, he’ll 
orchestrate the union, or else, like Cupid clipped, forever feel 
the weight of not. Our intrigant though detached is not 
omniscient, so cannot see the latent doom his instrument must 
face, nor the instrument that he too has become. His 
ignominious defeat is floodlit, and the limits of his ingenuity 
shown built from incalculable human matter. And so with all 
attendant eyes impaired with light, nobody sees the puppet 
nurse its contaminated heart, left to beat now until its end in a 
thousand or more dimmed pieces. 
 
§ (WESTON) WHEN YOU MAKE YOUR GOD FROM FEAR,  
 
from all the paths you cannot choose between alone, you make 
your praying mouth a trauma and its every dribbled word a 
tomb. God’s adherents see their love reflected just as clearly in 
the gleaming knife, as it passes through a throat, as in the still 
fresh waters gifted benignly from the sky. In zombiism as in 
zealotry, there’s no response to send us quailing on the earth. 
For the songs we sing in innocence will echo regardless of the 
substance of the walls, and the evil bodies, pissing doubt and 
excrement, will once dismembered make a veil.  
 
§ (WHITE) THE SKELETON, ITS BONES TIED UP IN RHYME,  
 
is yanked in ceremony from the meat it braced to become 
instead a frame. The architect of this once romantic structure 
is hushed and ridiculed inside the work and out, and like his 
doggerel obscured by shit you could not buy. And the 
desecrated tissues left behind prolong themselves through 
melting, hiding in the shade of those custodians that rape. But 
still within this black beyond there is gravity to witness: a 
malformed colossus skewered with a lance, each of its three 
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heads remade in agony, with screams that echoed out and on 







a  Dark Whiteness 





On the northern edge of the Boston Commons, at the 
intersection of its Freedom Trail and its Black Heritage Trail, 
stands a life-sized relief commemorating Colonel Robert 
Gould Shaw. While tour buses pause at the adjacent red light, 
microphoned guides repeat what walkers can read from the 
posted information: the white Colonel Shaw led the all-
African-American Massachusetts 54th Regiment, the first of its 
kind, into the Civil War. Among the hundreds of thousands of 
men who served and died in the American Civil War, Shaw is 
singled out, not because he fought and not because he died, 
but because he granted military legitimacy to the brigade of 
African-American troops who were otherwise not allowed to 
fight in their own cause. Augustus Saint-Gauden’s monu-
mental bronze centers Colonel Shaw on horseback, with his 
regiment members preceding and following. Although these 
men walking with the hero were cast with facial features 
identifying them as African-American, their skin color is 
indistinguishable from the military leader’s because his is 
darkened to the same hue by the bronze. In effect, Saint-
Gaudens’ memorial does what no war and no legislation has 
been able to do: erase the color difference, not by making all 
the men white but by making all the men dark.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 My deepest thanks to Audrey Kerr, Valerie Allen, Erick Kelemen, 
Myra Seaman, and Michael Shea for their thoughtful comments on 
this essay.  
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 I open with this racial-blurring vignette because Benjamin 
Brawley (1882–1939), an African-American scholar, educator, 
and poet who eulogized Shaw in verse, also eulogized Chaucer 
in verse. 2  Like Saint-Gauden’s memorial, Brawley’s poem 
“Chaucer” darkens its hero while praising Chaucer’s 
transformative role in English literary history. The poem 
reminds us that while the category of race is invisible in The 
Canterbury Tales, it has left in Chaucer’s reception a series of 
indelible marks that can be difficult to discern. This essay 
attempts to see through the centuries of assumed whiteness to 
the moment when Brawley darkens Chaucer’s reception. To 
see this transformation, I will first examine the faces both in 
Chaucer’s tales and of his readers, before providing a series of 
three readings of Brawley’s “Chaucer.” In do so, I will show 
how Brawley’s poem goes beyond celebrating Chaucer to 
establish the African-American versifier as a legitimate 
successor to the Middle English poet, thereby staking a claim 
for African-American poets as the source of the next 
innovation in English letters.  
 
§ WHITE CHAUCER 
 
White faces fill Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales. Their ubiquity 
can be easy to ignore because they are not labeled as white. 
Aside from the occasional lady with the fair face — which 
could refer to her skin tone, her beauty, or both — skin color 
is noteworthy in Chaucer’s tales not as a visible, essential 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 In using the terms “race” and “white” and making distinctions 
based on skin color, I am using terms and making distinctions with 
wide currency and credibility when Brawley wrote at the turn of the 
twentieth century. Though those terms and distinctions remain in 
use in popular culture, their credibility in the academy had been 
undermined well before the end of the century. For a succinct 
analysis of the shift, see Karim Murji, “Race,” in New Keywords: A 
Revised Vocabulary of Culture and Society, eds. Tony Bennett, 
Lawrence Grossberg, and Meaghan Morris (Malden: Blackwell, 
2005), 290–296. So while Brawley argued against racial discrimi-
nation, he did not argue against the existence of racial distinctions.  
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bodily quality but as a changeable trait linked to such external 
factors as climate, work, and habit. The ruddy faces of churls 
and imbibers show the results of their labors and their 
leisures. The faces of the distraught turn pale with worry or 
death. And the skins of Perkyn Revelour (“brown and as 
berye” [I.4368]) and the canon’s yeoman (with a “leden hewe” 
[VIII.827–88])3 manifest the visible consequences of meddling 
in the nefarious affairs of London’s back streets. None of the 
exotic Saracens or Asians populating The Man of Law’s Tale 
or The Squire’s Tale are noted for their dark-hued skin. The 
closest a foreign character comes to being dark-skinned is 
Emetreus, “the king of Inde” whose facial “colour was 
sangwyn / A fewe frakenes in his face yspreynd / Bitwixen 
yelow and somdel blak ymeynd” (I.2156, 2168–2170). The one 
reference to a dark-skinned Ethiopian is lodged within a 
simile describing the way the desert heat had transformed St. 
Jerome’s skin while leaving his lechery intact (X.345). And if 
we scratch that simile a bit, we find the Ethiope’s dark skin is 
not an essential attribute, for just below its surface is the 
Biblical notion that overexposure to the southern sun 
produced the sable-skinned Africans. No matter how exotic 
the characters or how foreign their origins, Chaucer’s 
Canterbury Tales show us no naturally dark-skinned man, 
woman, or child. Dark or ruddy skin in Chaucer’s work is a 
consequence of sin, sun, damnation, or putrefying flames; it is 
not a natural condition for the Tales’ characters. Whether 
describing knight or peasant, merchant or pirate, ruler or 
saint, man or woman, Englishman or Saracen, Chaucer seems 
to have assumed his characters were white-skinned until 
tainted by some corrupting influence. So as we imagine his 
kaleidoscope of characters, some exemplary in their perfection 
and most identifiable in their humanity, we must imagine a 
world that begins, by default, unrelentingly but invisibly 
white. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3  All references to Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales works from The 
Riverside Chaucer, gen. ed. Larry Benson, 3rd edn. (Boston: Hough-
ton Mifflin, 1987), by fragment and line number. 
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That essential whiteness would seem to extend to writers 
who have found inspiration in Chaucer’s tales: Gower, 
Hoccleve, Lydgate, Spenser, Shakespeare, Milton, Dryden, 
Wordsworth, Browning, Eliot, and Woolf, a litany of dead 
white males sprinkled with the names of a few white women. 
This reception history records their friendly, even filial, 
affection for the poet credited with creating a space for 
English vernacular verse. Even as they remake Chaucer’s 
works, they comment on the short distance they feel between 
themselves and the medieval poet. In joining the loud chorus 
of readers who find in Chaucer what they are or hope to 
become, they contribute to the Chaucerian whiteness. 
This persistent whiteness of Chaucer’s reconstruction 
permeates the darker moments in his reception history. 
During England’s imperial expansion into territories 
inhabited by darker races, Chaucer was carried along in the 
form of inexpensive duodecimos and middlebrow anthologies 
as a marker of British cultural superiority. Closely identified 
with British hegemony, Chaucer was an integral part of the 
colonists’ attempts to assert Anglo-Saxon excellence and to 
maintain close connections to the British homeland. There is 
no evidence that the colonized held Chaucer in similar esteem 
or affection. Neither his name nor his works were appro-
priated by the non-white, indigenous peoples as a vehicle for 
their own concerns, as, say, Shakespeare has been. And in the 
United States, where colonization was influenced by the 
diasporas of slavery and immigration, Chaucer inspired pens 
more often held in white than in black hands.   
And yet Chaucer’s tales would seem ripe for appropriation 
in ways not pursued by African-American authors. For 
example, the Canterbury Tales, with its collection of tale-
telling travelers from diverse estates and professions, would 
seem to be an attractive source text for transposing those 
social categories into ones more influenced by race and 
ethnicity. Yet, as far as I can tell, no African-American author 
has made such an appropriation. In addition, until the middle 
of the twentieth century, the African-American dialect was 
considered a juvenile form of Modern English, comparable 
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from twentieth-century Americans’ vantage to Chaucer’s 
equally immature Middle English, which John Dryden 
admired as “a rough Diamond” that “must be polish’d e’er he 
shines.”4 As Ellery Sedgwick — the long-time editor of The 
Atlantic Magazine and dean of American high culture — 
relates when he pauses in his memoir to note the 
compositional style of an African-American housekeeper, her 
writing is unshackled by either the niceties of spelling or the 
rules of grammar, “artless and vivid like that of some happy 
pilgrim of Dan Chaucer.” 5 Though Sedgwick records this 
observation after dialect verse had lost any currency, it 
illustrates the primitive affinities the white literati saw 
between Chaucer’s Middle English and African-American 
dialect, making it an attractive source text for appropriation 
into dialect poetry, a wide and easy path to success for 
African-American writers in late nineteenth-century America. 
Despite this linguistic affinity, no one has made use of it. 
Finally, although Chaucer’s bawdy humor and multi-syllabic 
rhymes makes his verse an ancient predecessor to late-
twentieth-century hip-hop, there’s been no darkening of 
Chaucer here, either. Baba Brinkman, the major redactor of 
the Tales into rap, keeps the pilgrims and their tales within an 
all-white world. Perhaps this whiteness darkens momentarily 
with Jay-Z’s “99 Problems”; these 1990s lyrics about African-
American urban culture include the line “If you don’t like my 
lyrics you can press fast forward,” a distant echo of Chaucer’s 
admonition that those readers offended by the Miller’s 
churlish tale should “turn the leef over and chese another tale” 
(I.3177). Except for this tantalizing bit, neither hip-hop nor 
any other predictable places reveal a darkened Chaucer.  
To find an African-American poet appropriating Chau-
cer’s name and verse we must to turn not to the places of 
obvious affinity, but to an area where Chaucer stands as the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 John Dryden, “Preface,” Fables, Ancient and Modern, in The Works 
of John Dryden, vol. 11 (London: William Miller, 1808), 229.  
5 Ellery Sedgwick, The Happy Profession (Boston: Little, Brown and 
Son, 1946), 211–212.  
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father of English verse, an agent of white cultural dominance. 
Here we find Benjamin Brawley’s poem from the turn of the 
twentieth century, a short moment in American letters when 
African-American authors sought to abandon their racial 
blackness, to molt and become white by adopting the values 
and skills prized by the dominant classes. In his scholarly 
works and in his pedagogy, Brawley advocated that African-
American students, intellectuals, and poets should adopt 
mainstream values of thought and speech to demonstrate 
their intelligence, education, and equality to the white learned 
classes.6 He believed the arts would be the place where the 
African-American genius would rise to its greatest distinction, 
but in order to be recognized as such, African-American art 
would have to be made in accordance with the standards 
promoted by the white elite.7 For Brawley, this first meant 
being steeped in the Anglo-Saxon literary heritage. He read 
and admired Britain’s canonical authors — Chaucer, 
Shakespeare, Milton, and Wordsworth — and their respected 
expositors at American universities, such as Kittredge at 
Harvard and Manly at the University of Chicago. For these 
reasons, he disdained the sentimental and supplicatory dialect 
poetry associated with Paul Laurence Dunbar, and he 
criticized the vernacular and raw literature associated with the 
Harlem Renaissance. 8  These values shape the sonnet he 
published in 1908 entitled “Chaucer”: 
 
Gone are the sensuous stars, and manifold, 
Clear sunbeams burst upon the front of night; 
Ten thousand swords of azure and of gold 
Give darkness to the dark and welcome light; 
Across the night of ages strike the gleams, 
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6 Allen Flint, “Black Response to Colonel Shaw,” Phylon 45.3 (1984): 
210–219.  
7 Benjamin Brawley, “The Negro Genius,” The Southern Workman 44 
(1915): 307–308.  
8 John W. Parker, “Benjamin Brawley and the American Cultural 
Tradition,” Phylon 16.2 (1955): 183–194. 
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And leading on the gilded host appears 
An old man writing in a book of dreams, 
And telling tales of lovers for the years; 
Still Troilus hears a voice that whispers, Stay; 
In Nature’s garden what a mad rout sings! 
Let’s hear these motley pilgrims wile [sic] away 
The tedious hours with stories of old things; 
Or might some shining eagle claim 
These lowly numbers for the House of Fame!9 
 
For over a century, the poem has been dismissed because its 
glorification of Chaucer seems too complicit in the continued 
whiteness of the English literary canon.  
It’s easy to see why readers have long assumed the poem is 
at best a race-neutral work praising the genius of Chaucer, 
and at worst a capitulation to white hegemony, the oppressive 
master.10 To see how it contributed to this reputation, one 
does not have to look very deep. To begin, “Chaucer” joins the 
hoards of conventional, turn-of-the-century verse praising 
this or that hero or noteworthy event. By writing in this 
commonplace genre, Brawley signals his efforts to join the 
literary mainstream. Additionally, the poem situates its praise 
by associating Chaucer with the bright light of daybreak, 
which has invaded the nighttime with “[t]en thousand swords 
of azure and of gold.” This association is further refined in the 
second quatrain, where the conflict between light and dark is 
redefined as the conquest of the benighted past’s darkness by a 
“gilded host” led by an “old man writing.” This enlightened 
author is identified as Chaucer by allusions to his corpus: his 
early dream poetry, Troilus and Criseyde, and the Canterbury 
Tales. Chaucer, according to these lines, is the author 
responsible for driving away the darkness and bringing the 
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9 Benjamin Brawley, “Chaucer,” in James Weldon Johnson, ed., The 
Book of American Negro Poetry, rev. edn. (New York: Harcourt, 
Brace, 1958), 151; hereafter referred to by line numbers. 
10 John W. Parker, “Toward an Appraisal of Benjamin Brawley’s 
Poetry,” CLA Journal 6 (1962): 55–56. 
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light of a new literary age. In this accepted reading, “Chaucer” 
is an over-the-top praise of the Father of English letters, and it 
is easy to assume that Brawley is holding up Chaucer as his 
literary hero to be emulated but never matched, a form of 
white love.  
 
§ BLACK CHAUCER 
However, not far beneath this laudatory reading of the poem 
lies a second, one which begins to darken Chaucer’s reception 
in two ways: it incorporates Brawley’s lyric speaker into 
Chaucer’s Canterbury-pilgrim audience, and it transforms 
Brawley into Chaucer’s apprentice, an African-American poet 
able to adopt the master’s techniques. We are alerted to this 
darkened reception by Brawley’s shift in syntax towards the 
end of his allusions to Chaucer’s verse. This shift, marked by 
“Let’s” (11), moves the speaker and his audience into The 
Canterbury Tales’ embedded audience, the storytelling 
“motley pilgrims” (11), thereby expanding Chaucer’s social 
categories to include one structured around darkness and 
whiteness. Moreover, in joining his contemporaneous 
audience with the Tale’s medieval pilgrims, Brawley, by 
extension, affiliates his lyrical voice with that of the master 
storyteller, Chaucer, whose whiteness brings prestige and 
literary opportunities to his dark-skinned disciple. The young 
poet’s confident gesture is magnified by what appears to signal 
his humility: identifying his verse as “lowly numbers” (14). In 
the context of Chaucer’s oeuvre, however, Brawley isn’t 
overcome by modesty. Instead, he is making a Chaucerian 
move, akin to bidding his “litel book” to “kis the steppes” of 
“Virgile, Ovide, Omer, Lucan, and Stace” (Troilus and 
Criseyde V.1789–92) and joining the company of canonical 
authors. He demonstrates his worth by publishing the poem 
(with its meticulous use of the sonnet form and standard 
English diction) in a solidly white forum, The Harvard 
Monthly. In this second reading, Brawley has taken the first 
step toward darkening Chaucer’s reception by embedding 
himself in the poem as both auditor and apprentice. 
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In echoing Chaucer’s gestures toward establishing his 
work as a literary classic, Brawley makes his own claim about 
setting a new form of English vernacular poetry alongside the 
traditional canon. To understand what that new form of 
English vernacular verse would look like, we need to return to 
Brawley’s broader ambitions. Throughout his career, Brawley 
sought to demonstrate how black artists could absorb white 
culture and then surpass it by mining the rich and complex 
African-American experience. We can see these broader 
ambitions in his long-term scholarship recovering African-
American history and letters from obscurity. Beginning with 
The Negro in Literature and Art (1910), and continuing with A 
Short History of the American Negro (1919) and A Social 
History of the American Negro (1921), Brawley sought to write 
the story of African-Americans and preserve their literature. 
He understood that whoever controlled the literary texts, no 
matter how well they measured up to canonical standards, 
controlled how they were remembered — or if they were 
remembered at all. Rather than allow the standard Anglo-
centric historical and literary narratives to erase African 
people’s presence in America, he seized control of the story 
and urged African-American poets to add their voices to the 
register of literary greatness. With this in mind, we can begin 
to understand how “Chaucer” goes beyond praising or 
emulating Chaucer’s literary values and, in a third level of 
reading, gives those values a dark face. In this way, the poem 
reveals that Brawley’s ambitions — for himself and for 
African-American poets — were much grander than his 
readers generally suppose: the African-American poet is the 
next logical step in the evolution of English verse inaugurated 
by Chaucer.  
In this third reading, images of darkness and light work 
together to demonstrate that the white verse of Chaucer and 
his descendants will be improved by the African-American 
verse inaugurated by Brawley and a new generation of 
African-American authors. As the first two readings note, 
Chaucer’s emergence is represented by daybreak, an image 
invoking the classical tradition of the Apollonian sun as the 
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source of poetic inspiration. The image of light displacing the 
darkness, however, is less stable than it first appears because 
the initial source of light — “sensuous stars” — can be read as 
representing light or, because stars are a synecdoche of 
nighttime, as darkness. Although this image teeters between 
light and darkness, the reader is not given an opportunity to 
consider the choice because the stars are “gone” before they 
are introduced, and soon thereafter “clear sunbeams” of light 
conquer the dim lights of the night with “ten thousand swords 
of azure and gold.” The sun’s light — which both inspires 
poets and darkens skins — dominates.  
The conspicuously indeterminate fourth line — “Give 
darkness to the dark and welcome light” — suggests, however, 
that the light should not be equated with a white, Eurocentric 
culture. Here, “dark” and “welcome” are syntactically 
ambiguous, while “darkness” remains a stable noun, no 
matter how we construe “dark” and “welcome.” What changes 
is the metaphorical tenor of “darkness,” which does depend 
on how we understand “dark” and “welcome. “ On the one 
hand, “welcome” can be a verb parallel to “give,” thereby 
making “dark” a noun. Read this way, the sunrise’s golden 
swords welcome the light, and “darkness” becomes a 
metaphor for erasure, making the sunrise eliminate the dark 
of night. On the other hand, “welcome” can be an adjective 
parallel to “dark,” and the welcome light is also a dark light.11 
In this case, darkness doesn’t erase or eliminate the light; 
rather, it intensifies a quality the “dark and welcome” light 
already has. In this reading, the exotic swords cast their 
darkness upon the light, not remaking it into their image but 
bringing out the qualities of the dark and exotic inherent in 
the light. Reading “welcome” as an adjective gives the first 
quatrain’s imagery a kind of paradoxical circularity: stars, 
nighttime’s lanterns, are dispelled by the brighter light of the 
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11 For a different reading of this line, see Jay Ruud, “Declaiming 
Chaucer to a Field of Cows: Three Twentieth-Century Glimpses of 
the Poet,” Proceedings of the Tenth Annual Northern Plains 
Conference on Earlier British Literature (2002): 9 [8–21].  
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sunrise’s exotic beams, which in turn transform daylight by 
intensifying its inherent darkness. Thus, when we reach the 
closing couplet, which asks us to see a syntactical parallel 
between “some . . . eagle claim” (13) and the earlier “Let’s 
hear” (11), the lyric voice and his audience can choose either 
to listen to Chaucer the master poet or to witness these new 
poetic lines, lines that dare to darken the white literary 
tradition, set on the altar at the House of Fame (14).   
Thus, while paying homage to the father of English verse 
and making claims to his part in the English literary tradition, 
“Chaucer” also repeatedly asserts that the dark will transform 
the white light. Brawley achieves this not by transforming 
Chaucer’s characters or imagining dark-skinned readers. 
Instead, he darkens the light that represents the innovation 
introduced by Chaucer. This is a subtle gesture that, at first 
reading, deflects attention away from the appropriator. But as 
my readings show, those rays coming from the dark and 
exotic margins are the source of the innovation. This 
innovation is a process that can be appropriated by anyone 
who approaches the light from the darkened margins. It is 
infinitely repeatable. Therefore, “Chaucer” is not hero 
worship — or white love — but the realization that one aspect 
of Chaucer’s art is within reach. And it doesn’t matter that 
Brawley provided no new tradition himself; what matters is 
that he imagined that the tradition — and its innovation — 







b  Saturn’s Darkness 
 




If we’re thinking of a dark Chaucer, Saturn’s speech in the 
Knight’s Tale comes quickly to mind (I.2453–2478).1 Although 
pop culture misguidedly loves The Canterbury Tales best for 
its fart jokes, the appearance of the old, pale god in the first of 
the pilgrim stories shows that Chaucer can get very dark 
indeed. Saturn’s darkness, this essay will argue, should remind 
scholars of Chaucer to be attentive to our own ineradicable 
darknesses. We should see our moments of collapse and chaos 
not just as unfortunate circumstances to be acknowledged 
(though that is needed desperately) but also as “ways in” to 
the most vital and distinctive aspects of our discipline.2  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 All references to Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales are to The Riverside 
Chaucer, gen. ed. Larry Benson, 3rd. edn. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 
1987), by fragment and line number. 
2  Many thanks to Eileen Joy and Nicola Masciandaro for early 
suggestions about the direction of this essay, to Susan Nakley for 
crucial bibliographic suggestions and for thoughts on a very early 
draft, and to Myra Seaman for invaluable editorial input. Deep and 
heartfelt thanks go to the eight contributors who were courageous 
enough to let their words become part of this essay. A core 
inspiration for this piece is the discussion in Aranye Fradenburg’s 
Sacrifice Your Love: Psychanalysis, Historicism, Chaucer (Minnea-
polis: Minnesota University Press, 2002), especially 1–78, 239–252. I 
write in solidarity with Margaret Price’s essay “It Shouldn’t Be So 
Hard,” Inside Higher Ed, February 7, 2011: http://www.inside 
highered.com/advice/2011/02/07/margaret_price_on_the_search
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I want this piece to explore our shared experience in the 
profession, so, in writing it, I sought the contributions of 
scholars of medieval literature who have dealt in one way or 
another with anxiety and depression (clinically diagnosed or 
otherwise), those unwelcome interventions of Saturn. Eight 
anonymous contributors sent in lengthy discussions of their 
experiences, and shared thoughts on the ways that the Saturn 
of the Knight’s Tale might help us think about feelings that are 
very often unwelcome or unacknowledged in academia. The 
contributors’ responses have shaped this essay and its 
readings of The Knight’s Tale, though the larger conclusions 
remain my own. Although the limited scope and methods of 
this study mean that it cannot make sociological claims or 
pretend to statistical significance, I hope that readers will keep 
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_process_for_those_with_mental_disabilities. Out of the immense 
amount of Knight’s Tale criticism, I draw on the following for this 
essay: David Aers, Chaucer, Langland, and the Creative Imagination 
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980), 174–195; Peter Brown 
and Andrew Butcher, The Age of Saturn: Literature and History in 
the Canterbury Tales (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), 1–19, 205–250; Alan 
T. Gaylord, “The Role of Saturn in the ‘Knight’s Tale,’” The Chaucer 
Review 8.3 (1974): 171–190; Robert W. Hanning, “‘The Struggle 
Between Noble Designs and Chaos’: The Literary Tradition of 
Chaucer’s Knight’s Tale,” Literary Review 23.4 (1980): 519–541; V. A. 
Kolve, Chaucer and the Imagery of Narrative (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1984), 85–157; H. Marshall Leicester, Jr., The 
Disenchanted Self: Representing the Subject in the Canterbury Tales 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 295–321; A.J. 
Minnis, Chaucer and Pagan Antiquity (Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 
1982), 108–143; Lee Patterson, Chaucer and the Subject of History 
(Madison: Wisconsin UP, 1991), 165–230; Gillian Rudd, Greenery: 
Ecocritical Readings of Late Medieval English Literature (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2007), 48–67; David Wallace, 
Chaucerian Polity: Absolutist Lineages and Associational Forms in 
England and Italy (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 104–
124. For Saturn lore, I rely on Raymond Klinbansky, Erwin Panofsky, 
and Fritz Saxl, Saturn and Melancholy: Studies in the History of 
Natural Philosophy, Religion, and Art (New York: Basic Books, 1964). 
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in mind that the thoughts shared here could very likely be 
those of their teachers, colleagues, students, and friends. 
Now let’s think more about that dark speech, in which we 
learn that a disastrous god is in control of the Knight’s Tale. A 
Lovecraftian figure of cosmic misfortune who lurks at the 
outskirts of the universe, Saturn uses his speech to proclaim 
his mastery of violent death, disorder, disease, and collapse 
(I.2453–2478). He rules over literal darkness (the prison in the 
“derke cote”) and over the symbolic darkness of secrecy and 
betrayal, the “derke tresons” he claims as his own. 3  The 
chilling images of Saturn’s speech also evoke a “darker” view 
of life, a world filled only with meaningless suffering and 
sudden political unrest, presided over by the uncaring forces 
that topple buildings and engender the Black Death’s 
apocalyptic destruction. Saturn’s role in the tale’s plot, and his 
speech, are entirely original additions not found in the 
Knight’s Tale’s Boccaccian source; Saturn demands our 
attention because he is a quintessentially Chaucerian inven-
tion.4  
Duke Theseus struggles against this formidable darkness. 
After Saturn engineers Arcite’s death, Theseus responds with 
lavish ceremony, political stagecraft, and public speaking in 
an effort to mitigate the sorrow of the young man’s death and 
offer an image of order to contrast with Saturn’s uncaring 
chaos. 5  Astrological lore holds that Saturn’s malignant 
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3 The words I use here appear frequently in scholarship on The 
Knight’s Tale. The word “darkness” is ubiquitous. For example, 
Gaylord, 171; Kolve, 123; Leicester, 367; Patterson, 207. “Malevolent” 
is also frequently applied to Saturn (for example, Gaylord, 175; 
Minnis, 139; Patterson, 203). Another common Saturnine word is 
“chaos.”  
4 See Aers, 179–180; Butcher and Brown, 213–224; Gaylord, 176; 
Hanning, 533–534; Kolve, 125–126; and Leicester, 318–319.  
5 As Patterson notes, Charles Muscatine established a tradition of 
seeing “order and disorder as the central theme of the tale,” which 
continues with variation in much of the criticism (165); see also 
Kolve, 125. Patterson claims that both Theseus and the knight seek 
closure in a way that exposes their failure to find it (200–230). 
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influence can be counteracted by the power of Jupiter, the 
deity whom Theseus imitates; fittingly, Theseus tries to light 
up the darkness Saturn creates in the tale.6 But Theseus’s light 
is costly, restrictive, forced. In preparing the funeral ceremony 
for Arcite, Theseus lays waste to the natural world.7 In his last 
attempt at correction and consolation, the “Firste Moevere” 
speech, the Duke fails as well. The lengthy oration presents 
little more than a compelled faith in a Jovian order from 
which Theseus himself benefits, a glorification of chivalric 
fame that the tale’s own narrative leads us to distrust, and a 
concluding disavowal of the world as a “foule prison” whose 
end result is a world view scarcely brighter than Saturn’s but 
much more constricting in its vision of drearily repetitive 
succession (I.3060).8  
 The distinction the tale makes between Theseus and 
Saturn, I propose, gives us a way of reading our own work 
together as scholars. Too often, I would argue, despite our 
best intentions, we are Thesian in our approach to our 
profession; we create a show of well-tailored display at great 
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Theseus’s “personal control over all aspects of statecraft” is noted by 
Wallace (117). Fradenburg notes the tale’s contrast between Theseus 
and Saturn, observing that one source of “puzzlement” in the tale is 
“the perplexing relation between Saturn’s arrangements and 
Theseus’s final speech” (Sacrifice Your Love, 166).  
6 Gaylord, 183. 
7 An observation made by Rudd, who treats Theseus’s destruction of 
the grove at length (58–63). See also Kolve, 131. 
8 This negative view of Theseus is fundamentally inspired by Wallace 
(104–124), and draws heavily from Butcher and Brown, especially 
their claims that Theseus’s argument is based on “faith” in Jupiter’s 
“repressive” rule, and that it is Theseus’s enterprises that have most 
clearly caused “the ruination of existence” (235–236). “Better the 
vaunted injustices of Saturn,” Butcher and Brown write, “who does 
encourage dissension and revolt” (236). Aers also provides a crucial 
anti-Thesian reading. Theseus’s concluding speech is critiqued (for 
its failure, its ironic effect, or its lack of coherence) by Aers (188–
194), Leicester (364–365), and Patterson (203–205). Kolve claims 
that the speech “ends in a metaphor of despair” and “shows reason 
confounded, not triumphant” (148).  
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cost, and we suppress the very Saturnine darknesses of our 
lives, either in order to boast about our self-sufficient 
scholarly virtues or to promote a “business as usual” 
acceptance of the “foule prison” of structural injustices in our 
profession and our institutions.  
What would it mean to accept Saturn’s invitation? To truly 
do so, we would need not only to fully acknowledge the 
presence of Saturn’s darkness, but also to think about its 
possibilities. A plea for the Saturnine could address many 
forms of darkness in our scholarly lives, but here I’d like to 
consider the anxieties and depressions, both diagnosed and 
not, that can fall upon us. One contributor writes about the 
intense isolation and alienation that can accompany 
emotional distress in our profession: 
 
The continuing culture of silence is really quite 
shocking, when you think about it. I felt very ashamed 
during my graduate school bouts of quite serious 
depression, and only now do I realize I did not need to 
be. I was not alone in my experience, but I certainly felt 
alone — I felt like a freak and a failure. . . . I still feel 
that I can only really talk about my feelings of 
insecurity and inadequacy — the well-springs of my 
depression, when I have it — with my closest friends in 
the profession, and no one else; everyone expects one 
to be at the top of your game all the time (or so it feels) 
. . . . 
 
Theseus builds no oratory to Saturn, shows no awareness of 
the old god’s power in his speech about the cosmic status quo. 
In our Thesian moments, we suppress our own freakishness 
and failure, we ignore or subtly pillory that of others, in order 
to appear at the top of our game.  
 What could be a more top-of-the-game enterprise than the 
curriculum vitae? The “course of life” that assembles our 
thoughts and travels into a coherent story also conveniently 
omits all hesitations, indecisions, and hardships. There are 
circumscribed and accepted ways of venting about workload, 
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but if we mention undergoing a period of truly severe distress 
we risk being “unprofessional.” 9  So “unprofessional” are 
moments of extreme emotional distress that we often take 
them to be signs that we should leave the field entirely. Several 
contributors to this essay associate the onset of depression 
and anxiety with a strong sense of being unfit for our 
profession: 
 
My first thought was to drop out. I had never 
disappointed myself so thoroughly before, and had 
decided that I was just not cut out for academia.  
 
I seriously thought of giving up entirely on academia at 
that point. I entered into a period of depression that 
has persisted in some small form to the present day, 
often with periods of greater intensity. 
 
The Middle Ages were too hard, I wasn’t smart 
enough, I could never do it, I was full of despair, I 
stopped eating, I lost 20 pounds in two months, I 
couldn’t sleep . . . . 
 
At the mention of exile, sleeplessness, and anxiety, we might 
initially think of turning away from Saturn’s cosmic darkness 
to claim kinship with the lovesick Palamon and Arcite. When 
exiled, Arcite, after all, cannot eat or sleep, and grows thin and 
pale (I.1373–1375, I.1358–1368). As one contributor writes, 
“The feelings of abandonment, estrangement, and pessimism 
that run through [the Knight’s Tale] all resonate with the 
experience of depression.” Our experiences are certainly as 
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9 Margaret Price makes a similar point about personality traits in the 
academy: “A certain amount of acceptable weirdness (usually called 
‘quirkiness’) does prevail within each discipline or field, of course, 
but overall, if someone can’t hold an engaging conversation over 
dinner, she is far less likely to succeed as an academic” (“It Shouldn’t 
Be So Hard”).  
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intense and harrowing as those of the characters we discuss 
dispassionately in class. We lose it entirely: 
 
I have become insomniac (which doesn’t help with the 
depression) because my brain cannot stop. I cannot 
stop thinking about the next day’s classes, the papers to 
mark, the students’ problems or needs, their mental 
health or readiness, the administrative things coming 
up, or family things (I’m the breadwinner for my 
husband and two children). 
 
I was to give a talk at a division-sponsored panel at 
MLA; I had interviews lined up at prestigious schools. 
And then I found that I couldn’t breathe. I started 
sobbing nonstop. I couldn’t sleep, then I couldn’t eat, 
then I couldn’t leave my apartment, then I couldn’t 
even stand up.  
 
But while the symptoms may resemble each other, our 
darknesses are different. A contributor points out a crucial 
distinction between our experiences and the lovesickness of 
the knights in the tale: 
  
Lovesickness has all the right symptoms (lack of ability 
to eat, sleep, socialize, etc.) but it also has both an 
identifiable origin and a social/narrative function. 
Lovesickness stalls Arcite and Palamon for a bit, but it 
also gives them a path to pursue. I’m not entirely sure I 
would say the same of depression. I don’t know that 
depression makes “sense” — either logical or 
perceptual. . . . The condition is stubbornly resistant to 
narrative closure and even to analysis. 
 
If only we were Palamon and Arcite, instead of ourselves. The 
knights weep heroically; their suffering pushes the narrative 
forward. If we look for a professional analogy, the knights’ 
early sufferings represent not true Saturnine darkness but 
rather the socially acceptable and glamorized stereotypes of 
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mental distress associated with the intellectual life: the lonely 
and isolated scholar, the broody dreamer, the melancholy 
genius.10 Adopting one of these theatrical personas is not an 
acceptance of the Saturnine, just a sneakier path into well-
polished Thesianism. The real cold, dark, thinking falls on us 
like the tower onto the “mynour” tunneling under it; it is 
more like Arcite’s death pangs, not his operatic love-suffering; 
it has no glamor and it has no apparent use: 
 
Despair is a smaller emotion: it doesn’t burst out and 
ruin a civilization. It destroys by nibbling, or it falls on 
you like a weight (a big black dog on your shoulders) 
and makes you smaller, too: anxiety, literal 
narrowness, as all your thought and being contracts to 
consideration of one thing, insomnia as your mind 
circles and circles, the thinning as your appetite 
disappears, though you’re weighted down by this thing 
on your shoulders, in your head, in your heart . . . . 
 
Life with him was a mad dance for which the steps 
were always changing. So, when I read Chaucer’s 
description of Saturn I am reminded of the chaotic 
world in which I lived. In the margins of my Riverside 
edition from graduate school, I have marked this 
passage with the words “my chaos.” I recognized not 
only the competing impulses and contraries pulling me 
in two directions, I also recognized the world where 
what seems to be true turns out to be false. 
 
The worst part of Depression is the fact that your 
illness is invisible. Countless times, I have submitted 
myself to bloodwork and other such medical tests, in 
the hope that they can find something real to diagnose 
me with. . . . No, I have Depression . . . that invisible, 
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10 Individual genius and melancholy started to be strongly associated 
with each other in the early modern period, according to Panofsky, 
Klibansky, and Saxl (241–254).  
Bryant & Alia :: Saturn’s Darkness 21 
!
lingering, ultimately untreatable pain that disconnects 
you from your life and turns you into an observer, 
albeit one who is still responsible for the subject’s 
behavior and academic progress. Even on my best 
days, I am standing outside myself, unable to control 
the hours of unproductive staring at the wall, and in 
the rare moments when I am allowed to reenter, it 
becomes painfully clear that I was only allowed back 
inside because observers cannot produce tears. Once 
the crying ends, I am banished again, forced to sit still 
and watch my life go nowhere. 
 
The incomprehensibility and unmanageability of our distress 
matches the elusiveness and unknowability of Chaucer’s 
Saturn. The old god is difficulty personified, a force that 
defines itself and isn’t created by, or subjected to, human 
knowledge. The tale’s presentation makes this clear. Venus 
and Mars, the desire and aggression of the tale, are tangible 
and visible in their oratories, their human-like bodies richly 
detailed (I.1918–2050).11 Of Saturn, we see nothing; he is only 
his own voice, speaking in the darkness.12 Like the disasters he 
presides over, Saturn is beyond human comprehension. 
Saturn embodies the themes that V. A. Kolve identifies in the 
Knight’s Tale: “epistemological and teleological darkness” and 
“human limitation.” 13  Saturn’s distant path through the 
cosmos carries in its wake “moore power than woot any man” 
(I.2455).  
Yet it is in Saturn’s incomprehensibility that we can see a 
glimmer of his promise. Ancient and medieval descriptions of 
Saturn are extremely messy, a flux of different traditions, but 
one consistent point is that Saturn is depicted as wise as well 
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11 On Venus and Mars as desire and aggression, see Gaylord, 180.  
12 The tale tells us only that Saturn is “pale” and “colde” (I.2443). On 
this point, see Leicester’s observation that the tale gradually leaves 
aside personification (316–317).  
13 Kolve, 123, 86. 
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as harmful. 14 Neoplatonists, in fact, revered Saturn for his 
power to inspire contemplation.15 This Saturnine intellect can 
be seen in Chaucer’s tale — a description of Saturn’s “olde 
experience” and “wysdom” precedes his horrible monologue, 
and the god is paradoxically disastrous and effective. Along 
with an acceptance of Saturnine darkness, we can explore the 
potential of Saturnine epistemology.16  Saturn’s challenging 
and disastrous way of knowing might offer a way of being for 
a restlessly searching future humanities. Better the contem-
plative Saturn as a model for scholarship than the 
commodified Mercury or the power-hungry Jupiter. Medieval 
tradition associates Mercury with clerkly knowledge, but, as 
the Wife of Bath points out, such Mercurial clerks can be self-
content and prudish (III.697–710). Jupiter, also, is associated 
with scholars, and the Jupiter-like Theseus propounds a kind 
of assuring, self-content scholarly theory of a human-directed 
universe in his well-known speech.17 We can hold up Saturn 
as a god of thoughts that aim for a scope beyond the human, 
that aim for recognition of all forces of the universe, and all 
the things we feel, without explanation or apology. Saturn as a 
god of the mystic darkness of contemplation, a patron of 
critical theory, of relentlessly questioning readings. 
We are, after all, people committed to the study of lives, of 
events, of works of art, of matters of uncertainty, not clerks or 
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14 Minnis, 140. For Saturn traditions, I rely on Klibansky, Panofsky, 
and Saxl.  
15 Klibansky, Panofsky, and Saxl, 151–159.  
16 Here I see a possible affinity with Eileen Joy’s mention of “sadness 
and melancholy as forms and signs of deep ecological connections” 
in her weblog post “Beowulf in the Dark, Medieval Madness, and 
Blue: Some Items of Possible Interest,” In the Middle, July 6, 2011: 
http://www.inthemedievalmiddle.com/2011/07/beowulf-in-dark-
medieval-madness-and.html. 
17 Kolve points out Theseus’s link to scholarship (127). Aers notes the 
inadequacy of Theseus’s thinking, pointing out Theseus’s lack of 
philosophical depth and his self-interested use of a simplistically 
treated “metaphysical language” (195). On the “anthropocentric” 
nature of the Knight’s Tale, see Rudd. 
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rulers who expect quick results. Aranye Fradenburg elo-
quently advocates careful consideration of medievalists’ 
emotional investment in our scholarship. She encourages us 
to develop “a working awareness of how [our] own to relation 
to history could help [us] design important new questions that 
could change what counts as knowledge about the Middle 
ages or how such knowledge is made.”18 Could we try to see 
our most unprofessional and Un-Thesian feelings, our distress 
and chaos, as a way in to Chaucer? Not as a glorying in 
suffering, but as a recognition of shared fragility? The parade 
of disasters in Saturn’s speech is, for all its darkness, a spur to 
contemplation of connections between the present and the 
past. It has some of the most closely grouped oblique 
historical references in The Canterbury Tales, and can be 
taught to students as an aggregate of the disasters that 
structure Chaucer’s lifetime: the “pestilence” of the Black 
Death, the “fallyng of the toures and of the walles” in siege 
warfare in the Hundred Years’ War, the “cherles rebellyng” of 
1381, the “derke tresons” of feuding factions, the “stranglynge 
and hangyng by the throte” of Chaucer’s one-time associate 
Thomas Usk, dangling from the gallows.19 The point is not 
that this passage is merely a coded allegory of historical 
events; rather, the lived experience of Chaucer’s time distills 
itself into the dark poetry of this passage and then 
redistributes itself out towards our own time, shaped by our 
own understanding of disaster.20 We know what Saturn does 
to us these days. Gillian Rudd observes that Saturn’s speech 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 Fradenburg, Sacrifice Your Love, 74. 
19 These historical connections are well known, thanks especially to 
the comprehensive and well-known historicist Chaucerian scholar-
ship of the late twentieth century, e.g. by Lee Patterson and David 
Wallace. Paul Strohm’s work, as well as being central to this 
enterprise in general, has been crucial for our understanding the 
Chaucer-Usk connection; see, for example, Paul Strohm, Hochon’s 
Arrow (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 145–160.  
20 Butcher and Brown observe that Saturn’s speech draws both on 
“the general and the particular,” and they match Saturn’s speech to 
various events in Chaucer’s time (224–226).  
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“could almost serve as a description of current ecological 
warnings,” something like the terrible litany mentioned by 
Timothy Morton: “The sky is falling, the globe is warming, the 
ozone hole persists; people are dying of radiation poisoning 
and other toxic agents; species are being wiped out, thousands 
per year; the coral reefs have nearly all gone.”21 Disaster, in its 
combination of human and nonhuman elements, of 
individual subjects and larger networks, is a medium through 
which communication across time can occur. Of course, we 
don’t want to become humorless mourners, and we don’t 
want to take up the musty posturings of the romanticized 
scholar. But could there an honest way of noting our special 
attunement to the unhinging Saturnine chaos of thinking 
across time? These resonances of Saturn with a distinctively 
destabilizing kind of knowledge suggest there are intellectual, 
as well as ethical, reasons for us to be open about the basic 
realities of our very non-Thesian professional lives. 
But the more vague philosophical benefits of Saturnine 
thinking seem ridiculously abstract right now when we cannot 
even be open about the everyday darknesses. In the most 
striking similarity among the testimonials anonymously 
contributed as material for this essay, the contributors (who 
did not know each other’s identities or consult with each 
other) identified a pervasive stigmatization of emotional 
distress in the academy, a stigmatization even of doubt or lack 
of confidence. Many expressed extreme caution about sharing 
their experiences of mental distress at all, and most of them 
observed that the professional academy actively discouraged 
such discussion. “I feel deeply uncomfortable,” one 
contributor writes, “describing these or any related issues in a 
professional context. I have felt that discussing mental health. 
. .would create more problems than it solved.” This 
contributor goes on to say that other students advised that 
“mentioning the problem would create a stigma I would have 
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21 Rudd, 64. Timothy Morton, Ecology Without Nature: Rethinking 
Environmental Aesthetics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 2007), 10. 
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to grapple with throughout my career.” This pattern 
continues in other contributions. None of us feel comfortable: 
 
I would not feel at all comfortable talking to colleagues 
about this . . . . 
 
I feel very ill at ease discussing mental health issues 
with anyone who is not in a similar professional 
position as I am, e.g. graduate student or recent 
graduate student who has finished. I would not discuss 
the issue with any full faculty members, especially if 
they are in any position of influence over me (from my 
department or in terms of professional networking) . . .  
 
I have discussed mental health issues with my teachers 
and mentors, but only when it is relevant to my 
academic progress, and always with disheartening 
results. 
 
And why? Because somehow admitting to distress would 
lessen our reputation:  
 
[I]n a profession where our judgement is not only 
always necessary but always being challenged . . . it 
would be hard to admit to one’s flawed vision; one 
cannot risk being thought untrustworthy, can one? 
 
I’ve tried every possible explanation that I can come up 
with, and yet, I still get the sense that my teachers 
believe that I am just lazy, or making excuses, or 
whatnot. 
 
And how ridiculous, given what we study: 
 
I feel there is an awful lot of unexamined and 
unrecognized privilege that exists amongst far too 
many employed academics, whether tenured or on 
their way to becoming tenured, or even those who 
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aren't there yet, but have been continuously employed. 
. . . So many modern medievalists are fond of looking 
at queer theory, monster theory, notions of abjection, 
and so forth from a distanced, ironic, and intellectual 
standpoint, while ignoring the queer, the monster, and 
the abject sitting in the front row taking notes on their 
papers. 
 
As Margaret Price puts it, “It shouldn’t be so hard.” Price, 
writing for the web periodical Inside Higher Ed, argues that 
academia retains a (Thesian) view of professionalism 
narrowly defined as a mastery of congeniality in social 
situations. Price observes that this focus on professionalism is 
particularly difficult for academics with diagnosed mental 
disabilities, but is demoralizing and destructive for everyone 
in the profession. Price asks us to re-think what we consider 
professional, to create an academy in which all of us are more 
open about our distresses, anxieties, and insecurities. We 
must, Price concludes, “questio[n] the very foundations of 
academe, our relentless use of social spaces to test scholarly 
merit, our continued valorization of what Quintilian called 
‘the good man speaking well.’”22  
The goal should be a re-evaluation of professionalism, not 
a disregard for it altogether; certainly our shared enterprise 
requires dependability, loyalty, generosity, hard work; those 
who employ us, take our classes, and read our work deserve 
our full engagement. But if we are to commit ourselves truly 
to the study of the past, to the study of the humanities, what 
can we really gain from the Thesian good man speaking well? 
Is the buttoned-down, impersonal professionalism suited to 
profit-driven business enterprises a good fit for our wider, 
stranger enterprise of shared inquiry? Our very strength, our 
very expertise, comes from darkness, indeterminacy, unmark-
etably disastrous historical realities, hanging, drowning, 
plague, ruin. Strange dark Saturnine knowledge, and all the 
unsightly darkness that goes with it. Let’s see with our flawed 
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22 Price, “It Shouldn’t Be So Hard.” 
Bryant & Alia :: Saturn’s Darkness 27 
!
vision, be happy with less than enough, and work darkly and 
beautifully at the bottom of our game. 
Because darkness is not always what it seems. For all the 
darkness in The Knight’s Tale, when the grove is destroyed for 
Arcite’s funeral it is the light that is horrible. When the trees 
have been cut down, the ground itself, “nat wont to seen the 
sonne bright,” becomes “agast . . . of the light” (I.2931–
2932). 23  In another example of dark counter-thinking, 
movingly discussed by David Aers, Arcite achieves his greatest 
triumph when, broken in body, dying, beyond all hope of 
chivalric victory or display, he speaks to Emelye and Palamon 
and “affirms incarnate human love and friendship even as he 
fully experiences and acknowledges the miserable precarious-
ness of human life” (I.2743–2797).24 If our halls and offices, 
our conferences and classrooms, are not a place for honestly 
and lovingly being together in all of our own darknesses, then 
there is no hope left in this world for the unpredictable, 
transformative, and contemplative gifts of Saturn. 
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23 Kolve, 131.  











I want to write about Alcyone’s dream because it’s fascinated 
me for so long, but the pages of my Riverside Chaucer won’t 
stay open at The Book of the Duchess, so I bend back the spine 
and put my left palm down firmly on the gutter, but it’s as if the 
book is resisting my desire to read, which annoys me because 
I’m excited to work out why I find her dream so dark. I know 
that the trigger will be certain enigmatic words that tease me or 
some other text that swims into my head as I’m reading. I don’t 
know exactly what that will be, though I remember that the 
word “derk” is there in the poem somewhere. Now I’m 
skimming the opening lines, trying to take it in slowly, how the 
dark dream is introduced, but my eye is racing ahead, 
anticipating “derk,” and although I want this experience to be 
frictionless, I’m stopping and starting, trying to find a rhythm 
for my reading, seizing at words and images and dropping them 
or busily storing them for future recall, and then there it is! 
Morpheus’s cave is “derk as helle-pit.” I slow down. Here’s the 
dream. It’s as odd as I remember it. 
§ A DARK STAIN 
My dark Chaucerian moment is the botched encounter 
between King Seys and his wife Alcyone in The Book of the 
Duchess, an encounter that takes place in a dream. I think of 
this moment as a small anamorphic image, whose distorted 
shape hovers like a dark stain at the edge of the poem. If I shift 
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position, or turn my book at an angle, the stain becomes 
magically legible.  
 
Hans Holbein the Younger, The Ambassadors, 1533 (National 
Gallery, London) 
Hans Holbein’s painting The Ambassadors is the classic 
instance of this play with perspectival vision that so entranced 
European artists in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In 
the foreground of the portrait floats a strange, elongated 
image that resolves itself into a perfectly-drawn skull when the 
viewer stands at a certain angle to the picture. Death looms 
over the portrait’s luminous display of worldly power and 
possessions. In geometral terms, two incompatible spatial 
orders — rectilinear and curvilinear — inhabit the flat surface 
of the painting. I can switch between the two spaces at will, 
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making one image rise up as the other falls away, and vice 
versa. 
But something more than an optical illusion is at stake in 
the anamorphic game. When the distorted image — the skull 
— appears whole, the rest of the picture looks fuzzy. The 
viewer is forced to recognize that the portrait is an illusion: 
not a world but a set of signifiers. This detaching of the gaze is 
like the effect of castration. Anamorphosis disturbs my 
relation to the object, to what is represented, by projecting 
another reality hidden behind illusionistic space.1 As Parveen 
Adams puts it, “A gap opens up between the register of the 
object and the register of the Real.”2 The Real is ab-sense, the 
impossibility of sense, but it is also sex, which Lacan 
designates “lack-of-sex-sense.”3 Sex is senseless, not in the 
sense that it is meaningless but in the sense that sex is not a 
relation but the impossibility of a relation. The Book of the 
Duchess ostensibly consoles Chaucer’s patron John of Gaunt 
for the loss of his beloved wife Blanche, whose death was the 
occasion for the poem. I suggest that Alcyone’s dream 
performs the anamorphic trick of showing another reality 
behind the space of the poem: the failure of the sexual 
relationship. (No one said this would be cheerful.) 
Lacan’s metaphors for perspectival distortion allude 
precisely to sexual difference. The warped fantasm in 
Holbein’s picture takes “a rising and descending form”;4 the 
moment when it assumes its rightful dimensions, its 
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1 Jacques Lacan, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis: The Seminar of Jacques 
Lacan, Book VII, 1959-1960, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Dennis 
Porter (New York: W.W. Norton, 1992), 141; Parveen Adams, The 
Emptiness of the Image: Psychoanalysis and Sexual Differences 
(London: Routledge, 1996), 112–115, 128. For a study of 
anamorphosis in premodern literature, see Jen E. Boyle, Anamor-
phosis in Early Modern Literature: Mediation and Affect (Farnham: 
Ashgate, 2010). 
2 Adams, Emptiness of the Image, 128. 
3 Jacques Lacan, “L’Etourdit: A Bilingual Presentation of the First 
Turn,” trans. Cormac Gallagher, The Letter 41 (2009): 38 [31–80]. 
4 Lacan, Ethics of Psychoanalysis, 142. 
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“developed form,” is like “the effect of an erection”; we 
glimpse, Lacan says, “something symbolic of the function of 
the lack, of the appearance of the phallic ghost.”5 The phallic 
metaphors are tiresome because women also have a relation to 
lack, to castration. 6 But the woman relates to the phallus 
differently from the man. The man submits to castration, 
taking as his object of desire objet a — not the woman but 
something in her that is more than is in her — and giving up 
(Renata Salecl’s words) “the hope of finding in his partner his 
own lack,” thus making himself vulnerable to the perception 
that he is unable to take up his symbolic role: am I a man? can 
I get it up?7 The woman, however, struggles with knowing that 
“she does not possess the object that a man sees in her.”8 This 
difference, as Salecl argues, relates to the different ways in 
which the sexual relationship fails for masculine and feminine 
subjects. Alcyone’s dream, I want to argue, concerns not so 
much her loss of Seys as her tragic experience of the misfiring 
of the sexual relationship, namely her anxiety about being 
taken as objet a: what does Seys love in me? The register of the 
Real that Alcyone’s dream opens up behind the illusionistic 
space of the poem invites us to think about disparity in love 
from the side of the woman. Let us allow this dark stain in the 
text to assume its proper dimensions. 
 
§ WIFE, CAN’T YOU SEE I’M DROWNING? 
 
Numbed almost to the point of death by a melancholy that has 
no specified source (love-sickness?) and by lack of sleep, the 
narrator of The Book of the Duchess decides to while away the 
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5 Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis, 
ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Alan Sheridan (London: Penguin, 
1977), 86–87. 
6 Adams, Emptiness of the Image, 102, 130. 
7 Renata Salecl, “Love Anxieties,” in Reading Seminar XX: Lacan’s 
Major Work on Love, Knowledge, and Feminine Sexuality, ed. 
Suzanne Barnard and Bruce Fink (New York: State University of 
New York Press, 2002), 94 [93–97]. 
8 Salecl, “Love Anxieties,” 94. 
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tedium of his nuit blanche by reading a book.9 It works. The 
narrator is enraptured by Ovid’s story of King Ceyx and his 
wife Alcyone: he finds it “a wonder thing” (61), a source of 
enchantment, an ironic echo of the decidedly unenchanted 
state in which he began the poem, one of “gret wonder” (1) at 
still being alive despite his suffering. For Aranye Fradenburg, 
“sleep, dream, enchantment, and memory work all hold out 
the lure of indifference, of a state in which one will not suffer 
from one’s aliveness.” 10  The narrator has shut down his 
feelings to protect himself from too much reality. Ironically, 
this reality — that love misses its mark — is exactly what he 
later tries to get Gaunt’s avatar, Man in Black, to face up to. 
In Chaucer’s version of Ovid’s tale Seys drowns in a storm 
at sea, and when he fails to return home, Alcyone is driven 
crazy . . . by what? By not knowing for certain that he is dead: 
“‘Alas!’ quod she, ‘that I was wrought! / And wher [whether] 
my lord, my love, be deed?’” (90–91). Alcyone’s animated 
anxiety is the opposite of the narrator’s “astoned” [turned to 
stone] indifference, his response (presumably) to the pain of 
unreciprocated love. But it’s not that women go mad and men 
shut down when love goes wrong; rather, each experiences the 
misfiring of the sexual relation differently. 
Alcyone prays to Juno that she may fall asleep and be 
granted “som certeyn sweven” [an authoritative dream], one 
that will assure her of the knowledge she craves: “Whether my 
lord be quyk or ded” (121). Juno grants her prayer, instructing 
her servant to go to Morpheus, the god of sleep, and to bid 
him to impersonate Seys: Morpheus must “crepe” [creep, 
crawl, burrow, enter, steal] (144) into Seys’s dead body, and 
tell “his” wife the truth, straight from the horse’s mouth, so to 
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9 Quotations from The Book of the Duchess are from The Riverside 
Chaucer, gen. ed. Larry D. Benson, 3rd edn. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1987), cited by line number. 
10 L.O. Aranye Fradenburg, “‘My Worldes Blisse’: Courtly Interiority 
in The Book of the Duchess,” in Sacrifice Your Love: Psychoanalysis, 
Historicism, Chaucer (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
2002), 91[79–112]; emphasis mine. 
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speak. Except that the horse is dead. The poem compounds 
irony on irony: the truth is spoken by an impostor; a lively 
body is really dead; the god of sleep does not enable Alcyone 
to go on sleeping but rather wakes her up — and, later, 
inadvertently kills her. Morpheus here isn’t shape-shifting; he 
is literally crawling inside a dead body. It’s a Gothic moment 
avant le fait: Seys’s uncanny double is a reanimated corpse 
that is creepy: to be twitching with pain or discomfort, have 




I’m marking certain words with a highlighter pen, which slows 
me down and takes me out of the feeling of being pulled in to 
the text. Images flash up in my mind’s eye: Morpheus creeping 
into Seys’s drowned body, the slack skin draped over him, is a 
Gustave Doré engraving, morphing into a Vesalius flayed body, 
lifeless yet prancing. Anamorphosis again! The body as phallus: 
limp, then swelling up as Morpheus gets inside. It’s cruelly 




Standing by Alcyone’s bed in the skin of her dead husband, 
Morpheus urges her: “Let be your sorwful lyf” (202). But is he 
asking her to abandon her grief or to put an end to it by 
killing herself? His words might be comforting — or an 
incitement to suicide. He then announces: “For certes, swete, I 
am but ded” (204). Does he mean “I am quite dead,” “I am 
merely dead,” or “I am as good as dead”? In Ovid’s tale, just as 
in Guillaume de Machaut’s version, Alcyone receives the 
certain knowledge she craves: “In this way, the beautiful 
Alcyone clearly saw King Ceyx, and knew without doubt the 
manner of his passing.”12 But Chaucer’s rendering is queasily 
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11  Middle English Dictionary, v. “crepen” (def. 7), http://quod. 
lib.umich.edu/m/med.  
12 Guillaume de Machaut, Fountain of Love, in Geoffrey Chaucer, 
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unresolved. After Morpheus-as-Seys commands Alcyone to 
bury his body and bids her a loving farewell, Alcyone’s 
reaction is bizarrely confused. Casting her eyes upwards, she 
sees “noght” (213). Is she still asleep at this point or has she 
woken up from her sleep? The allusion here might be to the 
gates of sleep described by Virgil, one of horn, penetrable to 
vision, and one of ivory, which is opaque. Later medieval 
dream theorists understand Virgil’s interpretation of these 
two gates as symbolizing two kinds of dream: those that come 
from outside (that are meaningful) and those that are self-
generated and have no meaning.13 That Alcyone sees “noght” 
implies that hers is merely an interior dream, signifying 
nothing. “Allas!” (213) is all Alcyone utters before she faints, 
and then dies three days later. In Ovid, Juno turns both 
husband and wife into two halcyon birds whose “love and 
conjugal vows remain in force.”14 But in Chaucer’s account 
there is no transcendence and no consolation. The 
‘heterosexual’ couple comes to a “dead end.”15 
The narrator’s response to this instance of love tragically 
missing its mark is jarringly insouciant. Earlier, he had 
displayed a rather showy compassion for Alcyone: “trewely I 
that made this book / Had swich pitee and swich routhe / To 
rede hir sorwe, that by my trouthe, / I ferde the worse al the 
morwe” (96–99). His protestations of sincerity (“trewly”; “by 
my trouthe”), the repetition of “swich,” the emphasis on 
feelings of “pitee” and “routhe,” his empathy for Alcyone in 
reading about her “sorwe,” all constitute a flamboyant, self-
fashioning parade of masculine courtly “pitee” for women. 
But now he is perversely unmoved by her death, claiming that 
he cannot tell us “what she sayede more in that swow” (215) 
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Dream Visions and Other Poems: A Norton Critical Edition, ed. 
Kathryn L. Lynch (New York: W.W. Norton, 2007), 291 [284–299]. 
13  Steven F. Kruger, Dreaming in the Middle Ages (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992), 18–19, 21, 75. 
14 Ovid, “The Story of Ceyx and Alcyone,” in Geoffrey Chaucer, 
Dream Visions and Other Poems, ed. Lynch, 257 [251–257]. 
15 Fradenburg, “‘My Worldes Blisse’,” 95. 
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because it “were to longe for to dwelle” (217). He is impatient 
to move on. 
Does the narrator’s strategic occupatio represent a turning 
away from the dream’s impenetrable kernel — Freud’s “navel 
of the dream” — or a repeating of it? The narrator returns to 
his own situation: had he not read the story, he insists, he 
would have been “ded, ryght thurgh defaute of slep” (223). 
Never mind that both Seys and Alcyone are dead. Their deaths 
are lesser events than his own near-death from lack of sleep. 
There is a certain aggression in the narrator’s jokey dismissal 
of Alcyone’s plight: why, to stop himself dying from insomnia 
he’d be willing to reward Morpheus, or Juno, or anyone — 
whatever! — with a luxury bed. The narrative swerve stops us 
from inquiring too deeply into the meaning of the dream, but 
the tonal shift has the opposite effect: it draws attention to 
Alcyone’s love-anxiety and to the deaths – and death – of the 
loving couple. 
 
§ FATHER, CAN’T YOU SEE I’M BURNING? 
 
I want to put Alcyone’s dream in dialogue with another 
famous dream of an uncanny reunion following bereavement, 
one that concerns not man and wife but a witnessing father 
and a sacrificial son: Freud’s Dream of the Burning Child.16 
This juxtaposition looks perverse: although every desire goes 
back to a desire of or for the other, the Oedipal motif of 
Freud’s dream seems remote from the courtly, erotic motifs of 
Alcyone’s. Yet both dreams speak of an encounter with the 
Real — an agonizing intrusion of something “beyond,” 
something that marks a limit to knowledge — that makes each 
dream the other’s double. 
In Freud’s account, a father has been watching over his 
sick child for many days. Once the child has died, the father 
lies down to sleep, in view of the body, which is surrounded 
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16 My terms are from David Lee Miller, Dreams of the Burning Child: 
Sacrificial Sons and the Father’s Witness (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2003). 
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by candles: “After a few hours’ sleep, the father dreams that 
the child is standing at his bedside, grasps him by the arm and 
whispers to him reproachfully, ‘Father, can’t you see that I am 
burning?’ He wakes up, notices a bright light coming from the 
room where the body is lying, hurries over and finds the old 
attendant fallen asleep, the shroud and an arm of the beloved 
body burnt by a lighted candle that had fallen across it.”17 For 
Freud, the dream is a textbook example of wish-fulfillment: it 
enables the father to prolong his sleep and to see his child 
alive again.18  
Yet as Lacan observes, if this dream serves only to satisfy 
the wish to sleep, then it fulfills a need, not a desire.19 If it 
fulfilled a need, why would the father awake? What wakes 
him, in Lacan’s words, “is, in the dream, another reality,” that 
of the child standing near him, reproaching him for not seeing 
that he is burning. Isn’t this dream, Lacan urges, “an act of 
homage to the missed reality — the reality that can no longer 
produce itself except by repeating itself endlessly, in some 
never attained awakening? . . . the terrible vision of the dead 
son taking the father by the arm designates a beyond that 
makes itself heard in the dream. . . . It is only in the dream 
that this truly unique encounter can occur.”20 The dream 
speaks of the father’s pain at his loss but it also bears witness 
to a more fundamental loss, one that can never be recovered 
because it ex-sists outside the phallic order, in “a beyond”: the 
Real. Lacking a signifier, this radical loss makes its searing 
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17 Sigmund Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, trans. Joyce Crick; 
Introduction and Notes by Ritchie Robertson (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), 330. 
18 Freud, Interpretation of Dreams, 331. 
19 Lacan, Four Fundamental Concepts, 57. 
20 Lacan, Four Fundamental Concepts, 58. See also Malcolm Bowie, 
Lacan (London: Fontana, 1991), 106: the dream-voice, he says, “is an 
accident that repeats an accident, an irreducible fragment of the real 
that speaks of an irrecoverable loss, an encounter that is peremptory 
and brutal and yet one that can now never, outside dreams, take 
place.” 
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presence felt in the missed encounter: father and son can 




But the words of Seys, the drowned man, aren’t like the words 
of the dead child. They’re not urgent or terrible. At times they’re 
comic in their bathos. It’s not even his voice. Perhaps that’s the 
point. I’m aware, because it’s Morpheus ventriloquizing Seys, 
that husband and wife are not meeting at all, not even in the 
dream. The “missed reality” here, the “beyond” that the poem 
gestures towards in Alcyone’s disturbed reaction to the longed-
for encounter that misses its mark, is the Real of sexual 
difference: an irrecoverable loss, lack-of-sex-sense, absex-sense. 
Is this what Man in Black means when he twice insists to the 





Like the child in Freud’s dream, Seys bears witness to an 
unbearable reality: “Ye shul me never on lyve yse’ (205) [you 
will never see me alive] (“Wife, can’t you see I’m drowning?”). 
Yet Alcyone, casting up her eyes, “saw noght” (213). If she 
sees nothing, the dream comes through the Virgilian gate of 
ivory and is a mere fantasm, not the truth. But Alcyone also 
sees nothing because she is not present in the dream. As Lacan 
says, our position in a dream is “profoundly that of someone 
who does not see,” that is, who is not conscious of herself as 
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21 As Yün Peng observes, in “A Knock Made for the Eye: Image and 
Awakening in Deleuze and Freud,” in The Dreams of Interpretation: 
A Century Down the Royal Road, eds. Catherine Liu, John Mowitt, 
Thomas Pepper, and Jakki Spicer (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2007), 217 [215–224]: “the dream is not a 
representation; it is rather a placeholder for something that is not 
present. This something is the real.” 
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dreaming.22 The subject slides away. Alcyone is captured by 
nothing. This is also like the anamorphic effect: the detach-
ment of the gaze annihilates the subject by puncturing the 
illusion of the world of which the anamorphic stain is a part.  
Far from preserving the idea of the loving couple or 
celebrating the One of erotic fusion, Alcyone’s dream speaks 
of an intolerable anxiety about the sexual relation on the part 
of the feminine subject. This anxiety has its counterpart 
(experienced from the side of the man) in the male narrator’s 
“sorwful ymagynacioun” (14), in his anxiety about his 
insomnia, in his eight-year sickness that can only be cured by 
one “phisicien” (39) — and it also has its counterpart in Man 
in Black’s anxiety about White’s death and his dysfunctional 
aristocratic identity. Alcyone’s dream, in its senselessness, 
speaks of the impossibility of making sex-sense: masculine 
and feminine subjects cannot complete each other because 
they are negated and included in the phallic function in 
different ways. Alcyone struggles to understand what she 
represents for Seys, whether she is still the objet a around 
which his fantasies revolve. 23  The narrator, conversely, is 
“traumatized by not being able to assume his symbolic role” 24 
as bearer of the phallus: he is so fearful of disappointing his 
lady that he has anaesthetized himself: “I have felynge in 
nothing” (11). 
Like Alcyone and like the narrator, Man in Black is in a 
limbo of living death, a version of Giorgio Agamben’s homo 
sacer, the man who can be killed with impunity but not 
sacrificed. He is “[a]lway deynge and [is] not ded” (588), 
suspended between death and a terrible aliveness.25 He is the 
very image of sorrow: “For y am sorwe, and sorwe ys y” (597). 
Man in Black moves in a world of mirror-images, 
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22 Lacan, Four Fundamental Concepts, 75. 
23 Salecl, “Love Anxieties,” 94–95. 
24 Salecl, “Love Anxieties,” 93. 
25 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, 
trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1998). 
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identifications and reciprocities: the scene, to borrow 
Malcolm Bowie’s words from another context, “of a desperate 
delusional attempt to be and remain ‘what one is’ by gathering 
to oneself ever more instances of sameness, resemblance and 
self-replication.” But Man in Black enjoys this stasis. He wants 
to be stuck; he seeks “to remove himself from the flux of 
becoming.”26 The strange obtuseness of the dreamer in not 
understanding Man in Black’s inexplicable loss powerfully 
suggests that what is a dream for the narrator becomes as it 
were Man in Black’s dream: that which allows his trauma to 
emerge repeatedly. In this sense the poem moves from the 
realm of the imaginary to the realm of the symbolic: rather 
than dissolving the otherness of Man in Black by becoming 
his mirror-image, the narrator seeks to engage him as a 
courtly subject and to move him beyond his stuckness.27 
 Alcyone’s dream of a terrifying and deathly non-
communication alerts us to a deeper trauma that is at the 
heart of the poem: that of the Real of sexual difference. In Joan 
Copjec’s words, “To say that the subject is sexed is to say that 
it is no longer possible to have any knowledge of him or her. 
Sex serves no other function than to limit reason, to remove the 
subject from the realm of possible experience or pure 
understanding. . . . sex, in opposing itself to sense, is also by 
definition opposed to relation, to communication.”28 Guess 
why this might not be a good thing for Chaucer to say to the 
person for whom he wrote this poem, his powerful patron 
John of Gaunt, Duke of Lancaster, mourning the death of his 
beloved wife Blanche? It requires, shall we say, a certain tact, a 
certain delicacy. What is remarkable is that Chaucer rises to 
the almost impossible task of writing a love letter to a dead 
woman on Gaunt’s behalf while simultaneously acknowledg-
ing the impossibility of a sexual relationship through the 
poem’s unfolding of a series of missed encounters: the 
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26 Bowie, Lacan, 92. 
27 Bowie, Lacan, 92. 
28 Joan Copjec, “Sex and the Euthanasia of Reason,” in Supposing the 
Subject, ed. Joan Copjec (London: Verso, 1994), 21 [16–44]. 
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dreamer’s with his “physicien,” Alcyone’s with Seys, Man in 
Black’s with Blanche. 29  The impossibility of Alcyone 
constituting Seys’s “whole” does not, however, point to the 
woman’s frailty or culpability: rather, lacking a limit, she 
represents “the failure of the limit, not the cause of the 
failure.”30 
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29 For a psychoanalytic reading of The Book of the Duchess that 
downplays the conventional reading of the poem as “an elegiac love-
poem that has found a way to express the lovelorn grief of another” 
to concentrate on a reading of the dreamer as “the projection of a 
single, albeit riven, consciousness that is seeking some form of ‘other’ 
that will address, perhaps even cure, his own sense of fragmentation 
and self-alienation,” see Peter W. Travis, “White,” Studies in the Age 
of Chaucer 22 (2000): 39 [1–66]. 






D  Chaucerian Afterlives 





To be medieval is to posit a future in the very act of self-recognition, 
to offer a memory or memorial to a future that will be recognized at a 
time and place not yet known.  
~Andrew Cole and D. Vance Smith, The Legitimacy of the Middle 
Ages: On the Unwritten History of Theory 
 
§  PROSPECTUS: BUT DARKLY 
 
The claim of this essai is that Chaucer is eschatological. I use 
this rather specific term first in order to indicate the 
apocalyptic aspect of Chaucer’s late-medieval theological 
context of the four last things (eschata) — death, judgment, hell 
and heaven — and secondly to illumine a dynamic of textual 
dispossession at work in Chaucer’s anticipations of reader 
response, and of his and his texts’ interconnected ‘afterlives.’ 
These dense formulations will require some unpacking, but at 
this point it suffices to say that an orientation to the prospect of 
future evaluation conditions in advance the “dark” moments 
explored below. 
Any discussion of eschatology seems for us moderns (even 
modern medievalists) to be something of a dark topic, and in 
at least two ways. One is the popular darkness associated with 
divine judgment, an anxiety nowadays often stripped of any 
theological reference whatsoever. Another sense is that 
analogous to the Pauline “we see now in a mirror but darkly,” 
or videmus nunc per speculum in enigmate (1 Cor. 13:12), 
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simply the fact that we cannot see beyond the mortal bounds 
of this life, except obscurely in figures. And that kind of 
obscurity makes the prospect of judgment sometimes hard to 
bear. The Cloud-author alludes to our limits in just these 
terms: 
 
For when I sey derknes, I mene a lackyng of knowyng; 
as alle thing that thou knowest not, or elles that thou 
hast forgetyn, it is derk to thee, for thou seest it not 
with thi goostly ighe. And for this skile it is not clepid a 
cloude of the eire, bot a cloude of unknowyng, that is 
bitwix thee and thi God.1  
 
In a historical eschatology, the dark “cloude of unknowyng” is 
thus the condition of finitude in temporal existence that 
qualifies all preparation for either death or the apocalyptic 
advent of the eschaton. In a hermeneutic eschatology 
pertaining to the afterlife of texts (reception, reader-response 
and pragmatic rhetorical effect), such “derknes” is inscribed 
into the event of the text itself as the ambiguous and active 
medium between other temporalities and agencies. Unlike 
historical eschatology, in which judgment is deferred until a 
final singular consummation, there are manifold hermeneutic 
afterlives, each partially fulfilling the anticipations of an 
authorial past even while disseminating toward new 
unforeseen interpretations and exaptations.2 Thus in my use 
of “dark,” I hope to evoke not only cognitive finitude and 
anxiety about merit but also the two contexts of future 
judgment, human and divine, within which agents — authors, 
characters, readers — confront such “derknes.”  
In what follows, then, I shall explore in four of Chaucer’s 
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1The Cloud of Unknowing, ed. Patrick J. Gallacher (Kalamazoo: 
Medieval Institute Publications, 1997), IV.415–419. 
2 For more on exaptations, see Conor Cunningham, Darwin’s Pious 
Idea (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2010), 94. 
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texts enunciations and depictions of Bakhtinian answerability3 
as they emerge by way of embedded readers from the 
eschatological nexus of the four last things (eschata).4 Again, 
this concise wording will gain added clarity in light of what 
follows. It is a matter of becoming sensitized to the dialectic of 
agency, to the mediation between self and other operative in 
textuality through temporal distension and distantiation. 
Chaucer’s own sensitivity to the future poses a unique 
challenge to modernity’s “addiction to futurity”5 in this sense 
because as Chaucer’s readers we ourselves embody the 
potential futures anticipated by his texts, however 
unrecognizably, even while we put those texts to present uses. 
The principal question is: how do contemporary readings 
coincide or conflict with the forward-directed aspects of texts 
concerned with their characters’, their readers’, and their own 
futures? Beyond any discussion of a determining authorial 
intention — for it is precisely the absence of such an 
intention’s efficacy that opens the space for hope or anxiety — 
this analysis will aim to bump around in the dark, stubbing 
our critical apparatus on the edges of those obscure futures 
which furnish the imaginative poetic text. 
 
§ ANTICIPATION & ANSWERABILITY IN RETRACCIOUNS, HOUSE 
OF FAME, FRIAR’S TALE, AND TROILUS AND CRISEYDE 
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3 In Bakhtin’s words, “Art and life are not one, but they must become 
united in myself — in the unity of my answerability”: Mikhail 
Bakhtin, Art and Answerability: Early Philosophical Essays, eds. 
Michael Holquist and Vadim Liapunov (Austin: University of Texas 
Press, 1990), 2. 
4 The phrase ‘embedded reader’ comes from Elizabeth Allen and 
concerns characters whose acts of interpretation within a narrative 
are exemplary for extra-textual readers. See Elizabeth Allen, False 
Fables and Exemplary Truth in Later Middle English Literature (New 
York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005). 
5 Nicholas Watson, “The Phantasmal Past: Time, History, and the 
Recombinative Imagination,” Studies in the Age of Chaucer 32 
(2010): 3 [1-37]. 
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In his Retracciouns, a dying Chaucer6 effectively becomes his 
own proto-reader, anticipating the evaluation of his texts and 
appealing for attentive reception.7  Because texts have their 
afterlives in readers whom they “sownen into synne” (CT 
X.1086) or, as the Monk has it, “into honestee” (CT 
VII.1967),8 authorial answerability strives to account for the 
effects of textual reception and response even while depending 
upon those effects for future dissemination (or censorship!). 
What is more, in gauging the potential responses of future 
readers of his Retracciouns, Chaucer recognizes that he is 
himself a text whom God, as the absolute evaluator, will soon 
take up and read.9 In this sense, the Last Judgment constitutes 
the paradigm of critical assessment and, in a poem like House 
of Fame, provides a speculative backdrop for portraying the 
arbitrary macrocosm of textual reception that is literary 
history. Both the Retracciouns and House of Fame portray the 
composition and dissemination of texts as an especially 
dangerous form of action, for texts reach far ahead in history 
to unknown effect. As deeds, the texts produced not only by 
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6 Melissa Furrow convincingly argues that we should take seriously 
Gascoigne’s fifteenth century reading of the Retracciouns as a 
“deathbed repentance”: Melissa Furrow, “The Author and 
Damnation: Chaucer, Writing, and Penitence,” Modern Language 
Studies 23.3 (1997): 252 [245-257]. 
7 Furrow is right in her line of reasoning here: “It is not that the 
fictions are sinful in themselves; it is that they ‘sownen into synne,’ 
are conducive to sin; the author cannot trust his readers to use them 
right. And if the reader does not use them right, the guilt is not just 
the reader’s, but the author’s” (250). 
8  All quotations from Chaucer’s works are from The Riverside 
Chaucer, gen. ed. Larry D. Benson, 3rd edn. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1987); quotations from Canterbury Tales (CT) cited 
by fragment and line number, from Troilus and Criseyde (TC) by 
book and line number, and House of Fame (HF) by line number.  
9 Medieval theologians who followed Augustine in De Civitate Dei 
XX-XXII held that the individual judgment of a soul followed 
immediately after death. 
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Chaucer but all authors will thus need to be accounted for “at 
the day of doom” (CT X.1092). 
Chaucer begins his Retracciouns by distributing the agency 
of both human and divine authorship as contingent upon the 
response of readers:  
 
Now I preye to hem alle that herkne this litel tretys or 
rede, that if ther be any thyng in it that liketh them, 
that therof they thanken oure Lord Jhesu Crist, of 
whom procedeth al wit and al goodnesse. / And if ther 
be any thyng that displease hem, I preye hem also that 
they arrette it to the defaute of myn unkonnynge and 
nat to my wyl, that wolde ful fayn have seyd bettre if I 
hadde had konnynge. (CT X.1080–1081) 
 
The careful distinction made between “wyl” and “konnynge” 
suggests a sophisticated awareness of the psychological 
faculties involved in questions of merit and salvation. 10 
Chaucer accordingly aligns his “entente” (CT X.1083) with the 
Pauline dictum — “‘Al that is writen is writen for doctrine’” 
(CT X.1083; Romans 15:4) — commonly invoked by medieval 
writers to justify the pedagogical worth of narrative fictions 
(e.g. the Nun’s Priest’s envoy, CT VII.3438–3446). 11  By 
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10 According to late-medieval voluntarism, volition trumped intellect 
with respect to meriting grace. See Gordon Leff, Heresy in the Later 
Middle Ages: The Relation of Heterodoxy to Dissent (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1967). 
11 It is worth adding nuance to the notion of “intention” at this point. 
“Entent” is an Englishing of the Latin rhetorical intentio, which 
describes a work’s meaning and structure; “[r]ather than be 
concerned with an author’s individual aims, intentio, a prescriptive 
category, indicates the abstract truth behind a text; in a sense, it thus 
most closely corresponds not to an inherent property of a work but 
to a reading practice”: Jocelyn Wogan-Browne, Nicholas Watson, 
Andrew Taylor, and Ruth Evans, “The Notion of Vernacular 
Theory,” in The Idea of the Vernacular: An Anthology of Middle 
English Literary Theory, 1280-1520 (University Park: Pennsylvania 
State University Press, 1999), 328. 
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locating Paul’s flexible hermeneutic principle just prior to his 
request for prayers, Chaucer situates his entire poetic oeuvre 
within an eschatological milieu, expressing mutual concern 
over both the merit of his texts for future readers and of 
himself for God. This is articulated directly at the end, “so that 
I may been oon of hem at the day of doom that shulle be 
saved” (CT X.1091). 
Regarding literary status, of course, Chaucer has long 
attained beatitude. Yet the very instability of poetic fame 
forces a deeper question: how are readers of Chaucer’s texts 
responsible for Chaucer as an eschatologically answerable 
agent? In other words, if reception partially determines the 
import of texts as deeds, and such deeds — for Chaucer at 
least — have everlasting repercussions, are critical 
interpretations of Chaucer’s texts somehow reductive in their 
neglect of this soteriological dimension? Given the 
postmodern death of the author, of what importance for 
critical scholarship is the appeal of a dying author?  
The fact that eschatological reference is a medieval 
convention only calls for a more serious consideration of 
similar topoi in medieval literary texts.12 Yet a Barthesian 
theoretical persuasion, in failing to consider the pragmatic 
dynamic of Bakhtinian answerability, seems to permit 
sustained inattention to such conventional anticipations of 
death and afterlife like Chaucer’s, to the extent that modern 
readings of the Retracciouns typically culminate with a retreat 
into critical neutrality,13 or a bland celebration of its internal 
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12  The suggestion that Chaucer is merely capitalizing on an 
opportunity to reiterate his oeuvre  (as he had done in the Man of 
Law’s Tale and the prologue to Legend of Good Women) seems too 
crassly to impute ulterior motives to what is, after all, a textual 
repertoire, but one given with a very specific and sober purpose, if we 
accept Gascoigne’s account. For a suggestion to the contrary, see 
John M. Bowers, Chaucer and Langland: The Antagonistic Tradition 
(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), 161–162. 
13 For an overview of the critical reception of the Retracciouns, see 
J.D. Gordon, “Chaucer’s Retraction: A Review of Opinion,” Studies 
in Medieval Literature in Honor of Albert Croll Baugh, ed. 
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contra-dictions.14 As a result, the linguistic reciprocation that 
Chaucer assigns — prayer for his soul — grates uneasily with 
the text’s function as an object of critical analysis. Its exposure 
of Chaucer’s potentially genuine post-mortem concerns has 
for the most part seemed to encourage its qualification as 
more unfashionably medieval than can be comfortably 
engaged within the parameters of a modern “collective 
cultural imaginary.” 15  Despite Melissa Furrow’s excellent 
analysis, the Retracciouns remain a dark site of ambivalence 
for Chaucer criticism. 
Like us, however, Chaucer was also disenchanted with 
certain versions of the eschaton. Take, for instance, the House 
of Fame. Written about two decades before the Retracciouns, 
House of Fame is Chaucer at his most experimental and 
audacious. Helen Cooper sees it as the beating heart of 
Chaucer’s anti-Danteism, a chaotic and overdetermined satire 
of the Commedia. 16  Dante’s presumption in damning his 
political enemies is parodied by Fame’s mock Last Judgment 
in Book III, an eschatology as discordant with the biblical 
“Apocalips” (HF 1385) as it is with Dante’s exposé of the 
afterlife. And yet a coincidence of hermeneutic and religious 
afterlives becomes uniquely visible in this part of House of 
Fame. After Book II ends with a spectacular figuration of a 
general resurrection, nine categorical groups of utterances are 
judged of their merit for good fame, the latter functioning 
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MacEdward Leach (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1961), 81–97. 
14  George Kane speaks of the Retracciouns as an “expression of 
religious submission [that] has embarrassed some critics to the 
extent of making them want to deny its authenticity or else its 
sincerity”: George Kane, “Langland and Chaucer: An Obligatory 
Conjunction,” Chaucer and Langland: Historical and Textual 
Approaches (London: The Athlone Press, 1989), 33. 
15 Watson, “The Phantasmal Past,” 36.  
16 See Helen Cooper, “The Four Last Things in Chaucer and Dante: 
Ugolino in the House of Rumour,” New Medieval Literatures 3 
(1999): 39–66.  
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diegetically as a rival version of beatitude. Framed with 
biblical allusions, Fame exercises her absolute power (potentia 




And somme of hem she graunted sone, 
And some she werned wel and faire, 
And somme she graunted the contraire 
Of her axyng outterly. 
But thus I seye yow, trewely,  
What her cause was, y niste. 
For of this folk ful wel y wiste, 
They hadde good fame ech deserved, 
Although they were dyversely served. (HF 1538–1546) 
 
Hermeneutically, Book III depicts an absolute yet radically 
inconsistent reader, a monstrous bundle of impulsive 
misreadings (HF 2110-17), an author’s worst nightmare. But 
Fame’s arbitrariness and caprice as a divine judge inaugurates 
a bad eschatology without room for post-textual prayers or 
interpretive mercy, offering an instructive contrast to and 
even justification for Chaucer’s more serious post-mortem 
concerns in the Retracciouns. In Kerby-Fulton’s words, “it is 
as if Chaucer is reenacting in a pagan setting an Ockhamesque 
nightmare of the Last Judgment gone mad — a Last 
Judgment, that is, in which everything is decided by divine 
potentia absoluta and nothing by potentia ordinata.”17 I would 
even go so far as to argue that House of Fame constitutes a sort 
of Chaucerian-Menippean satire, with its experimental 
deployment of personification allegory, its affirmation of 
logical contradiction (HF 1025–30, 2088–91), and its spec-
ulative, open-ended parody of the frightening extremes of 
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17 See Kathryn Kerby-Fulton, Books Under Suspicion: Censorship and 
Tolerance of Revelatory Writing in Late-Medieval England (Notre 
Dame, MI: University of Notre Press, 2006), 346. 
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voluntarist soteriology, one of the hottest philosophical topics 
of the fourteenth century.18  
The response of the narrative persona and embedded 
reader “Geffrey” (HF 729) is one of sympathy with the 
unjustly condemned, evoking academic terminology with 
“gilteles” and aligning Fame’s arbitrariness with the radical 
contingency personified by her allegorical sibling Fortune (HF 
1547): 
 
“Allas,” thoughte I, “what aventures 
Han these sory creatures! 
For they, amonges al the pres, 
Shul thus be shamed gilteles.” (HF 1631–1634). 
 
Later, not admitting to want fame (a coy authorial move on 
Chaucer’s part), Geoffrey rejects Fame’s equivocity, opting to 
judge — and be answerable only to — himself: 
 
“Sufficeth me, as I were ded, 
That no wight have my name in honde. 
I wot myself best how y stonde; 
For what I drye, or what I thynke, 
I wil myselven al hyt drynke, 
Certeyn, for the more part, 
As fer forth as I kan myn art.” (HF 1876–1882). 
 
Like Chaucer in the Retracciouns, Geffrey here strives to 
assume responsibility for his “art” (HF 1882) in the face of 
divine judgment, and we rightly laud his refusal of Fame’s 
decrees as a vernacular facere quod in se est. Yet the force of 
his proto-modern assertion over and against the 
contradictions of hermeneutic contingency, even if (or 
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18 See Kathryn Lynch, “The Parliament of Fowls and Late-Medieval 
Voluntarism (Part I),” Chaucer Review 25.1 (1990): 1–16, and David 
Aers, Salvation and Sin: Augustine, Langland, and Fourteenth-
Century Theology (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 
2009). 
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especially when) divine, remains in question. He never wakes 
up, after all! And while this seems not to bode well for 
Chaucer’s own deathbed anxieties, it is precisely the false 
immortality stemming from the literary fame of his more 
bawdy works that Chaucer is rejecting in the Retracciouns, 
hoping for the evaluation of a more consistently 
compassionate divine judge. 
The demonic fiend in the Friar’s Tale likewise exposes the 
frightening consequences of interpretive contingency, but to 
even darker ends. In the tale, a disguised fiend instructs a 
corrupt summoner in the nuances of speech genres, secretly 
aiming to secure the summoner’s damnation. To carry out his 
plan, the fiend teaches a voluntarist hermeneutic that his own 
fluid onto-morphology — “in divers art and in diverse 
figures” (CT III.1486) — can later misappropriate. At the 
tale’s climax, an irate widow who is ignorant of the yeoman’s 
demonic identity invokes the “devel blak and rough of hewe” 
(CT III.1622) in cursing the summoner, whose own willfully 
unrepentant response enables the fiend (according to his own 
schematic) to demand from the summoner the literal 
fulfillment of her figurative condemnation: “And with that 
word this foule feend him hente; / Body and soule he with the 
devel wente” (CT III.1637–1638). The fiend hopes for the 
same dark consequences of misreading that Chaucer fears in 
his Retracciouns, ironizing in the summoner the fact that 
discursive “mysdedes” (CT III.1664) do determine post-
mortem destiny. The tale’s conclusion hinges upon not an 
absolute reader (like Fame) but a metamorphosing one who 
capitalizes upon linguistic dispossession in order to gain 
possession of the summoner in the “hous of helle” (CT 
III.1652), described as an infernal academy where 
hermeneutic “sentence” is read (CT III.1515–1520). 
In light of the fiend’s overdetermination of intentional 
utterance, the Friar cautions the exercise of readerly agency, 
inviting a common response derived from the rhetorical 
efficacy of his exemplary fiction: 
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“But for to kepe us fro that cursed place, 
Waketh and preyeth Jhesu for his grace 
So kepe us fro the temptour Sathanas. 
Herketh this word! Beth war, as in this cas.”  
(CT III.1653–1656) 
 
In the so-called epilogue of Troilus and Criseyde (V.1765–
1870), the narrator similarly recognizes the agency of the 
reader, pleading with his personified text that “non myswrite 
the” (TC V.1795) as he issues it forth into the future: “Go, litel 
bok, go, litel myn tragedye” (TC V.1786). Several lines later, 
Troilus’s soul also issues out of his body, though toward a 
synoptic celestial position (TC V.1807–1810) from which he 
chortles at living mortals below.  
Troilus’s laughter continues to be a source of contention 
for Chaucer criticism, with some scholars arguing for the 
passage’s irony, some for its coherent seriousness. Most 
helpful for our purposes is a reading of the epilogue as a 
narration of Troilus’s very own retraction. Just as Chaucer’s 
Retracciouns formally dispossess a textual corpus of those 
works which may promote “worldly vanitees” (CT X.1085), so 
Troilus, after his soul is dispossessed of its textually 
constituted body, revokes with disdain the “worldly vanyte” 
(TC V.1837) of his former “blynde lust” (TC V.1824). And yet 
he betrays no evidence of being repentant or of assuming 
responsibility. Speech acts evidently bear less ethical weight 
for Troilus, whose rhetorical coercion of Criseyde (via 
Pandarus) — a serious linguistic “mysdede” — has no clear 
eschatological repercussions. Quite the opposite, in fact: 
Troilus is taken up into celestial immortality, the only 
character among those we have examined who may attain a 
good afterlife, depending on the pagan gods’ (arbitrary?) 
decision. Chaucer’s anticipation of future readers, on the 
other hand, articulates a more nuanced and risky 
understanding of answerability than Troilus’ scorn of “al oure 
werk” (CT V.1823). Chaucer seems to have internalized the 
answerability that is bound up with any exercise of linguistic 
agency. Far from assuming Troilus’ proud stance, in the 
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Retracciouns he accepts blame and shuns praise, 
acknowledging (at least rhetorically) the co-implication of his 
own and his readers’ futures. 
With reflexive texts like the Retracciouns or the Troilus 
epilogue, authorial answerability seems to operate like an ideal 
target which multiple and sometimes conflicting vectors aim 
to hit: who is answerable, and to what degree, in any given 
speech act or text-event? The response is necessarily con-
tingent on the circumstantial details born out in the figurative 
complexity and moral ambiguity of linguistic communication. 
Chaucer’s yielding of Troilus to the scrutiny of “moral Gower” 
and “philosophical Strode” (TC V.1856, 1857) “to correcte / of 
youre benignites and zeles goode” (TC V.1858–1859), for 
instance, can be read as hoping for the possibility of good 
constructive reception even while privileging certain readers 
over others. Chaucer thereby expands the scope of his 
potential audience — whose response determines the quality 
of his own textual agency — by intertwining historical and 
hermeneutic afterlives; after earlier begging of his text “that 
thow be understonde, God I biseche!” (TC V.1798), he prays 
for universal divine reception: “So make us, Jesus, for thi 
mercy, digne” (TC V.1868). However conventional, such 
universal(ist) appeals traverse historical distance to include all 
possible readers, presupposing a robust notion of answer-
ability hinged on the future divine judgment as itself a reading 
of infinite scope, made from an absolutely intimate vantage. 
 
§ EPILOGUE: OR EPITAPH 
Although the Monk prefaces his de casibus tragedies by 
anticipating their readerly afterlife of inciting “honestee” (CT 
VII.1967), he never finishes telling them. The Knight, 
otherwise a paragon of bravery, quails before the darkened 
countenance of Fortune (Fame’s sister, remember) and 
interrupts: “I seye for me, it is a greet disese / Wheras men 
han been in greet welthe and ese, / To heeren of hir sodein fal, 
allas!” (CT VII.2771–2773). This finicky yet forced foreclosure 
provides yet another example of embedded misreading 
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alongside caprice (Fame), autonomy (Geffrey), malice (the 
fiend), and scorn (Troilus).  
The Retracciouns seem to trouble all of these dark 
receptions — retrospectively qualifying an entire literary 
oeuvre in the process — by exposing Chaucer’s (un)dying 
hope in the possibility of good readings and good readers. If 
Gascoigne’s account of the occasion of their composition is 
accurate, Chaucer’s Retracciouns reveal an author suspended 
between multiple contingent finite judgments within history 
and a final, eschatological evaluation beyond all misappro-
priation (but not figuration). Yet as with textual 
interpretation, so the results of the final divine critique can 
themselves be partially determined by the “multiplicacioun” 
(HF 784) by others of a certain mode of response that 
acknowledges, beyond all failure of nerve, the shared 
vulnerability of finitude. And it is just such a “wounded”19 
mode of response, namely prayer, that Chaucer begs from us: 
“Wherfore I biseke yow mekely, for the mercy of God, that ye 
preye for me that Crist have mercy on me and foryeve my 
giltes; / and namely of my translacions and enditynges of 
worldly vanitees, the whiche I revoke in my retracciouns” (CT 
X.1083–1084).20 
While this articulation places a burden of action upon us, 
such requests can be ignored or denied. We are inclined to 
pass off the distantiated appeal as vacuously conventional, 
laden with ironic ulterior motivation, or as an impersonal 
semiotic patterning available to us only after the death of the 
author (both metaphorical and literal), and therefore of no 
real consequence for the entity that was once the efficient 
cause of the Canterbury Tales, a composite of body and soul, 
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19 Jean-Louis Chretien, “The Wounded Word: Phenomenology of 
Prayer,” Phenomenology and the Theological Turn: The French 
Debate, ed. Dominique Janicaud, trans. Bernard G. Prusak (New 
York: Fordham University Press, 2000), 176–216. 
20 Among the revoked texts, significantly, are our three texts of 
interest: “the book of Troilus; the book also of Fame  . . . the tales of 
Canterbury, thilke that sownen into synne” (CT X.1085). 
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with children and even a proper name: Geoffrey Chaucer. 
Given all sorts of larger contextual differences, moreover, like 
our inhabiting a post-Christian cultural (or at least academic) 
milieu, perhaps we are not able to do otherwise, thus 
precluding certain types of reader response tout court. 
If this is the case, then we rather awkwardly find ourselves 
as addressees of a most urgent plea at an intersection of 
historical and hermeneutic vectors: one, an imperative from 
the medieval past attempting to anticipate its own afterlives; 
the other, an interpretive response in the present facilitated 
through informed, disinterested retrospection. Of course, 
unlike that of the enthroned judge of the Johannine 
Apocalypse, both perspectives are limited, and yet there is a 
sense that we embrace the “derknes” of history with more ease 
because of an assurance of our status as the unimaginable 
future of any past perspective that we may select as an object 
of scholarly interest. In thus neglecting the full weight of 
Heidegger’s sense of inter-est, do we not sometimes derive 
strange solace in seeing the expectant medieval gaze fall short? 
I aim here to tease out a certain dark ethos tempting for 
those — like myself — who presume to wield the critical gaze, 
and to wonder: can dead authors be candidates for the ethical 
Other? If, as Bakhtin stresses, every act “is truly real . . . only 
in its entirety”21 (and texts are never-finished acts, always open 
to new receptions and readings) then must our answerability 
as writers really only be to posterity and not to the past, not 
also to those who are — and felt themselves to be — 
answerable to us, as forebears? And yet beyond the apparatus 
of tradition, how to bear the weight of what has already been 
said? This is the other side of Nicholas Watson’s point about 
modernity’s collective amnesia and self-definition over and 
against an archaic, inconsequential, and perhaps necessarily 
misrepresented past (the Dark Ages). Despite or even because 
of these modern tendencies, it seems timely to venture that we 
can only become truly answerable in entertaining the possi-
bility of being darkly prefigured by, and thus in some measure 
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21 See Bakhtin, Toward a Philosophy of the Act, 2. 
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the unwitting fulfillments of, the futures that the past 






d  Black Gold 





Despite their pretense of explaining beginnings, creation 
myths often if not always have ends in mind — a fact that 
certainly holds true for Chaucer’s “Former Age.” On the face 
of it, the poem is only a creation myth: its verse tells the story 
of human community at its origins, of a freer life (with only 
“good feith the empeirice” [55]) 1  before complex estate 
hierarchies and the State. Its few stanzas have all the look and 
feel of a sad song whose melody the centuries have worn away, 
with all the misty revelation of prehistoric “folk” impulse that 
the “ballad” label still inevitably implies. This obscurity of age 
in turn lends the poem its own rusty darkness, over and above 
the darkness of loss that its narrative claims (however dimly) 
to recover and bring to light. Most readers, including me, 
encounter “The Former Age” mainly as a poem cataloging 
and expressing — simply about — great loss.  
 Yet contrary to first impressions and the precedents of 
literary history, I suspect, “loss” is not really the poem’s main 
concern (or at least not in the way it would first appear). As its 
narrative shifts from the pre-history to the “present” day, so 
does the sense of the knowledge that it offers: “The Former 
Age” might lament a vanished past on the surface, but in fact 
(like any creation myth) it does so only to account for 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 All references to Chaucer’s poetry are to The Riverside Chaucer, 
gen. ed. Larry D. Benson, 3rd edn. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1987), by line number. 
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contemporary circumstances. As such, even though the 
poem’s simple and haunting form promises to reveal a radiant 
ancestral Volksgeist, its narrative actually retreats from the 
revelation of history (and even the declaiming narratorial 
subject, “Chaucer”) that we expect. In fact, operating by 
means of the very techniques that it claims to deplore, it 
masks values and priorities in which it has cause (through its 
very existence) to rejoice.  
This is no accident. To be effective, “The Former Age” 
depends on its not being the type of poem — fragmentary, a 
solitary ancient voice recorded unawares — that it might 
claim to be. It draws not so much on ancestral, oral memory, 
as on a richly textual — even classical — memory store to 
make its claims, which all but explicitly present a return to the 
Etas Prima as impossible and not even particularly desirable. 
In that case it can even, perversely, be read as an apologia (not 
an apology) for an enthralled, feverish yearning for 
production it ascribes to Chaucer’s time, though the same 
yearning is not unrecognizable today.  Production is not the 
first term that comes to mind when describing “The Former 
Age,” true, and the defense of production here is not without 
its tension: the “former” people who are the poem’s ostensible 
heroes neither spin nor toil. In fact a certain horror inheres in 
the shadowy, laborious descent for metal that catalyzes the 
change from one age to another. But more than anything else, 
an inexhaustible potential characterizes the early humans’ 
common life. The urge to build, to create, and to deplete that 




Not so much glittering but seeping into view, like oil, the 
allure of complex estates and competitions helps account for 
the profound blackness in this apparently simple poem. 
Commentators have noted that the narrator in “The Former 
Age” does not praise these first ancestors for their lack of 
comforts — though why should he, given that they have never 
given anything up? His assessment seems to waver between 
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disgust and pity for them, instead, as when he describes their 
sleeping arrangements: 
 
Yit was no paleis-chaumbres, ne non halles; 
In caves and wodes softe and swete 
Slepten this blissed folk withoute walles, 
On gras or leves in parfit quiete. (41–44) 
 
By the standards of a later era, these are hardly beds at all; but 
even so (if with a hint of surprise), the narrator describes the 
early peoples’ sleep as profoundly deep and secure:  
 
Ne doun of fetheres, ne no bleched shete 
Was kid to hem, but in seurtee they slepte. 
Hir hertes were al oon withoute galles; 
Everich of hem his feith to other kepte. (45–48) 
 
What the poem (like its precursors) describes, then, is a past 
of impossible estrangement from the driven character of the 
present, not only in its (negative) privation of goods but also 
its (positive) freedom from anxieties — chief among them that 
restlessness to fulfill some livelihood perfectly. The lines imply 
that the earliest people, lacking social anxiety through their 
inchoate lack of “estates,” were on balance far more blessed 
than ages yet to come.  
Just how unavoidably different this first status quo seems 
for the Chaucer of “The Former Age” — how much not to be 
looked back to, even as an ideal — appears with special 
vibrancy when the poem turns toward the subject of the first-
peoples’ nourishment. For just as there are no hierarchies to 
distress man, there is likewise no variation or progress 
between people. The similes immediately turn bestial to 
describe their utter congruity, so alien to the medieval (and 
contemporary) social system: they are “lambish people, voyd 
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Yit nas the ground nat wounded with the plough, 
But corn up-sprong, unsowe of mannes hond, 
The which they gnodded, and eete nat half ynough. 
 
This pigs’ food makes a comment on the first humans’ 
standard of productivity — which is none. They “heeld them 
payed of the food that the ete”: but this is no real pay (and 




The lack of production at the beginning, however, is not 
because of a lack of materials to work from. The first peoples’ 
world is literally full of gold, Chaucer tells us, in a trope 
common to other medieval works (like this twelfth-century 
poem by the monk Bernard of Cluny):  
 
Aurea tempora primaque robora praeterierunt 
Aurea gens fuit et simul haec ruit, illa ruerunt. 
Flebilis incipit aurea suscipit aurea metas; 
Transiit ocius et studium prius, et prior aetas.  
Gens erat aurea, cui furor alea, cui scelus aurum, 
Cui pudor emptio, cui necque mentio divitiarum. 
Non erat abdere fas neque tollere lucra crumenis. 
Plenus opum Tagus aurifluus, vagus ibit arenis. 
Moribus aemula lucra pericula quam preciosa, 
Non homo foderat aut fore noverat invidiosa.  
Sumpsit ut aurea ponderra ferrea spicula quisque— 
Mox tumor iraque sustulit utraque pugnat utrisque.  
 
[The Golden Age and primal strengths have perished. 
The race of gold existed, and once this fell, those too 
collapsed. The former zeal has swiftly passed away 
along with the former age. Golden was the race for 
whom gambling was madness, gold was a vice, buying 
was shameful, wealth was not even mentioned. To 
conceal riches, to carry riches in purses was unlawful. 
The wandering Tagus, full of treasures, flowed with 
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golden sands. Man did not dig for riches, the enemy of 
mortals, as dangerous as they are precious — nor did 
he know that they would stir envy. Each man took up 
weights of iron just as weights of gold; but soon Pride 
and Wrath raised their spears, and each fights the 
other.]2  
 
The connection here of various latencies — sexuality, metal, 
work itself — is very clear from this analogue; the situations 
that Bernard and Chaucer both depict, with their opposition 
between latency and entelechy, are the same.  
Chaucer mirrors the Consolation of Philosophy with his 
focus on things “no man” had done yet that mark his entry 
into full civilization: in contrast to the more upbeat account of 
things man did for the first time in Virgil’s Georgics, the 
phrasing implies risky aberration and a sense of prior 
emptiness (“no man”) in the world. The connotations are 
probably warranted, however, as nothing the first people of 
the poem do resembles activities socially organized in terms of 
profession or the estates so central to the medieval social 
imaginary. The fact that this state changes — and moreover 
where it changes in “The Former Age” — is doubly important 
as a result:   
 
What sholde it han avayled to werreye? 
Ther lay no profit, ther was no richesse, 
But cursed was the tyme, I dare wel seye, 
That men first dide hir swety bysinesse 
To grobbe up metal, lurkinge in derknesse, 
And in the riveres first gemmes soghte. 
Allas, than sprong up al the cursednesse 
Of coveytyse, that first our sorwe broghte. (25–32) 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2  Ronald Pepin, “Scorn for the World: Bernard of Cluny’s De 
contemptu mundi,” Medieval Texts and Studies 8 (East Lansing: 
Colleagues Press, 1991), 76–77. 
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The passage describes here how “man” enters the scene to 
shift mere “people” into the work of civilization, or at least the 
path to it, through a type of mining that Chaucer overlays 
with sexuality: it is “swety bysinesse” that moreover leads to a 
kind of fertility and fecundity as the “cursednesse of covetyse” 
“sprong up.”  
Chaucer heightens the sexuality inherent in the passage 
with the last line of the stanza, “that first our sorwe broghte” 
— echoing as it does the medieval Christian sentiment that 
the sin of Adam and Eve first brought sorrow into the world. 
In Genesis 3:16, where the word first appears, God tells Eve 
that “multiplicabo aerumnas tuas et conceptus tuos in dolore 
paries filios” 3  [“I will multiply thy sorrows, and thy 
conceptions: in sorrow shalt thou bring forth children”].4 
Chaucer’s choice of the adverb “swety” might also be 
significant: in Genesis, sweat and labor is the price Adam pays 
for his sin (see Genesis 3:19) — the difference here being that 
Adam’s sin set humans on a path to very poor nourishment 
won with labor from rocks and thistles, while the labor of men 
in Chaucer’s poem leads to the invention of a series of 
delicacies that ends the poem.  
The Boethian version avoids these scriptural references, by 
contrast, choosing to note only how the gems that would 
cause so much trouble “wished” to remain hidden:  
 
Heu primus quis fuit ille,  
Auri qui pondera tecti  
Gemmasque latere volentes  




3 Biblia Sacra: iuxta Vulgatam versionem, eds. Robert Weber and 
Roger Grayson (Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 1994). 
4 The Holy Bible, translated from the Latin Vulgate and diligently 
compared with the Hebrew, Greek, and other editions in diverse 
languages, pref. William H. McClellan, S.J. (New York: Douay Bible 
House, 1941). 
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[Alas, who was he who first dug out the weight of 
covered gold and gems that wished to remain hidden, 
precious perils?]5 
  
Despite these oblique references to the Genesis story, 
however, Chaucer’s “Former Age” on the whole joins 
Boethius’ account in not referring to the Bible — even 
actively, with purpose. Doing so was certainly not difficult: 
non-Biblical origin narratives circulated even among 
Christian audiences well into the Middle Ages.  In most of 
these, as in the classics, writers seem to have been concerned 
to produce an authoritative “historical” account of beginnings 
— the texts’ stated aim — as a complaint against modern vices 
weighted down with exemplary force. Yet by not allowing the 
existence in the former age even of classical gods, either, 
Chaucer’s poem seems systematically to deny the “lambish 
people” any part in a larger a cosmic hierarchy — let alone 
entry into the larger stream of Biblical salvation narrative:  
 
Yit was not Jupiter the likerous, 
That first was fader of delicacye, 
Come in this world; ne Nembrot, desirous 
To regne, had nat maad his toures hye. (56–59) 
 
With the removal of all divinity from the earlier time he 
describes, Chaucer further removes his poem’s “lambish” 
protagonists from an important human sphere. They have 
neither society nor, it seems now, souls; frozen in a present 
that will tragically lead to us, they can neither collaborate nor 
seem able to aspire.  
With their fall, the precipitating discovery of “precious 
perils” lying within the earth, these not-quite-three-
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5 Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy, trans. S. J. Tester, in  
Theological Tractates and The Consolation of Philosophy, eds. and 
trans. H. F. Stewart, E. K. Rand, and S. J. Tester, Loeb Classical 
Library (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973); translation 
mine. 
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dimensional forbears plunge headlong into the pursuit of 
endless productivity — an always actualizing, full-throttle 
economy that “otherworldly” religion would claim to abhor, 
were it only to exist — and exist it does, as the newer 
dispensation begins. A lust to make and achieve comes to 
comprise the center of humanity’s suddenly fervid activity; it 
takes only the small step to inventing gods to temper that will 
to produce and lend it dignity with the name of a soul. 
While the removal of a divine realm from the purview of 
“The Former Age” isn’t necessarily good or bad by itself, then, 
its anthropological outlook is dark. The disappearance (or 
non-appearance) of divinity removes from the poem a 
positive ideal that produces meaning, leaving a vacuum that 
significance must rush to fill. The stanza’s reference to Jupiter 
and Nimrod, hinting at the classical pantheon and the single 
Biblical deity, prove symptomatic of the overabundance of a 
creatively overheated latter age. The poem’s easy familiarity 
with both mythologies evokes and indicts the capacious, 
eclectic authorial figure we can recognize behind Chaucer’s 
other works.  
Not that the figure of the poet — here at least — gives 
synthesizing order to this very medieval chaos of abundance. 
No figure or voice seems to take up the ethically orienting 
role, even though both medieval literature and its theorists 
understood poets to take part in a sort of prophetic responsi-
bility. Chaucer hardly appears at all, in fact, lurking like dark 
matter or transparent as a ghost.  In his place we have only the 
ballad’s empty lyrics, a small black box resampling earlier text: 
a voice like mourning in autotune, not quite as recognizably 
authentic as its subject matter would demand, no doubt 
because it can only exist due to the tragic circumstances it 
relates. We might even call the poet here non-human, offering 
as he does a vision of humanistic discourse diffused only for 
the sake of societal self-evaluation: a wish for lambs to be men, 
or robots to pass a Turing test. Such anachronistic similes are 
appropriate because, in the last analysis, this poem about an 
irredeemable past is really about the future: a burnished 
mirror of older tropes reflecting the fragmented society and 
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the even more profoundly competitive, productive, “self-




Perhaps it’s best to read all the untapped potential suggested 
earlier in “The Former Age,” then, as part of the same 
darkness with which the poem ends. The anaphora of 
deprivation with which this ballad concludes gives way to a 
surplus — of money, clothing, and food, all markers of the 
new estates — yet this in turn collapses into another type of 
negativity: “nis but” 
 
. . . covetyse 
Doublenesse, and tresoun, and envye, 
Poyson, manslawtre, and mordre in sondry wyse.  
(61–63) 
 
In this ultimate darkness, the poem unveils the effects of all 
the production it slights the first people for avoiding, showing 
that the endless creation of new realities from so much past 
potential effects growth as relentless and deadly as a cancer: 
the series of foods (beginning with scarcely human “pounage” 
and ascending to “clarre or sauce of eglantine”) concludes, all-
too-significantly, with “poyson.” The very guarantees and 
engines of good life conspire to take it away, with those sauces 
and stocks turning the very mouths that ingest them into dust. 
After their first transition from vegetables to meat, a shift 
impossible without increased social stratification, humans 
even begin to consume each other.  
It seems even more sinister, then, that Chaucer should so 
entirely abandon the reader to the facts of the poem. The 
impersonal common narrator offers no advice; charming 
Chaucer “himself” is simply nowhere to be found. Yet though 
Chaucer seems to hide from these issues in “The Former 
Age,” in another way they seem to have exerted enormous 
influence on his overall poetic career. The Book of the Duchess, 
for instance, uses as its starting point the same insomnia that 
68 Dark Chaucer: An Assortment 
!
bedding, in this poem, was invented to prevent. “The Former 
Age” arguably exists to draw attention to this symptom — but 
not, like other nonbiblical creation myths, to label it an 
avoidable vice. The contour of the poem suggests an 
irreversible and unavailable transition from the prehistoric 
golden age to “oure dayes.” The impotence of classical poets 
to suggest a way out — they, also, have come too late — shows 
off the ravenous, self-defeating impulses of “korving” and 
“grobbing” that mark the entire poem. If “hevene hath 
propretee of sikernesse,” as another short poem of Chaucer’s 
opines (“Fortune,” l. 69), nothing in this poem seems siker 
except the poem itself.  
It may be best to read the fact of this poem as a sort of 
puzzle, one that puzzles mainly because we call it Chaucer’s. 
The poet’s easy and even inevitable turn from “former” world 
into the present “(“our dayes,” continuing into now) is hardly 
jolting. Literary critics from the early modern period on have 
often been tempted to view Chaucer as an early exponent of 
the same later critics’ “modern” views. The tossings and 
turnings of The Book of the Duchess, the fitful dreams of 
Troilus upon his bed, and the refraction of a few estates into 
uncategorizable individuals on the road to Canterbury all 
could be read to proclaim Chaucer as a star in self-obsessed 
modernity’s firmament of heroic individuals who have helped 
to promote the individual’s cause. Facing a body of work with 
such a triumphant sense of character, it’s only right to ask 
how “The Former Age” — anonymously mourning the loss of 
a community, depicting individuals in the direst terms, and 
denying any poem to redress the wrongs it tells of — can 
possibly fit in.  
I think that the solution to this puzzle lies in its apparent 
form: the form not of a polished set of Georgics, still less part 
of a learned prosimetrum, but of a short and affecting, 
anonymous and vernacular folk song instead. Incongruously 
bringing to mind the voice of a “folk” in a poem whose 
classical memory denies folk memory and whose whole 
purpose seems to be to narrate the loss of such early 
communal mentality, Chaucer appears to honor that early 
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cohesion (“I” appears nowhere) even while embracing the 
implications of its loss.  Nor are all of these implications 
necessarily bad in themselves: just as effectively as lack of 
possessions had, might not a spirit of selfish dissension 
prevent tyranny from taking root? In that regard Chaucer 
further suggests that this poem’s sense of complaint, or more 
precisely its welding-together of ambition with complaint, 
might be able to forge new communities through time if not 
in space, in the words of polished texts if not in revolution’s 
candid speech.  
This essay has suggested that “The Former Age” and its 
use of a golden age tradition for anonymous lament 
demonstrates a yearning for production as well as a lack of 
true feeling in a fallen latter age, the fate of which seems dark 
indeed. True community in groups, true souls in individuals, 
seem never to have existed as both we and Chaucer’s readers 
would like to imagine. Human progress appears as dangerous, 
inexorable and merciless, as the grinding of gears in a 
machine. Chaucer’s “Former Age” is not without its own 
glimmer of hope, though — an original one at that, precisely 
through its heavy reliance on the classics and Boethius.  No 
matter his reason for evoking them, their former worlds too 
are made present by his act. That act’s power (and their 
















percutis, ut sanes, et occidis nos, ne moriamur abs te  
~Augustine, Confessions  
 
 
Figure 1. Stefano Maderno (1575-1636), Martyrdom of Saint Cecilia, 
S. Cecilia in Trastevere, Rome.1 
 
§ SYNOPSIS  
 
St. Cecilia’s botched beheading in Chaucer’s Second Nun’s 
Tale masterfully sculpts the conundrum of life/death 
liminality into a horrific three-day dilation of the moment of 
martyrdom, opening the decollative blow that typically 
coincides with receiving its crown into a series of unfinished 
                                                                                  
1 Photograph by Remi Jouan (2007): http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Datei:Santa_Ceciclia_Travesere_statue_%282%29.jpg. 




neck-cuts. Pinched between the cruelty of the headsman’s 
impotence, the idiotic inflexibility of the law, and her own 
sacred durability, Cecilia embodies the paradoxical idea of an 
unending, asymptotically inconclusive decapitation, an 
infinite series of beheading blows that never severs the head. 
Her hacked neck fuses into one form the two principles it 
figurally evokes: the unbeheadability of the body of God — 
“illius enim capita membra sumus. Non potest hoc corpus 
decollari” [“We are limbs of that head. This body cannot be 
decapitated”]2 — and the semi-living nature of fallen 
humanity, as signified through medieval allegorical 
interpretation of the traveler who is attacked by robbers on 
the road from Jerusalem to Jericho and left “half alive/half 
dead” [semivivus, emithane] (Luke 10:30). The unity of this 
form is equivalent to the differential non-difference (half alive 
= half dead) between the Greek and Latin terms. The three-
fold opening intensively multiplies the “zero degree of 
torture”3 into a single tertium quid that is indifferently beyond 
the distinction between life and death. Being half dead, Cecilia 
is ultimately alive. Being half alive, Cecilia is ultimately dead. 
Dwelling in the hyper-intimacy of extreme dereliction, Cecilia 
is a lacerated, ever-dilating theopathic icon of divinity’s 
absolute indifference to life and death, its being 
superessentially beyond both. Her three-day rest from both, 
during which she simultaneously does nothing and works all 
the more fervently, exemplifies the “passivity and absence of 
effort . . . in which divine transcendence is dissolved.”4  
 
Thre strokes in the nekke he smoot hire tho,   
The tormentour, but for no maner chaunce  
                                                                                  
2 Augustine, Ennarationes in Psalmos, 88.5, in Patrologia Latina, ed. 
J.P. Migne, 217 vols. (Paris, 1844-1855), 37:1122; hereafter referred to 
as PL, cited by volume and page number. 
3 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, 
trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage, 1995), 33. 
4 Georges Bataille, On Nietzsche, trans. Bruce Boone (London: 
Continuum, 2004), 135. 




He myghte noght smyte al hir nekke atwo;  
And for ther was that tyme an ordinaunce 
That no man sholde doon man swich 
penaunce  
The ferthe strook to smyten, softe or soore,  
This tormentour ne dorste do namoore,  
But half deed, with hir nekke ycorven there, 
He lefte hir lye, and on his wey he went. 
(VIII.526–534)5 
 
§ THRE STROKES IN THE NEKKE HE SMOOT HIRE THO 
 
The representation of the three strokes emits several rays of 
darkness, occult illuminations of significance from what the 
image hides. First, there is the darkness of the three-ness itself, 
the obscurity of its relation to the semi-beheading event. That 
the reason for the three is later provided in no way erases this 
significant obscurity. Not only does the explanation not touch 
the question of threeness itself, it rather exacerbates the 
obscurity by linking three-ness to the arbitrariness of the law, 
superadding the abstract/bureaucratic violence of law per se 
to the palpable violence of the strokes and thus intensifying 
their numerical enigma. This conjunction — an excellent 
object for contemplating more generally the intimacy between 
law and number, all the hidden complicities between the law 
of number and the number of law — is essentially temporal, a 
repetition of momentary indistinction between the time of the 
act (“tho”) and the time of the law (“ther was that tyme an 
ordinaunce”) that incisionally counts and literally strikes law 
upon body. (The word law, via OE lagu, itself indicates 
something set down, a stroke, and is related to lecgan [lay], 
which also means to slay, strike down; cf. the expression to lay 
into someone). The darkness of this relation, the hidden 
                                                                                  
5 All citations of Chaucer are from The Riverside Chaucer, gen. ed. 
Larry D. Benson, 3rd edn. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1987), cited by 
fragment and/or book number, and by line numbers. 




mechanical link between the constitutive time of the active 
instant and the historical time of its situation, opens into the 
deeper darkness of the triune law of time itself (past, present, 
future), the inescapability of its numbering. In light of 
Aristotle’s definition of time as “the number of movement in 
respect of the before and after,”6 thre strokes is simply a literal 
intensification of the wound of time, the continuum of its 
cutting into being.7 Still, however deep a significance for the 
three is given, it never touches the three-ness of the stroke 
itself as a specific phenomenal reality. For that is something, 
in its immediate facticity, behind which cause and reason 
necessarily recede. Three in this sense is the real time of 
(thinking with) the one experiencing being beheaded, with her 
who is being capitally cut off from all that does not matter by 
facing a simple brutality of one, two, three — the essential 
count of ex-per-ience itself or out-through-going. To see this 
experience (as opposed to imagining what it is like) means 
seeing a superlative identity between three and Cecilia’s semi-
beheading, a direct and immediate identity. This threeness, as 
the primary, first-word feature of the event, is the threeness of 
beheading itself, an essential threeness of the act that is 
paradoxically disclosed, like the being of Heidegger’s hammer, 
when beheading breaks down or fails to fulfill itself. The 
essential ‘count’ of beheading is three, in the sense of being a 
tertium quid produced in the severing of the head/body 
binarism. Compare with: “Severing also is still a joining and 
relating” and Dante’s description of the infernal cephalophore 
Bertran de Born as “due in uno e uno in due” (Inferno 
28.125).8 Beheading unlocks the invisible head-body holism, 
                                                                                  
6 Aristotle, Physics, 220a; in The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard 
McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941). 
7 The identification of the three strokes with time, as a perfect 
intersection of chronos and kairos, passing time and the moment of 
opportune crisis, is supported by the apocalyptic dimensions of the 
tale. See Eileen S. Janowski, “Chaucer’s ‘Second Nun’s Tale’ and the 
Apocalyptic Imagination,” Chaucer Review 36 (2001): 128–148.  
8 “[A]uch das Trennen ist noch ein Verbinden und Beziehen” 




the conjunction of each being within the other, into the 
negative conjunction of severed head and body. 
Decapitation’s count is three, and in three distinct ways: 1) 
serially, decapitation is the weird third thing that follows the 
separation of head (one) from body (two), a neither-head-
nor-body that includes and emerges from both; 2) additively, 
decapitation is the sum of its parts: head plus body (head + 
trunk) equals three, where head must be counted twice, as 
head and as part of body; 3) synthetically, decapitation is three 
as the union of its dualities, its two-in-one and one-in-two. 
The three-ness of beheading may also be sought within its 
twisted temporality, its being a specular folding of past, 
present, and future, or “an event that ends before it begins and 
begins after it ends.”9  
Second, there is the darkness of the syntactical contraction 
of the three strokes into one act. By eliding the experiential 
space between the strokes, this contraction deepens the event 
by not dramatizing it, like off-stage violence in a Greek 
tragedy. Three strokes in the nekke, as if part of one design (an 
idea artistically realized in the Cecilia sculpture at the 
cathedral in Albi), silently equates the passing of the strokes 
with the unrepresentable, leaving it suspended and all the 
more present as something that does not enter into memory. 
Why? Because the passing of the three strokes, the durational 
suffering of them, is something radically unworthy of 
                                                                                  
(Martin Heidegger, “Logik: Heraklits Lehre vom Logos,” in Heraklit, 
‘Gesamtausgabe,’ Bd. 55 [Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 
1970], 337). Dante Alighieri, The Divine Comedy, ed. Giorgio 
Petrocchi, trans. Charles S. Singleton (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1979); all further citations of Dante are from this 
edition, by canto and line number. On these principles, see And They 
Were Two In One And One In Two, eds. Nicola Masciandaro and 
Eugene Thacker (New York: n.p., 2011).  
9 Nicola Masciandaro, “Non potest hoc corpus decollari: Beheading 
and the Impossible,” in Heads Will Roll: Decapitation in Medieval 
Literature and Culture, eds. Larissa Tracy and Jeff Massey (Leiden: E. 
J. Brill, 2012), 15–39. 




recollection. Not because it is to be forgotten, but because it is 
only known without recording, understood immediately in the 
absence of memorial entrapment and deformation. This silent 
passing of the strokes does not simply encode trauma, the real 
live wounding that never passes into language and is 
(dis)remembered symptomatically. It is something deeper: the 
exact openness of being wounded that will not, by its own 
deep transcendence of suffering in suffering, be circumscribed 
in any repetition whatsoever. Behind the baser darkness of the 
terrifying dilation of decapitation’s ideal instantaneity into 
three-fold time there lies the more brilliant darkness of 
Cecilia’s radical or totally rooted self-opening under the blade, 
her unrecordable dismembering. The unending opening of 
beheading into three exposes the shining obscurity of the 
deeper time that is the very place of Cecilia’s rootedness in 
God, the enigmatic ease of her actually being what Gawain 
only momentarily and with great difficulty achieves: “grathely 
hit bydez and glent with no membre / Bot stode stylle as the 
ston other a stubbe auther / That ratheled is in roche grounde 
with rotez a hundredth” [“Truly he awaits it and flinched with 
no member, but stood still as a stone, or a stump that is 
anchored in rocky ground with a hundred roots”].10 This 
rootless rootedness or abyssal stillness is the passional seed 
and prefiguration of the three-day half-death that follows 
(“Thre dayes lyved she in this torment,” VIII.537) — a 
temporal imitation of Christ’s entombment that the triune 
beheading law enables with perfect providential perversity, 
intimating a ready-made path to revolutionary salvation via 
suffering of the law’s very letter, i.e., martyrdom as hyper 
literal head tax: “Render unto Caesar . . .” (Matthew 22:21). 
The saint’s living three days in half-death is not simply the 
effect of surviving three strokes. It is the fulfillment and 
produced end of her real passive acting or intentional 
                                                                                  
10 Anonymous, Gawain and the Green Knight, in Poems of the Pearl 
Manuscript, eds. Malcolm Andrew and Ronald Waldron (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1978), ll. 2293–2295. 




endurance of all of them as one. Without this mysterious 
intention the specific duration of the survival would be 
senseless, whence Cecilia’s subsequent revelation of her secret 
request, To han respite thre dayes and namo (VIII.543), and its 
correspondence with the three-stroke maximum: This 
tormentour ne dorste do namoore (VIII.532). Note also the 
formulation of the wish, as if the prolonging of her death were 
a postponement of, or even rest from, execution (respite also 
connotes cessation of suffering),11 rather than its brutally 
extended form. Occupying the negativity of limit (namoore), 
the full threshold of the end, Cecilia here demonstrates how 
transcendent ceaselessness is a constraint-based art, a spiritual 
exercise of freedom that necessarily and paradoxically 
operates within strict conditions. Never ceasing — She nevere 
cessed (VIII.124); nevere cessed (VIII.538) — is an infinite 
work of finitude, not a task of those who think they have all 
day. The darkness of Cecilia’s intense openness to beheading 
may thus be formulated as an aggressive form of amor fati 
that fiercely insists from within on experiencing all three 
strokes, on passing through the full force of necessity, 
precisely without recourse to any external means that would 
enforce or facilitate that passage. The prolongation it 
produces is not a matter of experience-hunger, of wanting 
more life. Rather it is the need to arrive oneself to the real end, 
as opposed to merely being there when it is over. The last 
thing a saint wants is to die in her sleep. Die awake, so awake 
that experience runs ahead of death; show up for life, finally. 
Cecilia is not loitering or lingering on the boundary between 
this life and the next — “surely it is the height of folly for you 
to linger on this bridge.”12 She is crossing it so busily that 
death itself cannot happen or take place without protracted 
difficulty. In sum, the real subject of Thre strokes in the nekke . 
. . is the preposition in, the place where Cecilia’s desire 
                                                                                  
11 Middle English Dictionary, s.v. “respite,” 1b. 
12 Hakim Sinai, The Walled Garden of Truth, trans. David 
Pendlebury (London: Octagon Press, 1974), 52. 




operates, freely exposing the strength of its utter submission 
to God. Julian of Norwich understands this: “I harde telle . . . 
of the storye of Sainte Cecille . . . that she hadde thre woundes 
with a swerde in the nekke . . . By the stirringe of this, I 
consyvede a mighty desire, pryande oure lorde God that he 
wolde graunte me thre woundes in my life time [contrition, 
compassion, and longing for God] . . . withouten any 
condition.”13 As does Bataille: “incapable of doing anything — 
I survive — in laceration. And with my eyes, I follow a 
shimmering light that turns me into its plaything.”14 
Third, there is the darkness of the headsman’s intention. 
The primary and normal sense is that the headsman is not 
intending three strokes but is attempting thrice to behead her 
in one. This is supported by the assumption that this is what 
he, as headsman, should be intending and by the subsequent 
indication that was unable to (He myghte noght), which 
implies that he was in fact trying his best or attempting to 
apply a maximum of strength and skill to the effort. This is 
also supported by the earliest version of the Passio and 
subsequent versions: “[Q]uam cum speculator tertio ictu 
percussisset, caput eius amputare non potuit”;15 “Quam 
spiculator tribus ictibus in collo percussit, sed tamen caput 
eius amptare non potuit”;16 “The quellar smot with al his 
mayn, threo sithe on the swere / He ne mighte for nothinge 
smitten hit of.”17 Yet there are other more obscure 
possibilities, various clouds in the headsman’s will, divisible 
into those that fall under the normal sense of his intention 
and those that do not. The former will be more properly 
                                                                                  
13 The Writings of Julian of Norwich, eds. Nicholas Watson & 
Jacqueline Jenkins (University Park: Pennsylvania State University 
Press, 2006), 65, my emphasis. 
14 On Nietzsche, trans. Bruce Boone (London: Continuum, 1992), 91. 
15 Giacomo Laderchi, S. Caeciliae Virg[inis] et Mart[yris] Acta. . . 
(Rome, 1723), 38. 
16 Jacobus de Voragine, Legenda Aurea, ed. T. Graesse (Leipzig: 
Impensis Librariae Arnoldianae, 1850), 777. 
17 The Life of St. Cecilia, ed. Albert S. Cook (Boston, 1898), 91. 




discussed with respect to the next line. The latter comprises 
several intersecting possibilities, all of which are supported by 
the basely literal sense of Thre strokes . . . he smoot hire, 
namely, that the headsman simply struck Cecilia three times 
in the neck. Some of these are: 1) that the headsman wanted to 
torture Cecilia, to deny her a quick death, either by 
protracting the beheading or not beheading her at all; 2) that 
he did not want to harm Cecilia, but was compelled to, and 
thus did so minimally; 3) that he didn’t care about what he 
was doing and performed the task without proper intention; 
and 4) that he was intentionally conflicted, subject to opposed 
desires, and acted through some complicated combination of 
the above, perhaps changing his mind in the process. There is 
also a third and stranger kind of intentional darkness that is 
between and outside these distinctions, namely, the possibility 
that the headsman did indeed try his best but only via a pure 
and spontaneous decay of intention, a nameless form of 
volitional perforation whereby the will, not in relation to any 
other interfering object but precisely in relation to nothing, 
secretly and suddenly (sua sponte), lacks itself. Such intention 
is dark in the sense of being the subject of a clinamen or weird 
swerve that occurs, as Lucretius says, at no fixed place or time, 
only here the clinamen must be construed as itself weirded by 
the full perseveration of the originary intention — a swerve 
that travels in a straight line, as it were. Such a dark will, a will 
that purely is and is not one’s own, is well figured in the three 
non-severing strokes in that they do hit their mark, but 
inexplicably without realization of the intention for doing so. 
Although this potential negative spontaneity of the 
headsman’s will must be thought apart from possibilistic 
conditions or chance, it may be inversely compared to the 
event and experience of hitting a target by only diffidently or 
naively attempting to, that is, the situation where one succeeds 
in fulfilling an intention without really trying to. In that case, 
an intention’s deficiency becomes the paradoxical means of its 
realization, so that one strangely cannot take credit for 
succeeding at what one meant to do. In this case, an intention’s 




integrity is the paradoxical site of its non-realization (but not 
because of any external factors), so that one must take credit 
(if that were possible) for failing at what one meant to do on 
the basis of that meaning alone, that is, for a pure, 
unknowable, and thus unconfessable kind of failure that 
cannot properly be located in the will, or its application, or the 
difference between them. Although this third kind of 
intentional darkness is very difficult to conceive in practical 
terms, it may be fittingly defined in this hagiographic context 
as a momentary negative occasionalism or local withdrawal of 
divine omnipresence as universal intermediary of all action. 
The idea of such withdrawal also furnishes a more general 
theory of passion miracles, which so often involve a 
suspension of the capacity for things to touch, especially in the 
context of the comic impotence of violence to effect its ends. 
This may be conceived externally (blades fail to cut, fire fails 
to burn, etc.) but also internally, with respect to the mechanics 
of mental powers, so that the headsman’s will may be thought 
of as failing to touch itself and thus spinning in place like a 
disengaged primum mobile. The will still moves, gives every 
appearance of being itself, yet is somehow suspended in an 
essential detachment from its own being. Such a darkening of 
the headsman’s will, which may be correlated as well to the 
executioner’s traditional head covering and its symbolic 
removal of personal agency from legal murder, thus 
represents the perfect profane counterpoint to the celestial 
motion of Cecilia: “[As] hevene is swift and round and eek 
brennynge, / Right so was faire Cecilie the white / Ful swift 
and bisy evere in good werkynge, / And round and hool in 
good perseverynge / And brennynge evere in charite ful 
brighte” (VIII.114–118). Ultimately, the dark will of the 
headsman is visible as the intimate shadow of Cecilia’s own, 
the adjacent negative outline of her alchemical burning and 








§  HE MYGHTE NOGHT SMYTE AL HIR NEKKE ATWO 
 
The headsman’s failure to sever Cecilia’s neck, considered as 
an evental contradiction or prevention of his exercised will, 
fulfills the characteristically Christian renunciatory logic of 
strength-through-weakness: “for when I am weak, then I am 
strong” (2 Corinthians 12:10). There is a real dialectical 
relation between Cecilia’s self-exposure and her material 
power to withstand the tormentor’s blows. The obscurity of 
this relation concerns the actual location of this strength, 
which may be understood as existing everywhere, nowhere, or 
locally somewhere. Of these possibilities, locating the power 
in her neck seems the simplest and most physically plausible 
solution. It also offers the beauty of an inverse re-writing of 
the biblical trope of “stiff-necked” (durae cervicis) pride (e.g. 
Exodus 34:9, compare with “la cervice mia superba,” Dante, 
Purgatorio 11.53), whereby the humble neck, bending itself 
freely before the blow, achieves a truly superior durability. 
Literalizing in reverse the psychomachean allegory of 
Humility’s decapitation of Pride,18 Cecilia’s humbly-strong 
cervix stops the instrument that would violate it, exposing the 
fundamental weakness of its wielder vis-à-vis her uncuttable 
sancity — a correlative fulfillment of the verse, “Dominus 
iustus concidit cervices peccatorum” [“The Lord who is just 
will cut the necks of sinners”] (Psalms 128.4). As this line is 
read by Augustine in reference to “proud sinners in particular, 
the arrogant, stiff-necked kind,”19 so Cecilia’s saintly neck-
strength signifies an ordinate spiritual obstinacy and pride, a 
pure relentless refusal of the false which is paradoxically 
demonstrated in the inviolable openness and impenetrable 
nudity of an extreme passivity that renders action itself 
passive and inoperative, making agency the comically abject 
                                                                                  
18 See text of poem in Prudentius, Against Symmachus, ed. H.J. 
Thomson, Vol. 2 (Cambridge, Mass.: Loeb Classical Library, 1979), 
109–143 (esp. ll. 280–286). 
19 Augustine, Expositions of the Psalms, trans. Maria Boulding (Hyde 
Park: New City Press, 2004), 128.4. 




subject of its patient. On this point the impotent headsman is 
unveiled as the profane opposite of Cecilia’s angelic protector, 
who will instantly kill whoever improperly touches her body: 
“I have an aungel which that loveth me, / That with greet love, 
wher so I wake or sleepe, / Is redy ay my body for to kepe. / 
And if that he may feelen, out of drede, / That ye me touche, 
or love in vileynye, / He right anon wol sle yow with the dede” 
(VIII.152–157). In light of this aura of protection, it is all the 
more meaningful, as an image of authentic or do-it-yourself 
sanctity, that Cecilia appears to survive beheading on her own 
strength, without external intervention of the sort provided by 
John the Baptist when Sanctulus of Nursia, facing the power 
of “the strongest headsman, of whom there was no doubt that 
with one stroke he could sever the head,” calls out, “Saint 
John, get hold of him!” and “instantly the striker’s arm 
became stiff and inflexible, and held the sword heavenward.”20 
Still, the precise nature of the no maner chaunce whereby the 
executioner myghte not sever Cecilia’s neck remains 
uncertain. The expression no maner chaunce signifies 
impossibility as a negativity or limit that governs probability 
from the outside and also suggests the idea of proving that 
impossibility through exhaustion of possibilities, the failure of 
trial and error. This sense fulfills the weaker sense of myghte, 
“in which the ability or potentiality becomes mere 
possibility,”21 whereas the stronger sense (to be strong, have 
power, be able) makes less sense when governed by no maner 
chaunce.22 Indeed, the semantic hierarchy of the verb provides 
                                                                                  
20 Jacobus de Voragine, The Golden Legend, trans. William Granger 
Ryan, 2 vols. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 2:140. 
21 Middle English Dictionary, s.v. “mouen,” 3. 
22 More generally, the text requires us to undecidably entertain the 
differences between: a) the headsman in no way having sufficient 
power to sever Cecilia’s neck (because it is too resilient, naturally or 
supernaturally); b) the headsman’s having sufficient power to sever 
her neck and in no way being able to activate it for some reason; and 
c) the headsman’s having sufficient power and activating it but in no 
way succeeding to sever her neck because of some contingency. 




a good account, whatever the specific actuality of the event, of 
the swordsman’s situation as a suffering of the demotion of 
one’s power into an unavailable option, the becoming 
impossible of a power. The causal darkness of the scene thus 
lies precisely in its representation of an odd event of 
obstacleless interruption: nothing interferingly stops you from 
doing what you are doing but something nonetheless prevents 
it from happening. The negative or non-event reaches 
reversely into new and seemingly impossible forms of 
impossibility, all the stranger because things are working, 
moving forward, namely, the sword is indeed cutting into 
Cecilia’s flesh. The wonder of the semi-beheading revolves 
around a pair of unaccountable intersecting conjunctions: the 
executioner’s simultaneous impotency and effectivity, and the 
saint’s simultaneous durability and receptivity. To synthesize 
these double sides of the situation is difficult. Moving in the 
direction of diffuseness, we may imagine deficient blows 
slicing into minimally resistant flesh, a kind of pathetic 
miraculous in which the divine power can only barely raise 
itself into the world by displacing a little of the world’s own 
force, sucking a small amount of power from the agent and 
blowing it into the patient. Moving in the direction of 
intensity, we may imagine very powerful blows slicing 
maximally resistant flesh, a kind of heroic miraculous in 
which the divine power cannot resist dramatically presenting 
itself by meeting the force of the world face to face, inspiring 
the patient with power to endure an equally inspired agent. 
Alternately, we may imagine some admixture of the two 
alternatives spread across the three strokes, or a mutual 
cancellation of them altogether: a truly ridiculous eventuality 
in which the saint requires no divine intervention whatsoever 
because her neck is naturally strong enough to survive three 
blows from an inept headsman. All possibilities violate the 
                                                                                  
Inability must be distinguished from impossibility, even though they 
may overlap. Aristotle considers the senses of inability as privation of 
potency in Metaphysics, 1046a (Basic Works of Aristotle).       




decollative ideal of instantaneous death and thereby only 
exacerbate the spectacle of suffering, multiplying the three 
blows into a matrix of possibilities that nowhere presents any 
relief from their endurance. Nor is the darkness of the 
situation’s causal insolubility ever resolved. Rather, it is 
marvelously all-the-more occluded by the raw presence of 
Cecilia’s suffering and the subsequent revelation of her wish, 
in which the weird how of the event is transmuted into the 
fulfillment of its demonstrative actuality: “Thre dayes lyved 
she in this torment . . .  ‘I axed this of hevene kyng’” 
(VIII.537–542). And yet the specificity of the request and its 
fulfillment only underscores the realization of a precise 
modulation of psycho-physical forces that ends life in three 
days through wounds. Volitionally persevering herself as an 
unseverable unicity that will not be cut “atwo,” Cecilia 
chooses, with more or less understanding of that will’s 
operation, even the terms of her affliction.23     
 
§ HALF DEED 
 
The term half deed correctly translates seminecem from the 
original Passio: “seminecem eam cruentus carnifex dereliquit” 
(38). In the Legenda Aurea, which Chaucer also drew upon, 
                                                                                  
23 My argument thus fulfills, by taking one step further, Elizabeth 
Robertson’s reading of Chaucer’s Cecilia as an exemplar of the 
“inherently radical nature” of choice (“Apprehending the Divine and 
Choosing to Believe: Voluntarist Free Will in Chaucer’s Second Nun’s 
Tale,” The Chaucer Review 46 [2011]: 130). Robertson emphasizes 
“Cecilia’s choice to exert her free will . . . despite extreme physical 
exertion” (129) and more importantly, discerns how violence in the 
tale is “a metaphor for the nature of choice itself” in light of the 
voluntarist understanding of choice as marking “a radical shift from 
one domain to the next, from indeterminacy to determinacy, from 
potency to act” (130). My point is that precisely in these terms 
Cecilia’s will must be read as mysteriously touching and operating 
upon the reality of her own execution.     




semivivam sometimes occurs.24 The interchangeability of the 
terms is indicated by an entry in the Medulla Grammatice: 
“Seminecis: half dede, half kwyk,”25 but similar attention to 
literal correctness is shown in the two versions of the 
Wycliffite Bible, which translate the half-alive victim of the 
good Samaritan parable (“et plagis impositis abierunt 
semivivo relicto,” Luke 10:30) with “half quyk” and “half 
alyue,”26 and in Langland’s version of the parable we have: “for 
semyvif he semed, / And as naked as a needle, and noon help 
abouten.”27 Half-dead may enjoy a certain general conceptual 
priority over half-alive, insofar as the term is deployed by the 
living, from the perspective of life, within which it seems more 
natural to think the liminal state in terms of the constitutive 
opposite (death) rather than the pure privation of one’s own 
state. The distinction between the interchangeable terms is 
also clearly related to the connoted futurity of emphasis, where 
the chosen term implies a potential for or movement into its 
increase, i.e., half-alive as nearly dead and (perhaps) going-to-
live, half-dead as barely alive and (perhaps) going-to-die. The 
distinction was in fact important to medieval exegesis of good 
Samaritan parable, for which half-alive signifies the fallen but 
redeemable nature of sinful humanity,28 as clarified in the 
twelfth-century Lambeth Homilies: 
 
They (the devils) left him half alive; half alive he was 
when that he had sorrow within himself for his sins. 
                                                                                  
24 Sherry L. Reames, “The Second Nun’s Prologue and Tale,” in 
Sources and Analogues of the Canterbury Tales I, eds. Robert M. 
Correale and Mary Hamel, 2 vols. (Cambridge, Eng.: D.S. Brewer, 
2002), 1:514. 
25 Middle English Dictionary, s.v. “half,” adj. 1c. 
26 Middle English Dictionary, s.v. “half,” adj. 1c. 
27 The Vision of Piers Plowman: A Complete Edition of the B-Text, ed. 
A.V.C. Schmidt (London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1978), B.XVII.57–58. 
28 See, for example, Origen, Homilies on Luke, trans. Joseph T. 
Lienhard (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 
1996), Homily 34; Augustine, Sermo 131.6; PL 38:732. 




Here we ought to understand why it says ‘half alive’ 
[alf quic] and not ‘half dead’. Hereof we may take an 
example by two brands (torches), when the one is 
aquenched altogether, and the other is aquenched 
except a little spark; the one that hath the one spark in 
it we may blow and it will quicken (revive) and kindle 
the whole brand. The brand that is wholly quenched, 
though one blow on it for ever, may never again be 
kindled. These two brands betoken two men: the one 
sinneth and is sorry for his sin, but cannot subdue his 
flesh . . . This other man sinneth and loveth his sins.29 
 
In light of the half-alive/half-dead distinction, there are 
several specific senses to Chaucer’s use of half deed in relation 
to Cecilia. First, half deed emphasizes the fact that she is going 
to die, that she is closer to death than life, yet precisely for that 
reason nonetheless alive and indeed paradoxically living all 
the more intensely in intimacy with the other side of life for 
the three days during which she “never cessed hem the faith to 
teche / That she hadde fostred” (VIII.538–539). Second, the 
term emphasizes, in light of the allegorical logic of the 
Samaritan parable, Cecilia’s independence from external 
divine aid, the fact that her martyric miracle consists only in a 
little more life. That is all she requires. No supernatural 
displays, no hagio-grotesque cephalophory, no dramatic leap 
into the al di là, just a three-day expansion of the “zero degree 
of torture” into an opportunity “that I myghte do werche” 
(VIII.545). Rather than a liberating spiritual consummation of 
the sort exemplified by Prudentius’s account of St. Agnes’s 
beheading, in which angelic flight follows a swift death,30 
                                                                                  
29 Old English Homilies and Homiletic Treatises, ed. Richard Morris 
(London: N. Trubner & Co., 1868), 80. 
30 “[S]he bowed her head and humbly worshipped Christ, so that her 
bending neck should be readier to suffer the impending blow; and 
the executioner's hand fulfilled her great hope, for at one stroke he 
cut off her head and swift death forestalled the sense of pain. Now 
the disembodied spirit springs forth and leaps in freedom into the 




Cecilia’s passion fulfills itself in her staying here, in 
remaining, lying in the state in which the world leaves her. 
Third, half deed harmonizes with the principle of mors 
mystica, the mystic death to self necessary for divine union, as 
per Julian of Norwich’s “mighty desire” for an unconditional 
spiritual wounding cited above. It places the saint, still living, 
wholly within death, disclosing at once the saint’s self-
transcendence and the fundamental unreality of death itself. 
Here half deed perfectly signifies the essential negativity of the 
realization of a pure, as it were, contentless plenitude, like the 
actus purus identified with God, in which experience, the 
whole out-through-going of temporal being, is abandoned in 
the very midst of time, “not an experience of absence but 
rather an absence of experience — or even better, a point of 
indiscretion where this distinction would itself collapse.”31 
Fourth, half deed partakes of Chaucer’s characteristic death-
privileging interest in figuring life/death liminality: “neither 
quyk ne ded” (Troilus and Criseyde 3.79); “Always deynge and 
be not ded” (Book of the Duchess 588), “Myself I mordre with 
my privy thought” (Anelida and Arcite 291); “My throte is kut 
unto my nekke boon . . . and as by wey of kynde / I sholde 
have dyed, ye, longe tyme agon” (Prioress’s Tale VII.649–651); 
“and leften hire for deed, and wenten away” (Tale of Melibee 
VII.972), etc. This interest is most clearly shown in his 
handling of the scene of Arcite and Palamon’s discovery in the 
Knight’s Tale. Boccaccio, his source, places great emphasis on 
the vital sensitivity of the wounded knights, who cry out when 
they are found: “due giovani fediti dolorando / quivi trovaro, 
sanz’ alcun riposo; / e ciaschedun la morte domandava, / tanto 
dolor del lor mal gli gravava” [“they found there two young 
men critically wounded and in constant pain; and so much 
did the pain of their injuries afflict them, that each one begged 
                                                                                  
air, and angels are around her as she passes along the shining path” 
(Prudentius, Crowns of Martyrdom, in Prudentius, Against 
Symmachus, 14.85–93). 
31 Thomas A. Carlson, Indiscretion: Finitude and the Naming of God 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 257. 




to die”].32 Chaucer elides completely this pain and passion, 
replacing it with a double negative that pushes their being into 
a more purely liminal state of suspension: “Nat fully quyke, ne 
fully dede they were” (I.1015). Subtracted from both life and 
death, the double knights appropriately inhabit a strange kind 
of vaguely intensive double death, half-dead to life and half-
dead to death, which produces a dark suggestion proper to the 
tale: they may be brought back to life, but only for further 
death. The scene provides a clarifying counterpoint to 
Cecilia’s passion. Where the Theban knights’ neither-live-nor-
dead state represents a passive death-in-life that may be 
awakened to deathly passion, Cecilia’s half-death embodies an 
active life-in-death that expresses and opens into supra-living 
passion, “brennyge evere in charite ful brighte” (Knight’s Tale 
VIII.118), i.e. the superessential divine life that “live[s] in a 
fashion surpassing other living things.”33 Crucially, however, 
Chaucer places the superlative intensity of Cecilia’s saintly 
living wholly within this life, without any reference to another 
world or afterlife, and thus necessarily within death—an 
orientation that participates in the tale’s emphasis on the 
availability of paradise in the temporal here and now: “The 
swete smel that in myn herte I fynde / Hath chaunged me al in 
another kynde” (VIII.251–252). There is another world: this 
one. Cecilia’s half-death is deathly, ghastly, an ‘unbearable’ 
torment of being neither here nor there, alive nor dead. Yet it 
is so precisely as an index of the general lived nature of this 
life vis-à-vis its radical potential to produce and experience 
the true anagogy of the present, a foretaste of eternity that 
needs no future or other life. Next to this revolutionary life, 
the whole world is indeed half-dead.       
 
 
                                                                                  
32 Boccaccio, Teseida 2.85; cited from Robert M. Correale and Mary 
Hamel, Sources and Analogues of the Canterbury Tales, 2 vols. 
(Cambridge: D.S. Brewer, 2003), 2:138. 
33 Pseudo-Dionysius, Divine Names, 5.3; in Complete Works, trans. 
Colm Luibheid (New York: Paulist Press, 1987). 




§  HE LEFTE HIR LYE, AND ON HIS WEY HE WENT 
 
The executioner’s abandonment of Cecilia, especially with the 
reference to “his wey,” which is nowhere in the sources, 
evokes the dereliction of the victim in the good Samaritan 
parable, left “half-alive” on the road between Jerusalem and 
Jericho. In this context, the executioner emerges more 
specifically as a liminal figure intentionally half way between 
the thieves who harm the victim and the travelers who fail to 
help him. He is like the thieves in that he is the direct agent of 
the violence and a willing participant in its purpose. He is like 
the passersby in that he is not himself the cause of the 
violence, but someone who similarly fails to help the victim, 
neither caring for her nor mercifully killing her. In these 
terms he is a special kind of subject of the law, the subject who 
enforces its letter but remains neutral with respect to the 
present, situational question of its spirit, someone seemingly 
equally unable/unwilling to either stand outside the law (do 
anything beyond it) or transgress it (do anything against it). 
The tormentor’s walking away is a conspicuous index of this 
inability/unwillingness, an a-instrumental surplus action that 
also marks him as a subject in the first place, an individualized 
intentional being who exists in relation to things whether he 
will or no. Crucially, the action encompasses opposite 
possibilities, possibilities which indeterminately coincide 
around the specificity of “his way,” that is, around the 
indication that the tormentor does not simply walk away, but 
takes a way specific to him. On the one hand, the tormentor’s 
walking away suggests the idea of open refusal, not in the 
name of anything, but simply in the name of what is other 
than the situation at hand. On the other hand, the walking 
away suggests not refusal at all, but only a movement into 
nothing, or the movement of whatever kind of self-interest, 
having ‘something better’ to do. There is no deciding the 
intention of the tormentor’s walking way—that is the point. 
He appears only in his disappearance and through a 
fundamental ambivalence, at once a potentially redeemable 




subject of the drama, an outsider with a future perhaps 
intimately related to its truth, and its worst kind of 
protagonist, a pure practitioner of its (ideological) structure, 
the truly neither-living-nor-dead, neither-hot-nor-cold 
subject whose business-as-usual, spiritless ‘life’ is nothing but 
a self-serving and sleepily sinful concatentation of omissive 
com-missions and comissive omissions.        
 Chaucer’s interest in the figure of the executioner as 
subject is also indicated by his non-translation of the vilifying, 
objectifying adjectives applied to him in the sources (cruentus, 
truculentus). Instead, the poet gives him no adjectives at all 
and signifies him deictically, “This tormentor,” which has the 
effect of identifying him as a specific person, an individual: 
This dark who is neither a character nor a mere human prop, 
but someone whose intentionality is essentially and con-
stitutively bound up with the climactic event of the drama, but 
in a fundamentally impersonal way. As my analysis has 
hopefully shown, Cecilia’s near beheading is unthinkable 
without reference to what is ‘going on’ with the headsman, 
what is up with him. His failure to finish the job is not only 
negatively at the center of the show, but is ironically upstaged 
by the saint’s dynamic ability to complete her work three days 
beyond the evident hour of her death. It signifies both as a 
negative exemplum of the work-ethic that governs the tale and 
as an indispensable cog in the providential logic of the 
hagiography. What accounts for Chaucer’s creation of this 
indeterminate space of identity around Cecilia’s tormentor? 
 Nothing, I prefer to think. Allowing the headsman to walk 
away and be his own no-one, Chaucer exercises a dark, 
inscrutable charity toward the even darker subject of the 





H  In the Event of the Franklin’s Tale 
 
J. Allan Mitchell 
 
 
There is no truth to delimit in the event. Events come, if ever 
they arrive, to designate fields of pure possibility and 
emergent futurity.  Consider one old tale of “diverse 
aventures” (V.710), Chaucer’s Franklin’s Tale.1 Somewhere in 
Brittany, Dorigen is happily married to the knight Arveragus, 
having recently pledged her undying love. “Have heer my 
trouthe — til that myn herte breste” (V.759). Soon he goes on 
an expedition abroad. Dorigen watches ships come to port in 
the hopes that one will return her husband safely, and she is 
tormented by thoughts of his foundering. Dorigen cultivates a 
“derke fantasye” (V.844), meditating on the hazards of a 
seascape that consists of “grisly rokkes blake” (V.859) just 
offshore. They are menacing and apparently meaningless 
obstacles to her happiness. She cannot shake bleak thoughts of 
a possible fatality, despite friends’ comforting words and 
pleasant distractions. Then something unexpected does 
happen. At a dance, the amorous squire Aurelius propositions 
Dorigen, begging her mercy. She rejects his advances, tactfully 
couching her reply in terms that are described as playful: she 
says she will yield to Aurelius only if he removes the 
dangerous rocks that threaten her beloved husband. “Have 
heer my trouthe, in al that evere I kan” (V.998). It would seem 
                                                                                  
1 All citations of Chaucer’s Franklin’s Tale are from The Riverside 
Chaucer, gen. ed. Larry D. Benson, 3rd edn. (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin, 1987), by fragment and line number. 
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impossible. But Dorigen’s so-called rash promise to Aurelius 
is a fateful utterance carried away by further events, 
accompanied by a powerful sense of foreboding, setting in 
motion so many impossibilities. Dorigen and expectant 
readers of the tale subsequently drift towards a future of still 
more improbable events.  
The Franklin’s Tale is a tale of real “aventure,” the 
ramifications of which are hard to fathom. Radical 
contingency acts as a solvent to sense and significance for 
anyone who begins to contemplate all of the reversals of 
fortune.  Prodigal in the extreme, the tale can seem almost 
gratuitous, aleatory, free-wheeling. It is notable that Chaucer 
generates the crisis for characters and readers alike from 
within a quasi-pagan perspective that shows little respect for 
Christian theodicy, imagining a remote time and place — a 
heathen Breton outcrop before the arrival of the Truth — 
where there is no assurances of providential rule, reason, or 
justice. Neither does the tale issue an ultimate truth about the 
events it describes: the narrative is strictly a-theistic insofar as 
events are refractory to creeds, themes, and theses, though 
even that may be affirming too much. Here whatever meaning 
is arrived at, the truth is another eventuality.  But you get the 
drift. 
 
§ BECOMING ASTONED 
 
As indicated, Dorigen makes confident professions of her 
“trouthe” on two occasions, and then gets carried away. But 
you could hardly have expected more from her in the event. 
Notice how she takes the “grisly rokkes blake” to be 
unyielding fixtures. They will underwrite her truth, projecting 
her into unknown futures: 
 
Eterne God, that thurgh thy purveiaunce 
Ledest the world by certein governaunce, 
In ydel, as men seyn, ye no thyng make. 
But, Lord, thise grisly feendly rokkes blake, 
That semen rather a foul confusion 
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Of werk than any fair creacion 
Of swich a parfit wys God and a stable, 
Why han ye wroght this werk unresonable? 
For by this werk, south, north, ne west, ne eest, 
Ther nys yfostred man, ne bryd, ne beest; 
It dooth no good, to my wit, but anoyeth. 
Se ye nat, Lord, how mankynde it destroyeth? 
An hundred thousand bodyes of mankynde 
Han rokkes slayn, al be they nat in mynde . . .  
(V.865–878) 
 
She sees no rapprochement between the articles of faith 
(divine purveiaunce and governaunce) and material conditions 
on the ground, pitting one against the other. Both seem 
inexorable. The rocks for their part evoke the terror of hard 
and intractable reality set against other things relatively soft 
and vulnerable to change, namely those “hundred thousand 
bodyes of mankynde.” The evidence points to “foul 
confusion,” not “fair creacion,” though she imagines some 
clever clerk might nonetheless lamely argue, “al is for the 
beste” (V.886). But none steps forward, and Dorigen dilates 
on the damned confusion, as if taking up a theologian’s task. 
The situation is darker and more demanding than it first 
appears, and it implicates readers who follow and feel for her 
plight. It is basically the ignorance you share with Dorigin, 
locked into resonance with her sense of the occasion. 
Characters and readers both reside in the exigent moment of 
particular narrative occurrence into which vital bodies are 
thrown, prior to the realization of any authorial order 
(purveiaunce and governaunce again), where you wrestle with 
things as a set of eventualities, fortuities, flukes.  The threat 
seems to lie in the stability and solidity of the rocks, but of 
course no one ever expects the worst. How could Dorigen 
anticipate the event?  Could you? 
 For the time being the black rocks seem to guarantee her 
stability no matter what may occur, grounding her assertion 
of “trouthe.”  That becomes clear in her promise to Aurelius: 
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Looke what day that endelong Britayne 
Ye remoeve alle the rokkes, stoon by stoon, 
That they ne lette ship ne boot to goon — 
I seye, whan ye han maad the coost so clene 
Of rokkes that ther nys no stoon ysene, 
Thanne wol I love yow best of any man; 
Have heer my trouthe, in al that evere I kan.  
(V.992–998) 
 
She plainly means what she says, “in pley” (V.988): she in 
effect asserts that when lovers can remodel coastlines at will, 
only then would she betray her marriage vows, for the known 
world would have become so unnatural and untrue that there 
would be no grounds for constancy. And that if the rocks were 
removed, she would have cleared the way for her husband’s 
safe landing, which only then could make a sacrifice of her 
constancy tolerable. This is facetious hyperbole, but it is near 
the truth. Far from giving in to adulterous desire, she 
expresses heartfelt concern for her husband Arveragus. 
Aurelius immediately grasps the import: “‘Madame,’ quod he, 
‘this were an inpossible!’” (V.1009).  
Both assume that things will remain the same, and yet 
Dorigen’s playful promise will betray her when circumstances 
change so drastically as to reorder her understanding of truth, 
freedom, possibility, and substance. Anything is possible in 
the event. As it happens, she encounters the actual fluidity of 
the coastline when the rocks are made to disappear into the 
shoals. Not just the content of her words but also the 
foundation of the world becomes liquid, labile, groundless. It 
turns out that Aurelius has employed a canny clerk from 
Orleans to help remove all the rocks, stone by stone. Capable 
of clever illusions and “magyk natureel” (V.1125, 1155), the 
clerk somehow manages to make them disappear for a week 
or two. For Dorigen the event is distressing, and completely 
unexpected. A familiar waterfront view has in effect regressed 
to the primordial moment of flux at creation — as when the 
earth was void and empty, and darkness was upon the face of 
the deep, and the spirit of god moved over the waters – the 
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shore having been reconstituted as the site of pure 
potentiality. The scene is aqueous chaos. It is all a revelation 
to Dorigen — as it must be to the reader, since to this day no 
adequate explanation has yet been found for it. She says: 
 
“Alas,” quod she, “that evere this sholde happe! 
For wende I nevere by possibiltee 
That swich a monstre or merveille myghte be!  
It is agayns the process of nature.” (V.1342–1345) 
 
Would it have helped to recall that stone, as medieval science 
taught, is made up of quantities of earth and water? What 
about the proverbial rock worn away by drops of water? The 
lithic is not opposed to the liquid in any event, but constitutes 
one of the natural forms it takes. Rocks decompose and 
deliquesce, ever morphing, as an acquaintance with Albertus 
Magnus’s Book of Minerals could have revealed. And yet 
Dorigen meets with something of a different order of 
magnitude, events “agayns the process of nature.” She is the 
victim of another science (“magyk natureel”) and untold 
“possibilitee.”  There is no adequate explanation. The 
difficulty now is in coming to see rocks as events, or soft 
bodies just as vulnerable to tides of change. The shocking 
mutability of these things represents the terror of a fluid 
reality.  
 Dorigen suffers from an unexpected sea change, and 
readers are similarly situated. It is a traumatic occurrence 
thick with implication for the reified subject and object, where 
personal identity appears to ebb and flow with the natural 
environment. Things are rendered coalescent in a manner 
that can seem almost fated, foregone — but which only now 
are gathered in a singular, unexpected happenstance 
(“happe”). You start to make the connections after the fact. 
First, before anything much had happened, Dorigen was 
figured as a petroglyph impressed by the consolatory words of 
her friends: “By process, as ye knowen everichoon, / Men may 
so longe graven in a stoon, / Til som figure therinne 
emprented be” (V.829–831). The analogy is as prescient as her 
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very name, Dorigen evoking Droguen, a prominent rock along 
the coast of Penmarch where she settles with her husband in 
Brittany.2 Subsequently, the rocks having vanished by some 
inscrutable magical means, Dorigin becomes “astoned” 
(V.1339), petrified. Then she contemplates disappearing, 
considering a suicide that would have her dissolve into some 
earthy or oceanic substrate, returning to the elements. So her 
body is at once figured as a hardened substitute in the face of 
chaos (as if mineralizing to compensate for the absence of the 
rocks) and a recapitulation (threatening to dematerialize and 
deliquesce), but in either case she becomes newly 
incorporated and environed. Who knew the possibilities of 
stone, sea, desire, language?  
What makes her situation so astonishing is the 
combination of groundlessness and the thrilling freedom it 
represents — that is, the freedom for matters to be otherwise 
“by possibilitee.” Dorigen becomes one changed thing among 
others in the world, nothing so self-sufficient or self-evident 
as she had imagined. The realization is probably not so 
liberating for her as it is for Aurelius, who has now removed 
the obstacles to his desire. Dorigen’s husband has safely 
returned from overseas by this point in the tale, but no matter: 
Aurelius expects her to keep her promise.  She contemplates 
suicide to escape the catastrophe. “‘Allas,’ quod she, ‘on thee, 
Fortune, I pleyne, / That unwar wrapped hast me in thy 
cheyne’” (V.1355–1356). She has dodged one horrible 
eventuality (the death of her husband) only to be faced with 
another (the impending betrayal of her husband).  Owing to a 
strange fortuity, she seems least capable of changing her 
circumstances. And yet they will again. 
 
§ NARRATIVE AVENTURE 
 
The event is a litho-literary phenomenon, pertaining to things 
                                                                                  
2 John S. P. Tatlock, The Scene of the Franklin’s Tale Visited (London: 
Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner and Co., 1914), 37–40. 
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as real as stones and the words used to depict them after the 
fact, inasmuch as both emerge as incipiencies and 
possibilities. It is perhaps the literary situation par excellence. 
For the careful reader will experience a profound sort of 
disorientation, consisting of an irruption of pure potentiality 
into the present without any determinate future direction. 
Everything is in a state of emergency, and nothing can simply 
be “read off” a given world. Only by going on, selecting out 
one actual occurrence from all the possible ones, do things 
take shape in this strange tale.3 In the event, Dorigen reveals 
her plight to her husband, and he wishes her to keep her truth 
despite all the changes that have brought her to the current 
impasse: “Ye shul youre trouthe holden, by my fay! / . . . 
Trouthe is the hyeste thyng that man may kepe” (V.1474, 
1479).  It is an unexpected concession, and you are invited to 
interpret.   
Indeed it is precisely at this juncture that the focus comes 
to rest on that construal: you are asked to make a decision.  
Circumstances spill over — triggering an emergency not just 
for the fictional characters involved in the story but also for 
anyone caught up in the narration. Pausing a little, the 
Franklin addresses the audience’s incredulity towards the 
events narrated thus far:  
 
Paraventure an heep of yow, ywis, 
Wol holden hym [Arveragus] a lewed man in this 
That he wol putte his wyf [Dorigen] in jupartie. 
Herkeneth the tale er ye upon hire crie. 
She may have bettre fortune than yow semeth; 
And whan that ye han herd the tale, demeth.  
(V.1493–1498) 
                                                                                  
3 As Jill Mann says in Feminizing Chaucer (Cambridge, Eng.: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), the tale “embraces the 
potentiality of Dorigen’s rape, of her suicide, of the life-long stain on 
marital happiness, as it embraces the possibility of Arveragus’s 
shipwreck, or Dorigen’s betrayal” (95). 
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References to fortune and futurity multiply here and 
elsewhere in the tale (paraventure, jupartie, fortune), driving 
home the point — it is a tale in which anything can happen. 
There is a chance that the literary matter may be as lithic 
(meaning quite labile and liquid, as we now see) as the coastal 
terrain that was made to disappear so suddenly. You can 
hardly be complacent about present crisis. At this critical 
moment, you are implicated in an ethical decision about 
whether to go on. Action ceases, suspended between who-
knows-what futures. The Franklin addresses the reader, and 
you must decide to stop or forbear the consequences. Should 
you arrest the narrative flow and render judgment now? An 
audience may “deme” well enough: Arveragus now seems 
complicit in Dorigen’s ruin. But the tale simultaneously pulls 
in another direction, holding out a possibility — if not the 
likelihood — of some “bettre fortune.” Is that not the main 
drift? The Franklin for his part, an occasional justice of the 
peace, presides over the present case seemingly with 
consequentialist considerations in mind. He ties decisions to 
“fortune” rather than to any uncompromising principle. He 
prefers “pacience” to “rigour” (V.773–775), a distinction that 
resonates here. Should you be equally patient and 
accommodating?  
 In the end we find out that Dorigen is spared what seemed 
an inevitable shame: due to the knight Arveragus’ apparent 
openhandedness, the squire Aurelius is unable to follow 
through with ravishing Dorigen. But for the time being the 
question posed by the Franklin must remain pertinent, since 
we do not know how things go.  The dilemma is manifold at 
this contingent instant.  Contingency itself can seem illusory, 
for the reader knows that the Franklin suspends events, even 
as he superintends them, postponing what he may know to be 
the case. Like the clerk-magician, he may be equipped with 
superior foreknowledge, making your judgement moot. The 
Franklin does come across as a somewhat reluctant 
adventurer, wishing to forestall one possible response to the 
tale so far. He does not want anyone thinking the knight is a 
“lewed man.” It’s a mildly apologetic gesture on his part. He 
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guesses what you might think.  His defensiveness may also 
indicate that he is ready to change course, opportunistically; 
he may alter events. The Franklin is a particularly 
meddlesome pilgrim after all: having once interrupted the 
Squire’s tale, he now arrests his own. What then will he do 
now? Can anyone tell? He is also known as a convivial man, 
solicitous about the welfare of his guests, and so one 
implication is that he may resolve the situation to your 
satisfaction. Is the narrative fixed, rigged? 
The Franklin aggravates matters by holding events in 
abeyance, putting you in an analogous situation to that of 
Dorigen, facing immanent disaster. The tale is one of 
emergent events that become your eventualities, where the 
truth is up for grabs. The situation is pressing because there is 
no access to the author (or Author-God). There is no divine 
or authorial assurance that things will turn out better, and 
even if they did (as in fact they do), the audience may find the 
ending an intolerable specimen of authorial inconstancy. The 
event is impossible to calculate, and no matter how it looks in 
retrospect (however stage-managed) the temporal unfolding 
of events remains eventful.  It is in the nature of events to 
arrive as if from the future in this way: they only ever will have 
been — future anterior. In the meantime they suspend 
meaning, thwart expectation, surprise.4 
 
§ MOST FRE? 
 
What transpires directly following the Franklin’s 
prevaricating remarks and request for readerly tolerance puts 
the situation in high relief, dramatizing what is at stake in 
assessing such hard realities. When Dorigen leaves her house 
                                                                                  
4 Chaucer attains the suspense not by foreshadowing events to come 
so much as sideshadowing, creating a sort of middle realm containing 
a surplus of virtual possibilities. See Gary Saul Morson, Narrative 
and Freedom: The Shadows of Time (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1994), 6 et passim. 
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to meet Aurelius in the garden, she accidentally crosses paths 
with him in the town: “Of aventure happed hire to meete” 
(V.1501). A few lines later the meeting is described differently, 
“For wel he spyed whan she wolde go / Out of hir hous to any 
maner place” (V.1506–1507). Arveragus has in fact kept 
Dorigen under surveillance, and from his perspective, it was 
no chance meeting at all. Interestingly, the Franklin is evasive 
on the point, not wishing to commit one way or another, 
equivocating over the meaning of the intersecting lines of his 
own narration: “But thus they mette, of aventure or grace” 
(V.1508). His hedging cannot help but cast doubts on his role 
in the events. Is the Franklin, like Aurelius, not also taking 
pains to make luck go his way?  
 At the same time, the Franklin does not seem to know 
what he is saying. You may wonder if he knows where he is 
going, and whether the illusion is that he is in control. His 
equivocal response bears comparison with other notorious 
authorial asides, as in the Nun’s Priest’s Tale (VII.3252–3266), 
where the priest asserts and then retracts statements about 
women’s counsel, in a dizzying and disingenuous series of non 
sequiturs, and also in the Manciple’s Tale (IX.160–188), where 
the tale-teller issues a series of exempla about female 
fickleness that are subsequently construed, in an unexpectedly 
paranoid way, to apply to “men / That been untrewe, and 
nothyng by wommen” (IX.187–188). If there is anything to be 
said for the “roadside drama” approach to the Canterbury 
Tales, then it has to do with the theatrical way in which the 
pilgrims continually act and react, predict and pre-empt one 
another. The tale-telling game is an unfolding event, not a plot 
or program without the freedom to change direction. Here, 
perhaps, no doubt inadvertently again, something the 
Franklin said earlier seems material: “For in this world, 
certein, ther no wight is / That he ne dooth or seith somtyme 
amys” (V.79–80). In light of so much human error and ill 
fortune, what is anyone to do? Dorigen is not the only one 
who has misspoken — “in pley.” 
 There seems an unavoidable “aventure” in the telling after 
all, some latitude to events. The tale’s resolution is contingent 
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on so many improbable, gratuitous gestures in fact. Here is 
how things go in the end. A husband is unexpectedly free 
(loose) with the body of his wife; a lover frees a woman of her 
(coerced) obligation; and finally a clerk releases a squire from 
a payment he could have never afforded to begin with. It is a 
tale ostensibly with so much freedom (outstripping necessity), 
where one gift elicits another in a kind of hastily assembled 
gift economy. The resolution turns on the multiple meanings 
of “fre,” a word with a lot of semantic play.5 The Franklin ends 
the tale with one final question, drawing you in to the debate: 
“Which was the mooste fre, as thynketh yow? / Now telleth 
me, er that ye ferther wende” (V.1620). 
 Of course freedom is always constrained by an identifiable 
sequence of cause and effect, which can be adduced here to 
explain the domino effect of the ending. A critique might run 
along these lines: real capital is not relinquished so much as 
counted up and cashed out to acquire symbolic goods. There 
is therefore no real gift without a demand for a return.6  It is a 
decidedly masculinist orientation. Dorigen is an opportunity 
for men to show their truth, grace, and pity — a set of virtues 
that belong to what Auerbach would call a “class ethics” 
associated with the aristocracy.7 The Franklin betrays his own 
class interest in the way the tale proceeds. He showed himself 
scrupulous about his patrimony in the interruption of the 
Squire (where the Franklin rebukes his son for wasting his 
                                                                                  
5 Just a few of the relevant definitions of “fre” in the Middle English 
Dictionary include: “the status of a noble or a freeman”; “unrestricted 
in movement or action”; “free of the bonds of love or matrimony”; 
“unrestricted choice, the right or power to choose”; “noble in 
character; gracious, well-mannered”; “generous, open-handed”; 
“ready or willing.” 
6 For an especially persuasive analysis, see Britton J. Harwood, 
“Chaucer and the Gift (If there is Any),” Studies in Philology 103.1 
(2006): 26–46. 
7 Erich Auerbach, Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western 
Literature, trans. Willard R. Trask (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1953), 138. 
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money and failing in decorum), and now seeks to distinguish 
himself as a free man, that is a franklin (from franc, free, in 
Old French), one who holds land in freehold and exercises 
aristocratic “franchise.” To that end he sources a French or 
Italian story: a Breton lay or Boccaccian tale, demonstrating 
broad familiarity with the high-toned, cosmopolitan literature 
associated with the leisure class to which he aspires. Things 
can be explained away. The removal of the rocks was no 
natural disaster.  A clerk arranged the events; the Franklin 
may have worked his magic too. You observe the patterns. 
The situation could be one big non-event. A cognitive reflex 
seems destined always to rationalize events: historicity 
becomes history; contingency, causality.   
Events become relatively stable objects of retrospection 
and contemplation when treated to such critiques (i.e., 
construals of the truth), but that seems unwarranted in a tale 
about the instability and gratuity of events. Retrospection is 
delayed, belated, hard-won. We can hardly forget the affective 
dynamics and vicissitudes of the collective situation. We recall 
the fortunes to which husband, lover, and clerk are hostage. 
And who can neglect the suffering of Dorigen? Events are 
open-ended, catching characters off-guard, thwarting their 
plans. Respective outcomes are as much accidents as they are 
individual achievements, rising up from a phenomenal field of 
productivity that constitutes freedom as always partially 
determined. The audience is in no better position for the 
duration of the tale, and long afterward, having arrived at an 
ending that is unresolved (“fre”). The question with which the 
tale ends might actually be a most generous one: “Which was 
the mooste fre, as thynketh yow?” You assess the matter 
differently depending on where you find yourself in the event.  





Y  Black as the Crow 
 
Travis Neel and Andrew Richmond 
 
 
When Crow was white he decided the sun was too white. 
He decided it glared much too whitely. 
He decided to attack it and defeat it. 
 
He got his strength up flush and in full glitter. 
He clawed and fluffed his rage up. 
He aimed his beak direct at the sun’s centre. 
 




At his battle cry trees grew suddenly old, 
Shadows flattened. 
 
But the sun brightened — 
It brightened, and Crow returned charred black. 
 
He opened his mouth but what came out was charred black.  
 
“Up there,” he managed,  
“Where white is black and black is white, I won.” 
     
 ~Ted Hughes, “Crow’s Fall” 
 
Perched among the many birds in the Parliament of Foules sits 
“the crowe with vois of care” (364).1 The crow receives no 
                                                                                              
1 Quotations from the works of Geoffrey Chaucer are taken from The 
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space to speak in Geoffrey Chaucer’s Valentine’s Day poem — 
a grim reminder perhaps of the circumstances under which he 
received his sad voice and scorched appearance. In Chaucer’s 
hands it is a different, perhaps darker, story than the one told 
by Ted Hughes. The crow does not launch himself into 
blackness through a jealousy contest; rather he becomes but 
one victim at the hands of a jealous and wrathful master. As 
Chaucer’s Manciple tells the story, the crow had once been a 
white bird with a beautiful voice. Phoebus Apollo had taught 
the crow how to speak like a human, and when this crow sang, 
“Therwith in al this world no nyghtyngale/ Ne koude, by an 
hondred thousand deel, / Syngen so wonder myrily and weel” 
(IX.136–139). But the crow’s status within Phoebus’s 
household does not last long in the Manciple’s Tale. Having 
witnessed Phoebus’s wife with her beloved, the crow 
immediately declares the wife’s unfaithfulness to Phoebus — 
and Pheobus’ resulting identity as a cuckold — with the song, 
“Cokkow! Cokkow! Cokkow!” (IX.243). Phoebus turns his ire 
and sorrow towards his wife and his minstrelsy before 
addressing the crow as a traitor. To quite the crow of his false 
tale (IX.293), Phoebus strips him of his song, deplumes his 
white feathers, and casts him out of his home.  
But the Manciple’s Tale does not conclude with the 
etiology of the crow. Instead, the Manciple proclaims the crow 
to be an example encouraging restraint in speech, especially 
when telling a man about the sexual indiscretions of his wife 
(IX.309–312). Echoing the advice of his mother, the Manciple 
concludes by offering his audience the following injunction: 
“Kepe wel thy tonge and thenk upon the crowe” (IX.362). The 
critical reception of the Manciple’s Tale has often followed the 
Manciple’s explication of his tale, noting that the analogy 
between the Manciple and the bird might also extend to the 
                                                                                              
Riverside Chaucer, gen. ed. Larry D. Benson, 3rd edn. (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1987), by line numbers (as well as by fragment 
and book numbers, where applicable). 
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court poet.2 For David Wallace, the Manciple’s Tale 
demonstrates that Chaucer “never quite shakes off anxieties 
regarding the legitimacy or usefulness of his own social role.”3 
Similarly, James Simpson writes,  
 
Chaucer marks the withdrawal of his own voice from 
the public realm with the story of Apollo’s bird, who is 
punished for speaking the truth in terms rhetorically 
fit for base and scandalous actions. The narrative ends 
with the recommendation of silence, except in 
speaking about God; from the perspective of this tale, 
the following Parson’s Tale is not so much salutary as 
safe.4  
 
In her recent treatment of Chaucerian birds, Jill Mann echoes 
this line of critical reception, writing that, “A story of sexual 
betrayal thus becomes a story of linguistic betrayal.”5 For 
Mann and others, this linguistic betrayal is also a sign that the 
various communities represented by and within both the 
Manciple’s prologue and his tale are highly fraught and 
                                                                                              
2 Louise Fradenburg, “The Manciple’s Servant Tongue: Politics and 
Poetry in The Canterbury Tales,” ELH 52 (1985): 86 [85–118]. A. C. 
Spearing also suggests that the crow “is present as an impotent 
voyeur — precisely the role in which Chaucer so often places himself 
in his courtly poems about love” (The Medieval Poet as Voyeur: 
Looking and Listening in Medieval Love-Narratives [Cambridge, 
Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1993], 137). Other approaches to 
the Manciple’s Tale are exemplified in the six papers in the 
Colloquium on the Manciple’s Tale in Studies in the Age of Chaucer 
25 (2003): 287–337. 
3 David Wallace, Chaucerian Polity: Absolutist Lineages and 
Associational Forms in England and Italy (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1997), 249. 
4 James Simpson, The Oxford English Literary History, Volume 2, 
1350-1547: Reform and Cultural Revolution (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), 253. 
5 Jill Mann, From Aesop to Reynard: Beast Literature in Medieval 
Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 218 
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potentially dangerous.6  
Yet, while the reception of the Manciple’s Tale has done 
wonders to intimate the tensions and dangers of the poet-
patron relationship, the tendency in these analyses has been to 
read the crow as an all-too-human servant.7 The status of the 
crow as a bird, a pet, and one of the victims of Apollo’s wrath 
enters the analytical frame only in as much as it is expressive 
of the anxieties of court servants. This essay aims to follow the 
latter part of the Manciple’s ventriloquization of his mother’s 
advice: to think on the crow. Rather than following the crow’s 
metamorphosis from Chaucer’s potential sources and ana-
logues to the crow of Phoebus’s house in the Manciple’s Tale, 
we track the crow through the Chaucerian corpus.8 The figure 
of the crow appears three times in Chaucer’s works: silently 
perched alongside the raven in the Parliament of Fowls, as one 
of the victims in the Manciple’s Tale, and as a metaphor for 
the very blackness of the blood streaming over Arcite’s face 
near the conclusion to the Knight’s Tale.9 What marks these 
moments out to us is that whereas various late medieval texts 
offered a variety of possibilities for reading crows, Chaucer’s 
                                                                                              
6 Mann, From Aesop to Reynard, 218. For more on the social dangers 
represented in the Manciple’s Tale see Fradenburg, “The Manciple’s 
Servant Tongue”; Wallace, Chaucerian Polity; and Stephanie Trigg, 
“Friendship, Association, and Service in the Manciple’s Tale,” Studies 
in the Age of Chaucer 25 (2003): 325–330. 
7 Part of the inspiration for this pursuit was drawn from Jill Mann’s 
confession that, “I cannot find that the role of the animal in the 
Manciple’s Tale has been the central focus of attention in any analysis 
of the tale to date” (Mann, From Aesop to Reynard, 207 n36). 
8 For recent accounts of the possible sources and analogues to the 
Manciple’s Tale, see Mann, 209–215, and Jamie C. Fumo, “Thinking 
upon the Crow: The Manciple’s Tale and Ovidian Mythography,” 
The Chaucer Review 38.4 (2004): 355–375. 
9 Arguably the crow could be said to make a fourth appearance in 
Troilus and Criseyde when Pandarus warns Criseyde about the effects 
of time by drawing her attention to what may be the first recorded 
use of “crowe’s feet” (II.403). 
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crows are univocal in their dark significations. The crow 
marks what is abject in the games of love: the squawking of 
lesser fowls, the unfaithfulness of a lover, gossip, and 
treachery. In its darkest manifestations, the crow becomes a 
marker for silence, sterility, and death. To think on the crow is 
not to dwell in one of the darkest tales of Chaucer’s 
Canterbury Tales; it is to dwell with the darkness generated by 
that tale. The Chaucerian crow testifies that participation in 
the desportes of love necessitates the production of abject 
bodies and spaces: “And for this caas been alle crowes blake” 
(IX.307). 
While Chaucer’s crow may register only a dark 
signification, the crow as described in a variety of other high 
and late medieval works emerges as an ambiguous character.10 
Naturalistic accounts detailed an animal exemplifying a strong 
familial instinct, while theological treatises presented a bird 
burdened with dark associations to the Devil and prophecy. 
Throughout this spectrum of texts, a common refrain 
concentrates on attributing a strong sense of worldliness to 
the crow. For instance, Hugh of Fouilley opens his Aviarum 
(twelfth century) by contrasting the Psalmic beauty of the 
dove with the black raven, whose cry of cras, cras [tomorrow, 
tomorrow] reveals its eternal desire for one more day of life 
on earth.11 The crow was also said to use this same cry, and 
thus to subscribe to the accompanying conceit.12 Indeed, this 
                                                                                              
10 Since the Middle English word “croue” or “crowe” was often used 
to refer to both crows and ravens, our discussion of the crow has 
been somewhat supplemented (particularly in theological contexts) 
with discussions of the raven; see MED, “croue (n.),” meaning 1(a).  
11 W.B. Clark, ed. and trans., The Medieval Book of Birds: Hugh of 
Fouilloy's Aviarum (Binghamton: Medieval and Renaissance Texts 
and Studies, 1992) 117. 
12 For instance, Isidore of Seville (seventh century) remarks that 
“many bird names are evidently constructed from the sound of their 
calls, such as . . . the crow (corvus)”: S.A. Barney et al., eds. and trans., 
The Etymologies of Isidore of Seville (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), 264. 
108 Dark Chaucer: An Assortment 
!
tradition may have influenced the belief that crows lived to 
achieve great age. Early modern texts posit that crows would 
take one mate for life, exemplifying marital fidelity and 
concord.13 The crow was also thought to be a devoted family 
bird, caring for its offspring long after they had left the nest. 
Albertus Magnus (twelfth century) notes that such an attitude 
towards their youth was motivated by a sense of piety.14 In a 
defensive capacity, crows were well known for antagonizing 
birds of prey, particularly eagles and owls, gathering into 
groups to overcome their stronger foes.15 However, crow 
parents were believed to refrain from caring for newborn 
chicks until their complexion was appropriately darkened; 
before they were black, the parents could not recognize them 
as fellow crows. According to Caxton's Mirrour of the World, 
this concentration on color as the primary marker of crow-
identity derives from the fact that the crow believed itself to be 
the fairest of all birds in appearance and voice.16 Finally, while 
white crows were known, this was often taken to be a sign of 
disease or weakness, not as a sign of Divine favor.17 
In theological contexts, crows and ravens often served to 
represent two sides of the same coin. Hugh of Fouilley's 
account details how ravens mimic the assault of the Devil by 
first going for the eyes of corpses, entering thereby into the 
                                                                                              
13 E. Topsell, The Fowles of Heauen or History of Birdes, eds. T.P. 
Harrison and F.D. Hoeniger (Austin: University of Texas Press, 
1972), 224–225 (citing primarily Classical sources). 
14 K.F. Kitchell, Jr., and I.M. Resnick, trans., Albertus Magnus On 
Animals: A Medieval Summa Zoologica, Vols. 1 & 2 (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 1567. 
15 Kitchell and Resnick, Albertus Magnus on Animals, 672, 1567. 
16 O.H. Prior, Caxton's Mirrour of the World, Early English Texts 
Society, e.s. 110 (London, UK: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 
Ltd., 1913), 103. Caxton translated a French text, Image du Monde, 
which had been in circulation since the thirteenth century; see Prior, 
Caxtoun’s Mirrour, v-vi. 
17 Kitchell and Resnick, Albertus Magnus on Animals, 1352. 
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brain.18 Genesis 8:7 provided further support for the theory of 
the raven and crow as worldly birds, stating that the bird did 
not return to Noah's Ark when sent to search for land. As 
such, ravens and crows were seen to represent worldly sinners, 
lacking the ability for introspection. Their black plumage was 
thus taken as symbolic of despair, of sinners that had lost all 
hope for God's grace.19 Yet their darkness could also be seen as 
indicative of humility, the black raven representing a good 
preacher, who wears the memory of his sins in his black cloth. 
In this light, then, the parental activities of crows and ravens 
could be interpreted positively: the parents waited for their 
children to turn black before caring for them, just as good 
prelates waited for their students to demonstrate humility 
before accepting them.20 Finally, crows were well known as 
birds used by pagan augury, and their cry was commonly held 
to be indicative of coming rain.21 
 Lodged between reflecting the life of a real-world animal 
and symbolizing carnal desire, the late medieval crow resisted 
becoming a simple marker of danger or dark fate. Rather, the 
attributes of fidelity, concord, and familial responsibility 
especially defined the crow as a heuristic of properly 
monogamous, reproductive morality. In love, then, the crow's 
worldliness was balanced by a devotion to duty and 
propagation that favored the protection of mate and kin above 
all other obligations — a surprising character twist on the 
common villain of battlefield carrion-feeders. Worldly and 
considerate, humble and vain, the crow's singular color belied 
a wide palette of associations from which a late medieval 
author could draw.  
                                                                                              
18 Clark, The Medieval Book of Birds, 175. See also Kitchell and 
Resnick, Albertus Magnus on Animals, 600, for Albertus Magnus's 
categorization of crows as omnivorous. 
19 Clark, The Medieval Book of Birds, 177. 
20 Clark, The Medieval Book of Birds, 177–179. 
21 Kitchell and Resnick, Albertus Magnus on Animals, 1567; Barney et 
al., The Etymologies of Isidore of Seville, 267. 
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 In Chaucer’s hands, however, the polysemic possibilities of 
the crow become narrower and darker. Perched alongside the 
raven in the Parliament of Foules, Chaucer has put the crow in 
his place. While the crow and the raven may be among the 
noise of fowls that cry for an end to the argument (491–497), 
their singular voices are never heard. When Nature silences 
the “murmur of the lewednesse behynde” (520), there is no 
sense that the crow has spoken out of turn with his “vois of 
care.” In this game of love, the crow has but one duty: to 
watch silently. This impotent voyeurism is often discussed in 
treatments of the crow in the Manciple’s Tale, where the 
crow’s silence as he watches the betrayal of Apollo’s mistress is 
contrasted with his bursting forth in speech upon Apollo’s 
return.22 In these contexts, Apollo’s judgment that the crow is 
a traitor who has spoken a fals tale suggests that the crow 
might be — as the Manciple glosses — an exemplar for proper 
and tactful speech. 
 But Apollo’s crow, like the crow of the Parliament, is in a 
no-win situation. Silence would seem to make him complicit 
in the wife’s infidelity, and speech only seems to lead to 
trouble. The crow’s crime seems not to be what he speaks or 
how he speaks, but rather that he speaks at all. The crow’s 
initial cry to Apollo (“Cokkow”) reveals itself to be multiply 
transgressive. The onomatopoetic utterance invokes both the 
call of Apollo’s beloved pet and the vulgar speech of a 
household servant. From any other crow, this utterance might 
not signal any cause for alarm, but this bird had been taught 
to counterfeit human speech. What comes out of his mouth, 
then, is unrecognizable — except that it is damning. More 
importantly, though, the crow confronts Apollo and the 
audience of the Manciple’s Tale with the possibility that the 
                                                                                              
22 Spearing, The Medieval Poet as Voyeur, 137. John McCall describes 
the crow as “stupid, insensitive, blabbering, short-sighted, and 
voyeuristic” in Chaucer Among the Gods: The Poetics of Classical 
Myth (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1979), 
148.  
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tale is not a romance, but a fabliau — that Apollo is not a 
romantic hero, but a cuckolded husband.23  
In order to re-establish the ordered household and the 
identity of the romantic hero that the Manciple presents his 
audiences with at the start of the tale, Apollo must purge both 
his person and his home of every stain that would contradict 
his claims to “gentillesse, honour and parfit worthinesse” 
(IX.124–125). While the Manciple and a very large and 
heavily substantiated cross-section of the secondary literature 
on his tale suggests that the crow’s transgression is intimately 
tied to language and the proper uses of speech, we would 
suggest that the crow’s role in the tale cannot simply be 
reduced to a stand-in for a household servant, for the 
narrators, or for Chaucer himself. Rather, the crow of the 
Manciple’s Tale manifests the abject — the unstable boundary 
where subject and object confront one another and meaning 
risks collapse. While Apollo takes out his jealous rage on his 
wife, instruments, and crow respectively, the focus of both his 
rage and the Manciple’s narration fall squarely upon the 
figure of the crow and his becoming-black. Despite the avowal 
that “ther is namoore to sayn” after Apollo murders his wife, 
the Manciple’s Tale continues to describe how Apollo 
displaces his sorrow, guilt, and rage onto the crow: “Traitor,’ 
quod he, ‘with tonge of scorpioun,/ Thou hast me broght to 
my confusioun;” (IX.266, 271–272).  The crow, who — like 
the wife — had begun the tale as one of the prized love-objects 
of the romantic hero, remains structurally linked to Apollo’s 
wife as the hero and the tale struggle to deny and to reject all 
of the narrative’s fabliaux elements. The now-dead wife is 
linked to the still living crow in a contrast between the 
traitor’s false tongue and the dead lover’s innocence:  “O deere 
wyf! O gemme of lusti-heed! / That were to me so sad and eek 
                                                                                              
23 Ann Astell, “Nietzsche, Chaucer, and the Sacrifice of Art,” The 
Chaucer Review 39.3 (2005): 323–340. Many have noted that the 
Manciple’s Tale struggles to pose as a chivalric romance but gives 
way even in the beginning to the tones of fabliau. 
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so trewe, / Now listow deed, with face pale of hewe, / Ful 
giltelees, that dorste I swere, ywys!” (IX.274–277). Apollo’s 
final attention to the wife is significant here in two respects. 
First, the concluding scenes of the Manciple’s Tale omit 
elements of its Ovidian source: the wife’s name, her speech, 
the revelation of her pregnancy, and the presence of her 
lifeless body as Apollo rescues their son from her womb.24 
Second, Apollo’s lament for his wife reinforces the structural 
link between her and the crow. The pale hue of his wife’s 
corpse is the final glimpse (IX.275) offered of the wife as 
Apollo’s vengeance on the crow becomes the central feature of 
the tale.25  
In the short space of thirty-eight lines (IX.270–308), the 
crow becomes a loaded signifier: traitor, false thief, black, 
silent, and the structural parallel to an absent corpse bereft of 
its offspring. Having accused the crow of treachery (IX.270) 
and implicated him in the act of murder (IX.271–272), Apollo 
proceeds to curse the crow: 
 
 “O false theef!” seyde he, 
“I wol thee quite anon thy false tale. 
Thou songe whilom lyk a nyghtyngale; 
Now shaltow, false theef, thy song forgon, 
And eek thy white fetheres everichon, 
Ne nevere in al thy lif ne shaltou speke. 
Thou shal men on a traytour been awreke; 
Thou and thyn ofspryng evere shul be blake 
Ne nevere sweete noyse shul ye make, 
 
                                                                                              
24 For discussions of these omissions see Jamie C. Fumo, “Thinking 
upon the Crow,” and the papers in the Colloquium on the Manciple’s 
Tale in Studies in the Age of Chaucer 25 (2003), particularly John 
Hines, “For sorwe of which he brak his minstralcye”: The Demise of 
the ‘Sweete Noyse’ of Verse in the Canterbury Tales,” 302 [299–308]. 
25 See Astell, “Nietzsche, Chaucer, and the Sacrifice of Art,” 329 and 
332, for a description of the crow as a scapegoat. 
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But evere crie agayn tempest and rayn, 
In tokenynge that thurgh thee my wyf is slayn.”  
(IX.290–302) 
 
Here, Apollo takes advantage of the non-human crow’s 
human attribute (rational speech) to expunge the sin of his 
own murderous action. Yet the crow is simultaneously 
recognizable through his physical attributes (most notably, 
white feathers) as a non-human animal, an object compelled 
to suffer the course of Apollo’s rehabilitation of romantic 
identity. Apollo denies the animality inhering in both his wife 
(the metaphor of the guilded cage, IX.162) and himself, and 
ascribes these bad traits to the “true” animal, the crow. Black 
was the deed, and black the crow shall be, “in tokenynge that 
thurgh thee my wyf is slayn.” Apollo castigates the crow “And 
pulled his white fetheres everychon, / And made hym blak, 
and refte hym al his song, / And eek his speche, and out at 
dore hym slong / Unto the devel” (IX.303–305). Apollo 
further clarifies this goal of displacing all the animal traits 
onto the crow by transforming his voice into speech that shall 
be “nevere sweet noyse . . . / but evere crie agayn tempest and 
rayn” — the forces of the nonhuman, natural world. In this 
way, Apollo seeks to force the marginal crow — figure of the 
abject — into the separate other, forcing him “out at dore” 
(IX.306), imbued now with Apollo’s violence, the wife’s 
unfaithfulness, and the univocal cockow appropriate to a bird 
“with vois of care.” Signaling a shift from failed romance and 
fabliaux to beast fable, the metamorphosis of the crow offers 
the Manciple’s Tale the possibility of being read etiologically. 
This is, in fact, the direction that the Manciple takes as he 
turns to the company of pilgrims with the gloss: “And for this 
caas been alle crowes blake” (IX.307).  
In this way, the crow of the Manciple’s Tale manifests the 
abject — the unstable boundary where subject and object 
confront one another, and meaning risks collapse. In a 
language particularly reminiscent of Apollo’s crow, Julia 
Kristeva describes the abject as  
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what disturbs identity, system, order. What does not 
respect borders, positions, rules. The in-between, the 
ambiguous, the composite. The traitor, the liar, the 
criminal with a good conscience, the shameless rapist, 
the killer who claims he is a savior.26 
 
The abjection of the other (Apollo’s metamorphosis of the 
crow and the Manciple’s erasure of the corpse from his tale) 
serves to defend the subject from a collapse of the symbolic. In 
Apollo’s eyes, the crow must take on all of the traits that 
would deny the possibility of becoming a romantic hero. The 
crow must not only become dark and speechless, but he must 
also be clearly marked as an animal and stand in for the 
corpse that in hindsight Apollo wishes he had not produced. 
In this light, it is not surprising that the crow’s feathers are 
first mentioned as they are being pulled (IX.304) and that the 
crow is consigned to the devil as though he were already dead 
(IX.307). In his final image of the crow, then, the Manciple 
offers a figure “on the edge of nonexistence.”27 
We encounter the third figure of the crow in Chaucer’s 
corpus at yet another instance of such a figure — the bloody 
face of the dying Arcita in Part Four of the Knight’s Tale. 
Before Arcita dies at the end of the Knight’s Tale, Chaucer 
offers a lingering depiction of Arcita’s wounds that begins 
with an invocation of the crow: 
 
His brest tobrosten with his sadel-bowe. 
As blak he lay as any cole or crowe, 
So was the blood yronnen in his face. 
                                                                                              
26 Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection, trans. Leon 
S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 4. 
27 Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection, 2. Chaucer’s 
crow may not be abjected in the truest sense of Kristeva’s usage since 
she writes, “there is nothing either objective or objectal to the abject” 
(9). It might be suggested that the crow could be read as a “deject,” or 
as the product of a sublimation aiming at controlling a more primal 
repression (10–13).  
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Anon he was yborn out of the place, 
With herte soor, to Theseus paleys.  (I.2691–2695)  
 
The confluence of the crumbling of literary artifice, the 
intrusion of the natural into the courtly, and the figure of the 
crow coalesce in the moment of the hero’s body-becoming-
corpse. Arcita’s impending death nearly robs the Knight’s Tale 
of its romantic ending by posing the possibility of courtly 
tragedy — a dramatic cleavage that the Knight spends the rest 
of his tale seeking to resolve. Only through the machinations 
of Theseus is the romance rescued from its tragic potentials, 
as Emelye is promised to Palamoun and the tale can finally 
conclude as romance. On the edge of generic collapse, then, 
the crow emerges fully abjected as a figure of the very 
blackness of the blood that marks Arcita as being between two 
deaths.28 While Apollo’s crow may only parallel the wife’s 
corpse, the Knight’s crow foretells of a corpse to come. Rather 
than black being a descriptor of the crow, the figure of the 
crow becomes an explication for how darkly Arcita’s blood 
runs. The Knight’s comparison transforms the crow into a 
description of the color and a sure sign that there will be no 
remedy for Arcita’s latest heartbreak. The crow’s colorful 
possibilities are confined in Chaucer’s poetry to blackness, 
foreboding blood, the becoming-corpse.  
 Thinking upon Chaucer’s crow draws us to the 
boundaries: included in the parliament but consigned to 
silence, taught to speak in order to be muted, conferred to the 
devil while still alive, caught between serving in a romance or 
suffering in a fabliau, and running down a not-yet-dead face. 
Like the absent body of Apollo’s wife, the indecipherable but 
offensively clear utterance of “Cokkow,” the voyeuristic 
presence of lesser fowls, or the blood streaming from a mortal 
wound, Chaucer’s crow is a dark and ominous figure. The 
                                                                                              
28 For an attentive reading of the “cole or crowe” simile, see L.O. 
Aranye Fradenburg, Sacrifice Your Love: Psychoanalysis, Historicism, 
Chaucer (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), 167. 
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blackened crow remains a token of the animal within, the 
traitor in our midst, the body-becoming-corpse, and the white 
bird whose truthfulness was condemned to blackness. It is this 
constant abjection of the crow that the Manciple — following 
his mother — calls us never to forget as we continue to “thenk 
on the crowe” (IX.319, 362). But what makes the crow’s 
presence perhaps more haunting is the remembrance of a 
different time — a time when black was white, “Cokkow” was 
sung in the voice unmatched by nightingales, lovers were true, 
and the blood shed by a chivalrous knight was not life-
threatening. Possibly, then, Chaucer’s crow hearkens us to a 
primordial time — where the crow wins. Where white is black 
and black is white, where thinking on the crow facilitates an 












She seyde she was so mazed in the see 
That she forgat hir mynde, by hir trouthe. 
~Chaucer, The Man of Law’s Tale 
 
She came from the sea, mazed, amazed — masen —confused, 
bewildered, senseless. Deceived, deranged, crazed. They 
stopped and asked her who she was. When they stopped and 
asked her who she was, she said she did not know. She said 
she was so mazed in the sea, that she forgot her mind. Her 
mind — mynde — seat of memory, faculty of memory, 
individual remembrance. Reason, understanding. Will, desire, 
purpose. She forgot her mind, when she lost herself. 
Constance forgets Constance. Constance is lost. Distress 
teaches us to be inventive, says the nightingale, but blank 




Once, she was Constance. Syrian chapmen found her in 
Rome, among the other things, specially. The chapmen took 
their cloths of gold, their satins rich of hew, their chaffare so 
                                                                                              
1 I am grateful to Christina Petty and Janilee Plummer, postgraduate 
students on the Lexis of Cloth and Clothing Project at the University 
of Manchester, for their advice on matters relating to medieval 
embroidery and cloth production. 
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thrifty and new, and returned with tales of Constance. Their 
chaffare — anything of virtue, something desirable. An 
exchange, a bargain, a deal. So thrifty — well-made, seemly, 
suitable. Golden, rich of hew, so thrifty and so new, they 
returned with tales of Constance. The chapmen went to 
market. Take the cloth and sell the cloth, take the goods and 
sell the goods. The smooth trade in luxury prevails over gods 
and geography. Facilitate allegiance in the market. Chapmen 
exchange satin for Dame Constance. 
 
But now she comes from the sea, so mazed that she forgot her 




Take the cloth and pull the threads, unravelling the stitches. 
The picture isn’t woven, it can be undone. Stitches unpicked 
from the linen cloth, one thread at a time. Wind the silks 
around your hand, little by little erase. Fine scissors cut again 
and again, and the silks are all removed. The picture isn’t 
woven, and it can be undone. But look — small holes and 
blemishes, silk smudges and colours remain. Wash the cloth 
well. Soak it in water. All traces of the picture are gone. The 




Constance meets another, a woman wrapped in cloth. She says 
I have forgot my mind. The other holds a fine needle and a 
piece of fine spun gold. Constance says I am a wretch — 
wrecca — outcast, exiled. The other says I am Egaré — esgarée 
— outcast, exiled. And the cloth on her shone so bright. They 
asked me for my name, she says, and I changed it there anon. 
She takes the needle and couches gold over layers of silk, 
embellishing, embroidering. A cloth, a story, a name. 
Constance has no needle. Her cloth is bare, and there is 
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nothing there to couch. Blank linen, no trace of what came 
before. 
 
Egaré shows her another woman. From somewhere further 
east. This woman makes a love-token to give to a Sultan’s son. 
She takes the cloth and covers it in gold and azure, rich stones 
on every side. She adds pictures to the corners. Lovers, 
separated, suffering. Her web charts grief beyond her own. In 
the fourth, she weaves herself, her lover, to testify their tale. 
To bear witness, manifest, and attest the truth. Love token 
bestowed turns to spoil of war, and ends in the hands of an 
emperor. Egaré wraps herself in the woven words of the 
Eastern weaver, and coats herself in the testament. When the 
storms rage at sea, she will use unforgotten stories to cover her 
own face. 
 
And now another comes. She says her name is Couste. I am a 
woman woefully bestad, says Constance, I have forgot my 
mind. I am a woman woefully bestad, says Couste. They asked 
me for my name, she says, but I would not confess. I keep it 
woven into me, a cloth, a story, a name. Couste can be 
recognized, through the traces of my tale. In the word I 
choose to mean myself, my self-fashioned me, not all stitches 
can be unpicked. But Constance has no tapestry. The frame is 
bare, and there is nothing here to weave. Blank linen, no trace 




Take the cloth and pull the threads, unravelling the stitches. 
The picture isn’t woven, it can be undone. Stitches unpicked 
from the linen cloth, one thread at a time. Wind the silks 
around your hand, little by little erase. Fine scissors cut again 
and again, and the silks are all removed. The picture isn’t 
woven, and it can be undone. But look – small holes and 
blemishes, silk smudges and colours remain. Wash the cloth 
well. Soak it in water. All traces of the picture are gone. The 
cloth can be reused. 




A nightingale weaves a tapestry. In her youth she had learned 
to work and to embroider. To weave in her frame a radevore, 
as she knows women did of yore. She weaves, I am a woeful 
lady. Constance says, I am a woeful lady. I have forgot my 
mind. The nightingale stitches, with a pen I cannot write, but I 
can weave letters to and fro. It takes a year to fill my wooden 
frame, but then I weave it well. My cloth, my story, my name, 
and how I was served for my sister’s love. To bear witness, 
manifest, and to attest the truth. 
 
Constance sees the nightingale’s cloth. Woollen threads 
complete the wooden frame. No threads remain of Constance 
now. No letters woven on a frame. How is she served for her 
father’s love? How is she served for her husband’s love? I do 
not sew, says Constance, I do not weave. Who are you? weaves 
the nightingale. I do not remember. I cannot testify. 
 
A Greek bird sews the scene the same, though her dumb lips 
cannot reveal. But grief and pain might breed ingenuity, and 
distress teaches us to be inventive. Constance suffers grief and 
pain, and her dumb lips do not reveal. But no ingenuity 
remains with her, inventiveness unthreaded and washed away. 
She stitches no scene, she weaves no letters. She has no needle, 




Take the cloth and pull the threads, unravelling the stitches. 
The picture isn’t woven, it can be undone. Stitches unpicked 
from the linen cloth, one thread at a time. Wind the silks 
around your hand, little by little erase. Fine scissors cut again 
and again, and the silks are all removed. The picture isn’t 
woven, and it can be undone. But look — small holes and 
blemishes, silk smudges and colours remain. Wash the cloth 
Priest :: Unravelling Constance 121 
!
well. Soak it in water. All traces of the picture are gone. The 




The chapmen took their cloths of gold, their satins rich of 
hew, their chaffare so thrifty and new, and returned with tales 
of Constance. Golden, rich of hew, so thrifty and so new. She 
has no needle to embroider her cloth, and she has no shears to 
cut it. Her threads were pulled by other hands, by many pairs 
of other hands. 
 
A Sultaness, a cursed crone, first does the cursed deed. 
Constance’s act of embroidery, sewing Christian yarns on 
Syrian cloth, is stopped before the needle pricks. The old 
woman measures the threads of her son’s life, and snaps her 
shears early. The crone’s Syrian tapestry remains unchanged 
and Constance unravelling is given to the sea. 
 
Donegild, next, full of tyranny. Her daughter-in-law’s cloth is 
ready for images to be sewn, and the patterns are now set. But 
the old queen waits with her own silk, to counterfeit most 
subtly. Her picture she wrought most sinfully, as she 
embroiders Constance’s monstrosity. She unpicks the words 
that her son might say, and invents a new story. The old 
queen’s skill outstrips the younger’s and Constance 
unravelling is given to the sea. 
 
Stitchcraft is taught woman to girl. Without a mother, a nurse 
will do (maybe a lady that men call Abro). Constance says 
goodbye to her mother, and never learns to sew. It is no 
marvel, then, that crones and queens can wield their needles 
with far more subtlety. Constance lacks their skill. She has no 
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Take the cloth and pull the threads, unravelling the stitches. 
The picture isn’t woven, it can be undone. Stitches unpicked 
from the linen cloth, one thread at a time. Wind the silks 
around your hand, little by little erase. Fine scissors cut again 
and again, and the silks are all removed. The picture isn’t 
woven, and it can be undone. But look — small holes and 
blemishes, silk smudges and colours remain. Wash the cloth 
well. Soak it in water. All traces of the picture are gone. The 




Two women weave tapestries and grieve. One, alone and 
lonely, sews a funeral robe. She weaves the great web all day. 
But when night comes she sets torches beside her, and 
unravels her own stitches. The other, alone and lonely, weaves 
by night and day a magic web with colours gay. Did you write 
your name upon the boat? she says. Did you write it on the 
prow? Go to your house, and busy yourself. Go to your distaff 
and loom. I have no house, Constance says. I am a wretch — 
wrecca — outcast and exiled. I have no distaff and I have no 
loom. I have no warp and I have no weft. I have no web to 
weave.  
 
Look to the spider, Constance. From her belly, she yet spins 
her thread, and as a spider is busy with her web of old. Grief 
and pain might breed ingenuity, and distress teaches her to be 
inventive. The spider’s web charts grief beyond her own. 
Europa, Asterie, Antiope. Alcmene, Danae, Aegina. 
Proserpine, Canace, Iphimedeia. Bisaltis, Demeter, Melantho. 
Medusa, Isse, Erigone. Egaré and Couste, the daughter of the 
Emir. The nightingale, Ithaca’s queen, the lady in the tower. 
Other women have been mazed before. Deceived, deranged, 
crazed. Other women have been mazed before. But they kept 
hold of the threads to find the way out. 
 
Constance. Constance has no place inside a web. She cannot 
sew her self. She has no web, she has no loom. She has no silk, 
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she has no gold. She has no needles, she has no frame. She is 
the cloth that the chapmen bought. She is the cloth for crones 
and queens to couch upon. The cloth for kings and Sultans to 
couch gold upon. She is the blank linen back without the 
wool, the unpicked square without the yarn.  
 
She has no memory, she has no mind. She has no needle, she 





Take the cloth and pull the threads, unravelling the stitches. 
The picture isn’t woven, it can be undone. Stitches unpicked 
from the linen cloth, one thread at a time. Wind the silks 
around your hand, and little by little erase. Fine scissors cut 
again and again, and the silks are all removed. The picture isn’t 
woven, and it can be undone. But look — small holes and 
blemishes, silk smudges and colours remain. Wash the cloth 
well. Soak it in water. All traces of the picture are gone. The 




She came from the sea, mazed, amazed. An exchange, a 
bargain, a deal. They stopped and asked her who she was. 
When they stopped and asked her who she was, she said she 
did not know. Golden, rich of hew, so thrifty and so new. She 
said she was so mazed in the sea, that she forgot her mind. 
Reason, understanding, will, desire, purpose. Go to your 















Pornography, like fairy tale, tells us who we are. 
~Andrea Dworkin 
 
There is also something called a poire prisonnière. Unlike other 
eaux-de-vie, poire prisonnière captures the fruit itself. Early in the 
growing season, when the pears are just forming on the trees, glass 
bottles are tied over some of the most promising buds. The pear 
grows inside the bottle, and when it is ripe, it is cut from the tree-still 
in the bottle. Both bottle and pear are washed and pear brandy is 
added. The whole pear is in the bottle you buy, its beauty and flavor 
completely intact. 
~“Eaux de Vie (Eau de Vie),” Moveable Feasts1 
                                                                                  
The photo of Poire Prisonnière is from Westford Distilleries (http://www. 
westfordhill.com), reprinted here with their permission. 
 
1 “Eaux de Vie (Eau de Vie),” Moveable Feasts [cookbook weblog], March 27, 
2010: http://moveablefeastscookbook.blogspot.com/2010/ 03/eaux-de-vie-
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§ HEERE FOLWETH THE PHISICIENS TALE. 
 
For centuries she didn’t speak at all, the girl Virginia. The 
silent girl who finally speaks tells the story. Submission, 
omission, commission, submersion, subversion, inversion, 
corruption, coercion. Defilement, denial, the child, the trial, fil, 
fille, vile, ville, filial bonds, bondage, twisted positions and 
impositions, text and subtext and context and cuntext. 
Penetration, vellum, hide, marks, pens, wounds, piercings, 
cuttings, severings, maidenheads, giving head, what’s inside our 
heads that is left unsaid, what cannot be said being said, the 
sinkhole in a prison bed, the outburst of consent and the 
pressure of speech, the hand holding the pencil raced over the 
paper without the least concern for the hour or the light. The 
girl was writing the way you speak in the dark to the person 
you love when you’ve held back the words of love too long and 
they flow at last2, hysteria catatonia silence asceticism 
abasement how a woman throws herself is thrown hurls herself 
is hurled cuts herself is cut how there is an O in the center of the 
monastery and in the rear of the prison the text is inscribed, 
marked, stripped, cut, scraped, erased, reinscribed, corrected, 
raped, rapt, wrapped3 and how this story is old, begins with a 
snake’s mouth and ends in a bit of tale served up by a woman, 
an O, once a V, an A(nne), an A(ury), a Pauline nun from the 
                                                                                  
eau-de-vie.html. 
2 Pauline Réage, née Anne Desclos, alias Dominique Aury, Return to the 
Chateau, preceded by, A Girl in Love (New York: Grove Press, 1973), 7. 
3 Parallels between the body and text have been drawn by many scholars and 
poets, including Chaucer. Carolyn Dinshaw illuminates the relation of text 
and subjugated female body in Chaucer’s Sexual Poetics (Madison: University 
of Wisconsin, 1989), citing Chaucer’s use of the then-ambiguous word “rape” 
in his “Chaucer’s Wordes unto Adam, His Owne Scriveyn”: The final line, 
“And al is thorough thy negligence and rape,” could mean merely haste and 
carelessness or, as was current by Chaucer’s time, could at least connote the 
modern meaning of sexual violation. Dinshaw argues that Chaucer deployed 
the ambiguity with deliberate intent to invest the word and the subject of 
writing and text-making with a gendered, sexual meaning (3–10).  
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bawdy papers, a Reagent. The Autre. The Autre4 Translation 
transgression transubstantiation, trasumanar5, tongues, longing, 
language, sources, apocrypha apostasy outtakes originals pens 
and penetration, comments, commas, parents, parentheses, 
prisons, patrimony, patronage, the mouth, the eye, the os, the 
ass, the orifice, the vacuole, the caesura, the fissure, the seizure, 
the rapture, ravissement, stripping away, strips of skin, 
laceration, O in the middle, jouissance,6 O behind, the iron O 
on the finger, the steel O in the labia, the monsters inside us: 
The Three-Legged Man, The Headless Woman . . . we forget to 
remember and remember to forget a story of giving credit and 
revoking credit of not knowing half the time to whom to give 
credit.7  
                                                                                  
4 “In Lacanian terms, the other — the ‘barred’ O — is what lies behind the 
fantasy of the full, watchful Other. This ‘barred’ O can never be fully 
accounted for . . . [and] is one way of designating the ‘symbolic order,’ the 
open-ended and unpredictable network of signifiers that constructs human 
subjectivity,” writes L.O. Aranye Fradenburg, Sacrifice Your Love: 
Psychoanalysis, Historicism, and Chaucer (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2002), 5–6.  
5 “Trasumanare” is generally agreed to have been coined by Dante in Canto I, 
line 70 of The Paradiso, and has been translated to mean, “to transcend the 
human.” The word’s inexpressible meaning is articulated at its very birth in 
the phrase “Trasumanar significar per verba / Non si poria” [“The passing 
beyond humanity cannot be described in words,” I.70–71], as cited by 
Mariann Sanders Regan in Love Words: The Self and the Text in Medieval and 
Renaissance Poetry (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982), 174. 
6 An untranslatable word from the French for extreme (and usually sexual) 
bliss characterized by “a pleasure that is excessive, leading to a sense of being 
overwhelmed or disgusted, yet simultaneously providing a source of 
fascination”: Bruce Fink, The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and 
Jouissance (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), xii. Lacan took up 
the term circa 1959 to describe desire of the most fundamental sort, and to 
this day a good way to start a bloodbath among Lacanians is to release a little 
jouissance into the water. For one rather heady and gutsy discussion, see 
Adrian Johnston, “The Forced Choice of Enjoyment: Jousissance Between 
Expectation and Actualization,” Lacan.com [n.d.], http://www.lacan.com/ 
forced.htm. 
7 This opening monologue owes its trajectory to Lucky’s speech in Beckett’s 
Waiting for Godot. 
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 Take. Eat.8 
She listened from another room or sat sewing in the same 
room, as her father praised her to the suitors, calling their 
attention to her modesty, her chastity, her health, her clean 
habits and orderly mind. As wel in goost as body chast 
was she. The father boasted that she was fully obedient and 
flexible to his discipline, and “Who is she,” they were 
saying, “who does she belong to?” “You, if you like,” he 
replied,9 that a good husband would have no difficulty at all 
containing her youth and impulsiveness. In fact, these 
qualities so little plagued her, that she might instruct another 
in sobriety.  
 (This is a corrupt text.)  
 
 Another version of this essay’s beginning is simpler and 
more direct.10 
 The daughter’s consent.11 
 From the first known telling of the crime of Appius and the 
                                                                                  
8 Within an apocryphal version of Genesis, a curious tale links nourishment 
with penitence and sacrificial killing of a woman by a man, at the woman’s 
request. To which the man — The Man, Adam — does not consent, saying, 
“How indeed, can I do you any evil, for you are my body.” The first attempt at 
communion, exiled from the Bible itself in the slushpile of apocrypha (see 
Gary A. Anderson and Michael E. Stone, The Life of Adam and Eve: The 
Biblical Story in Judaism and Christianity: http://www2.iath.virginia.edu/ 
anderson/vita/english/vita.arm.html#per2). Also not forgetting the role of 
eating in sacramental moments of the Church and in the moments of 
treachery against virgins in stories such as Snow White, as well as the details of 
the Frog Prince in which the Princess’s bowl and cup are as important to the 
Frog as her bed. 
9 Pauline Réage, Story of O (New York: Ballantine Books, 1973), 197. 
10 Paraphrase from Réage, Story of O, 5. 
11 Lianna Farber states, “In a remarkable moment of the Physician’s Tale 
Virginia consents to her own death, asking her father Virginius to kill her: 
“Yif me my deeth, er that I have a shame,” she implores him (VI.249). This 
moment, like all those when Virginia speaks, appears neither in Chaucer's 
stated source, Livy's history, which Chaucer may or may not have known, nor 
in his unstated source, Jean de Meun's Roman de la Rose, which Chaucer most 
certainly did know” (“The Creation of Consent in the Physician’s Tale,” The 
Chaucer Review 39.2 [2004]: 151–164). 
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honor-killing of the girl Virginia,12 certain traits survive into 
subsequent retellings. Chaucer’s “The Physician’s Tale” is part 
of a trio of medieval recountings that include Reason’s 
assertions to the Lover in Le Roman de la Rose and John 
Gower’s roughly concurrent and possibly competitive retelling 
in Confessio amantis. All three preserve Livy’s essential 
triangle of lustful judge (Appius), loyal soldier who defies the 
law (Virginius), and hapless virgin whose physical life is taken 
by her father to preserve her chastity (Virginia).  
 But an entire person is missing from Le Roman de la Rose 
and from Chaucer’s story: Lucius Icilius, to whom Virginia 
was lawfully betrothed in Livy’s telling. Chaucer’s version also 
tweaks a passing detail in Livy’s original: she was apprehended 
by the judge’s man as she went to school in Livy, whereas 
Chaucer inserts a temple. Both changes set the girl on an 
ascent from person to quality, from Virginia to V. 
 The removal of Icilius from the narrative, first in Le Roman 
and later in Chaucer’s tale, may have been a simple choice for 
editorial expediency, but it acts as a ritual purification.13 The 
Xing out of a future husband transubstantiates the girl from 
marriageable young woman to sacred object, Christlike as her 
father’s only child. Then the sacrifice of her to prevent her 
defilement by Appius becomes allegorical, her day in 
kangaroo court as absurd as Jesus’s trial before Pilate. Her 
pleading, her swooning, and her eventual acceptance of her 
father’s will suggest Christ’s passion on the cross, a parallel 
that is both supported and profaned by the follow-up pairing 
with the Pardoner, with his mocked-up relics, his rags and 
bones, and his trio of rogues who cancel themselves in their 
quest to cancel Death. 
 Most important, Virginia never speaks in any version until 
Chaucer adds her consent to her own death, albeit after 
protestations and a few fainting spells: “Yif me my deeth, er 
                                                                                  
12 Livy, The Early History of Rome, trans. Aubrey de Selincourt (New York: 
Penguin Books, 1960), III.44–51. 
13 Gower’s telling retains the suitor. 
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that I have a shame” (VI.249).14 
 In other words, she was asking for it.  
  
The woman’s “yes” to her own destruction resonates. Six 
centuries later, a meek lady of letters pens a text to amuse her 
lover and becomes the first female pornographer of record. O is 
one enormous yes, and she turns V’s old yes on its ass with an 
actual request for death in the second ending of Histoire D’O. 
The text implies a resurrection of both endings from an act of 
omission and silencing at the hands of a “suppressing” outside 
party or by the author herself: 
  
In a final chapter, which has been suppressed, O 
returned to Roissy, where she was abandoned by Sir 
Stephen. 
There exists a second ending to the story of O, 
according to which O, seeing that Sir Stephen was about 
to leave her, said she would prefer to die. Sir Stephen 
gave her his consent.15 
 
Thus an act of textual erasure (to keep the main character alive) 
becomes an act of textual revision that kills her. 
 
 Not only is V stripped of her original suitor, but her quest 
for secular learning (in Livy) is transformed into a spiritual 
errand through Chaucer’s insertion of the temple. Centuries 
                                                                                  
14 All citations of Chaucer’s Physician’s Tale from Larry D. Benson, gen. ed, 
The Riverside Chaucer, 3rd edn. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1987), by 
fragment and line number. 
15Fifteen years after the publication of Histoire D’O, Susan Sontag insisted that 
the heroine, O, remains sovereign, an assertion supported by the few — but 
pivotal — moments in the book when O is offered her freedom. In her essay 
entitled “The Pornographic Imagination,” Sontag wrote, “That she chooses to 
die is O’s ultimate choice, it is within her power. . . . Her condition . . . should 
not be understood as a by-product of her enslavement . . . but as the point of 
her situation, something she seeks and eventually attains”: “The Pornographic 
Imagination,” in Susan Sontag, Styles of Radical Will (New York: Farrar, 
Straus, and Giroux, 1969) 55 [35–73]. 
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later, O, too, is stripped of ordinary social status and identity 
at the beginning of her story, removed from normal life while 
on an outing. She is also seized by a trusted figure — her own 
lover. Ordered into a car and told to ritualistically strip off her 
undergarments while remaining publicly dressed, she is 
relieved of her handbag, which the author notes contains all 
her identification papers. But she is not stripped of agency, 
albeit an agency expressed in abjection, submission, and 
abdication of self-sovereignty that leads directly to a 
transcendent state: 
 
He began by saying that she should not think that she 
was now free. With one exception, and that was that she 
was free not to love him any longer, and to leave him 
immediately. But if she did love him, then she was in no 
wise free. She listened to him without saying a word, 
thinking how happy she was that he wanted to prove to 
himself — it mattered little how — that she belonged to 
him, and thinking too that he was more than a little 
naive not to realize that this proprietorship was beyond 
any proof. . . . The word “open” and the expression 
“opening her legs” were, on her lover's lips, charged with 
such uneasiness and power that she could never hear 
them without experiencing a kind of internal 
prostration, a sacred submission, as though a god, and 
not he, had spoken to her.16 
 
Thus begins her transfiguration through obloquy and eventual 
obliteration. By her own consent. 
 
§ “SHE LISTENED TO HIM WITHOUT SAYING A WORD”: OUI, NO, 
AND O  
 
All the writers of the Virginia story face a dramatic difficulty 
in making the girl accessible after the trial so her father can 
                                                                                  
16 Réage, Story of O, 54–55. 
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handily kill her. In Livy the father seizes the girl and 
dispatches her life in a public place (semi-public, actually, and 
foully ironic: her father takes her to an alley near the sheds of 
learning where all the trouble began). In Chaucer, the murder 
takes place at home: He gooth hym hoom, and sette him in his 
halle, / And leet anon his deere doghter calle (VI.207–208).  
 How does one verify the fact of a fable? The girl was never 
released, or she was never imprisoned. The yard was filled 
with the shards of her discarded toys, and the shit of the 
greyhounds her father kept; it was in Rome, or in Paris, or 
nowhere in between. “There was nothing real about this 
country, which night had turned into make-believe, nothing 
except the smell of sage and lavender.”17  
 Centuries passed. Her father took her back to the sheds of 
learning. He took her directly from the courthouse, or he took 
her the next morning, on his way back. Or he took her behind 
the house, or in some anonymous alley that is the same in 
every city, in every city where an older man who claims rights 
to a younger woman will take her when he wants to do 
something unspeakable, in the name of love. “There is only 
one way, my child, to make you free.”18 Gently, with the 
lightest touch befitting a father whose daughter denies him 
nothing, he pushed her to her knees in the alley by the Forum, 
or in the yard where she’d once played, or in a place they’d 
never been. There, within sight of the temple where her 
prayers had once gone up to the goddess of wisdom, within 
sight of the apple tree she’d climbed and straddled, within 
shouting distance of the court of law, the first mid-morning 
rays of summer raised the stench of kitchen heaps and the 
indistinct odor of rats’ tunnels, spilled wine, urine, and dust to 
her nostrils. She did nothing to resist. Did he ask her 
permission? They were alone. Who knows. He struck her a 
blow across the throat, and then no more. . . . her refuge of 
                                                                                  
17 Réage, Story of O, 196. 
18 Livy, The Early History of Rome, 236. 






Chaucer didn’t like this silence. Chaucer couldn’t abide it. 
Chaucer elided the moment as best he could, made it better, 
made it worse: 
 “O gemme of chastitee, in pacience / Take thou thy deeth, for 
this is my sentence:/For love and nat for hate thou / most be 
deed; / My pitous hand moott smyten of thyn heed” (VI.223–
226). 
 And she, silent so long, spoke her last: one day this girl of 
whom I am speaking, and rightly so, since if I have nothing of 
hers she has everything of mine, the voice to begin with,20 
“Blissed be God that I shal dye a mayde! / Yif me my deeth, er 
that I have a shame; / Dooth with youre child youre wyl, a 
Goddes name!” (VI.248–250). 
 The death is told with bloodless precision in ten one-
syllable words. Except that Chaucer can’t resist evoking the 
grim image of the Knight yanking his daughter’s severed head 
up by the hair and tossing it at the feet of the corrupted 
Appius in open court. A sick joke: Maidenhead is yours; just 




A woman’s consent to the impossible — the unthinkable, the 
inhumane and inhuman — has been a feature of stories of all 
sorts: the bestial transgressions of “Beauty and the Beast” and 
“The Frog Prince” (in which, in the unsanitized version, it is 
not a kiss that resurrects the prince to humanity but the 
princess’s brutal act of frustration in throwing him against a 
wall, splitting his skin). “The Physician’s Tale” and the Story of 
                                                                                  
19 Réage, Story of O, 43. 
20 Réage, Return to the Chateau, 6. 
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O continue this night work. 
 In Chaucer’s time, the fantasy of the all-encompassing 
female YES had a double in the knight’s unwavering 
dedication to his lady and his state. The father Virginius has 
sworn allegiance to serve and submit to Appius, who is both 
judge and governor. The father’s NO, paired with the girl’s 
YES, cancels secular power over family, over purity, over 
sanctities and personal sovereignty. The father Virginius and 
the girl Virginia — in name practically one person, intimates 
of one another in the same way that God the Father and Jesus 
the Son are aspects of the same triadic identity, with the Holy 
Spirit being wholly hole-y holy in Its abundantly present 
Absence — are in a collusion of apostatic resistance, opting 
out of the formal judicial decision to which they are both 
bound for different reasons. He says he is freeing her. He is. 
He is not. 
 The woman who says yes to what is not possible and the 
knight who can save her from anything by doing what he likes 
to her — by carrying her away from the tower, by raping her 
in the form of a beast or a frog or a swan, by dropping her 
coffin and dislodging the stifling apple from her fallen throat, 
by killing her to save her honor — are central figures of the 
ourobourosian, slipping realities of these stories, what Andrea 
Dworkin calls the “double-double think” in her critique of 
Histoire d’O: “Everything is what it is, what it isn't, and its 
direct opposite.”21 As in the ancient wedding rites, in which a 
woman’s silence represented consent, nothingness means 
everything. And it is the implicit power of NO — every 
woman’s right even when trampled and unobserved — that 
makes the assent so tantalizing, whether by silence or by 
explicit statement. These moments in our stories take place 
beyond utterance, in paroxysmic union of Us with Other, in 
the dissolution of self in the annihilation of All:  
  
 
                                                                                  
21 Andrea Dworkin, Woman Hating (New York: Plume, 1974). 
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Thus he would possess her as a god possesses his 
creatures, whom he lays hold of in the guise of a 
monster or a bird, of an invisible spirit or a 
state of ecstasy.22 
 
In 1380, a curious legal proceeding concerning Geoffrey 
Chaucer came to light, hovered for a few months, then 
submerged into history’s confusions without further expla-
nation. On May 1 of that year, a woman named Cecily 
Champain agreed in a formal document to release Geoffrey 
Chaucer from responsibility for omnimodas acciones tam de 
raptu meo — any and all actions concerning her rape.23 Two 
months later, two men named Richard Goodchild and John 
Grove issued the same sort of document releasing Chaucer 
from obligation for any harm done to them — no mention of 
rape. The same day, Cecily Champain “signed a nearly 
identical document releasing the same two men.”24 Three days 
later, John Grove paid Cecily Champain ten pounds. 
 We know less of this woman than we do of Chaucer 
himself. We know that she was fatherless, but not a minor — 
her father had died twenty-one years before. Her stepmother 
was likely Alice Perrers, mistress to the king and a close friend 
to Chaucer.25 Was Cecily also a noted beauty, available and 
valuable as a commodity of pleasure? Had she given herself 
and regretted it, been taken by force, or perhaps been the 
bespoke property of another man, and fallen into or chosen 
the hands of another, or others? In any case, these documents 
acknowledge at least the aborted presence of an accusation of 
either rape or kidnapping, and it seems that a sum of money 
changed hands as recompense. And other men were involved 
 Although his work on the Canterbury Tales had its roots in 
                                                                                  
22 Réage, Story of O, 31. 
23 Donald R. Howard, Chaucer: His Life, His Works, His World (New York: 
Ballantine Books, 1989), 317. 
24 Howard, Chaucer, 319. 
25 Howard, Chaucer, 318. 
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earlier work, it is generally agreed that Chaucer began the 
project in earnest after 1380. Important surveys have been 
made of the Tales’ repeated references to rape, the coercion of 
women, and “the many different ways social structures are 
disrupted and redefined when women speak, specifically when 
they say yes and no.”26 If — and it is a rather large if — 
Chaucer had himself been redeemed after the rape of a 
woman, what demons might these tales have released and laid 
to rest for him?  
 To make up a story is a curious trap.27 
 
In 1954 a shocking text surfaced in Paris. In just under 200 
pages of cool, sinuous prose, it told the story of a young woman’s 
induction into a life of bondage and submission. The scandal of 
the text was not that it was pornographic, but that its publisher 
claimed it was written by a woman. The first French edition 
carried a preface by prominent editor and taste-maker Jean 
Paulhan, who admired the book’s “always pure and violent 
spirit, endless and unadulterated.”28  
 The author would wait 40 years to speak up and claim the 
book. But Paulhan knew who she was: his adulterous 
companion for at least 8 years by then, and the only woman 
within the inner circle of men at Editions Gallimard. Quiet, 
unassuming, known for her demure and modest dress (“very 
pretty, in soft colors,” one contemporary described her29), 
Dominique Aury (itself a pseudonym, her given name at birth 
being Anne Declos) had nonetheless produced this lacerating 
work on a dare, because Paulhan believed no woman could 
write pornography. She balanced the book’s entire existence on 
one irresistible conceit: The Woman Who Never Says No. 
 “I advance through O with a strange feeling,” said Paulhan, 
“as though I am moving through a fairy tale — we  know that 
                                                                                  
26 Elizabeth Robertson. “Comprehending Rape in Medieval England,” 
Medieval Feminists Forum 21.1 (1996): 13–15. 
27 Réage, Return to the Chateau, 19.  
28 Réage, Story of O, xxiv. 
29 Quoted in Writer of O, dir. Pola Rapaport (Zeitgeist Films, 2006). 
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fairy tales are erotic novels for children.”30  
 The book is hypnotic and seamless in the first sixty pages, 
spotty and hit-or-miss thereafter. It begins and ends abruptly, 
and twice each time. Ourobouros. The final word of the book, 
“consent,” leaves the narrative hanging in the balance, at the 
point just after a verdict is rendered, yet before it is enacted. 
 
Hire beautee was hire deth, I dar wel sayn.31 
                                                                                  
30 Réage, Story of O, xxiii. 











The tomb is not a passage; it is a non-site that shelters an 
absence. 
 ~Jean-Luc Nancy, Dis-Enclosure: The Deconstruction  
of Christianity 
 
Art without consolation would, it seems, be fatally deficient. 
Art’s distinctive identity, central to a humanist aesthetic, 
emanates from its supposedly singular capacity to transcend: 
where humanists are menaced by meaninglessness, art offers 
significance; where humanists lament loss, art reveals timeless 
truth and enduring beauty; where humanists sense absence, 
art promises presence. Humanist art consoles the living about 
the dead and the losses they signify. It affirms the extension of 
(human) life into the realms of the lifeless. Read (as it 
customarily is) with such expectations, Chaucer’s Book of the 
Duchess becomes an artistic experiment in which the death of 
John of Gaunt’s wife provides Chaucer the matter through 
which to transcend the boundaries of human life and, in that 
act, create art.  
 But not so fast. Humanist traditions prepare readers for 
such a result, and yet this narrative continuously avoids 
granting it. Instead, the poem actively “refuses to re-figure 
loss as transcendence.”1 It requires that we proclaim, along 
with its proverbially obtuse narrator, that “She is dead!”2 and, 
                                                                                  
1 Louise O. Fradenburg, “‘Voice Memorial’: Loss and Reparation in 
Chaucer’s Poetry,” Exemplaria 2.1 (March 1990): 177 [169–202]. 
2 Geoffrey Chaucer, Book of the Duchess, in The Riverside Chaucer, 
3rd edn., gen. ed. Larry D. Benson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1987), 
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in the process, it “insist[s] on the irreducibility of certain 
limits.”3 Absence, loss, and the threat of meaninglessness all 
endure. The poem’s many irresolvable ambiguities — its 
narrator’s mysterious and unnatural illness, its melancholic 
modifications that transform Ovid’s story of Ceyx (for 
Chaucer, Seys) and Alcyone into tragedy, its hyperbolic 
miscommunication between grieving knight and inquisitive 
dreamer — linger. In deliberately refusing transformation or 
transcendence, the poem enacts what I would call a 
disconsolate poetics, in which pain and suffering perdure, in 
which darkness obscures the light. 
 Within the narrative of the Book of the Duchess, the 
common expectation of transcendence through art is revealed 
in triplicate. Humanist readers abound. The narrator, afflicted 
with an undiagnosed illness one symptom of which is 
insomnia, turns to fictional art for comfort. Similarly, within 
the story to which the narrator turns to end his sleeplessness, 
art is once again expected to relieve suffering: here, artistry (in 
the form of the god Morpheus’ performance of the dead Seys’ 
persona while inhabiting his corpse) is expected to provide 
answers, to end pain through providing knowledge, to console 
by “soothing the pain, . . . retrieving the presence and the life 
of those who are dead.”4 This gesture of the faithful is echoed 
within the narrator’s dream (itself generated by his reading) 
by a mysterious Man in Black who the narrator overhears 
expressing his grief over the loss of his beloved wife, Blanche 
(that is, ‘White’), through lyric art. Yet in all three cases, and 
wholly contrary to the faith expressed by the three characters 
in their different narrative environments, calling on art to 
soothe, restore, and retrieve instead betrays an art whose 
power is limited and perhaps even fatal.  
                                                                                  
l. 1309 [pp. 329–346]. All further citations from this poem will be 
indicated, by line numbers, within the text. 
3 Fradenburg, “Voice Memorial,” 177. 
4 Jean-Luc Nancy, Dis-Enclosure: The Deconstruction of Christianity, 
trans. Bettina Bergo, Gabriel Malenfant, and Michael B. Smith (New 
York: Fordham University Press, 2008), 99. 
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 The experiences of the narrator and of the Man in Black 
imply this limitation: the narrator’s reading increases rather 
than relieves his sorrow, while the Man in Black’s poetic 
lament offers him no hope, not even the hope of 
communicating meaningfully with his living audience. The 
modified Ovidian story of Alcyone embodies this limitation 
directly and fully, leaving little doubt that faith in art as a tool 
for transcendence is misplaced. Indeed, the story-within-the-
story bears no witness to Ovid’s artistic transformation of 
tragedy into comedy, of death into (after)life, through the 
couple’s transformation into birds. Instead, here, there is only 
death. When the corpse of Seys, artificially enlivened by 
Morpheus, appears at the bedside of a desperately anxious 
Alcyone to announce to her the details of his death, her own 
death is precipitated. The death of one causes the death of the 
other, through dashed hope of life after death. Chaucer 
focuses not on the metaphysical transcendence through 
transform-ation familiar from Ovid’s version but instead on 
the mechanical animation of Seys, a unique feature of this 
version, which depends upon Morpheus’ artistry. The dead 
Seys only appears to be alive — for humanist art convinces us 
of presence despite absence. Yet this simulation, in calling 
attention to its being only a simulation, reveals that art cannot 
create what is not but instead can only adapt what is. In her 
instructions to Morpheus (via her messenger), Juno says, 
“[T]ake up Seys body the king” (142); this body, referred to 
only as “hit,” and not “he,” is never (re)made into the king but 
can be only merely the semblance of him — made to speak 
“[r]ight as hit was wont to do, / The whyles that hit was on 
lyve” (149–150). This corpse is a lifeless object, albeit one that 
can be made to appear a still-living, still-human object, 
through the extreme verisimilitude of Morpheus’ artistry.  
This art, however, does not provide the desired presence 
but instead emphasizes the feared absence. It affirms for 
Alcyone the aptness of her grieving. She who was once “[t]he 
beste that mighte bere lyf” (64) is transformed by the news to 
the epitome of the unliving, the inorganic: twice she “fil a-
swown as cold as ston” (123, 126–127). The knowledge she 
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sought induces her own death, a death that is an extension of 
her suspended living: she has, for days prior to the nighttime 
vision, been just this side of death, due to her inability to eat 
and her general lack of investment in life. Her appearing dead 
though still alive is contrasted utterly by the animation of her 
dead lover, which puts her in league with the inhabitants of 
the timeless world of the Cave of Sleep from which Morpheus 
has been briefly roused. Morpheus’ temporary illusory 
transform-ation of Seys’ lifeless body offers, instead of 
transcendence, only a vivid reminder of what has been 
irretrievably lost. Everything Seys requests, as he appears to 
Alycone, including his own burial and the reduction of her 
sorrow, assuring her that “I nam but ded” (304), apparently is 
for nought: She dies in three days. Like Alcyone, like Seys, we 
receive no consolation. The reanimation of Seys’ lifeless body, 
through Morpheus’ art, produces only death.  
 The Man in Black attempts through his verse something 
similar to Morpheus’ animation, the “revivification of the 
dead White, . . . reading the past into the present and the 
present into the past.”5 Painfully, though, the poem repeatedly 
raises this hope while only leaving it deferred. The dreamer is 
himself suspended between life and death, with “felyng in 
nothing” and sensing only that “Al is ylyche god to me” (11, 
9). He wonders, as a result, “How that I live” (2), for “wel ye 
woot, agaynes kynde / Hit were to liven in this wyse” (16–17). 
He turns to narrative to alleviate his mysterious affliction but 
finds there instead a double-death. This failure of art-as-
remedy is then followed by his encounter with the Man in 
Black’s loss, a loss that the dreamer refuses to accept until the 
Man in Black can stand it no longer. The dreamer is not 
attached to Blanche individually, like Alcyone is to Seys and 
the Man in Black is to his queen, so his resistance to 
acknowledging intense loss is because, as the dreamer 
proclaims in horror, “Is that your los? By god, hit is routhe!” 
                                                                                  
5 Nancy Ciccone, “The Chamber, the Man in Black, and the Structure 
of Chaucer’s Book of the Duchess,” The Chaucer Review 44.2 (2009): 
208 [205–23]. 
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(1310). From art, then, the narrator gained “swich pite and 
swich routhe / To rede hir sorwe, that, by my trouthe, / I ferde 
the worse al the morwe” (97–99). The series of encounters 
with art amounts to a series of encounters with death, with 
sorrow untranscended. The bleakness of Alcyone’s experience 
of loss — a loss re-enacted for her through Juno’s art — places 
all that follows in the poem in a shadow that is never 
eradicated, despite repeated expectation by those who suffer 
loss that art will produce precisely that transformation.  
 While Seys’ reanimated body becomes a tool of 
destruction, killing his wife’s hopes and thereby killing her, 
another Ovidian figure of transformation and transcendence 
becomes, through a certain Middle English disconsolate 
poetics, a self-destructive rejection of love’s, and art’s, capacity 
to move us beyond the limitations of earthly existence — of 
life. In the anonymous fourteenth-century Middle English 
romance Sir Orfeo, a lively adaptation of Ovid’s Orpheus and 
Eurydice story, it is a husband suffering the loss of his wife 
who physically and spiritually removes himself from human 
community, entering a deathlike state while experiencing the 
loss of — and with little hope for the return of — the absent 
beloved. His actions thus mirror those of Alcyone in the 
dreamer’s book in Chaucer’s Book of the Duchess. Seys and 
Heurodys are both tangibly alive, through the vividness of the 
poetic representation of their vulnerable bodies, and yet they 
are both in that precise moment absent, literally beyond 
human life.  
In this case, the Fairy King abducts Heurodys 
(alternatively, Meurodys in the version of Orfeo as it appears 
in Manuscript Ashmole 61), and while she is ultimately 
retrieved from her imprisonment in the fairy kingdom, she is 
nearly immediately dead (again). The artistry of the poem, in 
fact, lingers (twice) on her self-mutilation and on her 
suspension in a living death. First, when she obeys the Fairy 
King’s demand that she submit to him, Heurodys is palpably 
present as she tears at her body, shredding her skin and 
making us feel her physicality, as does Orfeo who describes 
her actions to her, in her distant madness:  
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Thy flessch that was so whyte beforn 
With thi nayles thou hast torn. 
Thy lyppes that were so bryght rede 
Semys as wan as thou were dede. 
And thi fyngyrs long and smale, 
Thei be blody and all pale. 6 
 
And yet at this moment she is somewhere beyond human life, 
mentally and emotionally elsewhere as she anticipates trans-
ference to the inhuman fairy kingdom.  
 Death in Orfeo masquerades as fairy abduction. 
Heurodys has literally been taken by the Fairy King from this 
world to another, at a pre-arranged time. Yet the effects of his 
intervention are precisely those effects known to be the result 
of death: after Heurodys tears at her body to the point that 
Orfeo says she appears dead she explains that they simply 
must part, despite their great love and harmonious life. This is 
a deathbed scene (100), with Orfeo’s response expressing 
precisely our questions at the moment of death — like Orfeo, 
we often ask of the departing beloved, “Where are you going?” 
and “Why can't I go with you?” When she recounts what the 
fairy king requires of her, it's as if she is being taken to heaven 
— confirmed later in the poem, in the Auchinleck 
manuscript’s version of Orfeo, when Orfeo enters the Fairy 
King’s castle and perceives it as “Paradise”7 — and if she 
resists, she will experience the physical torments generally 
associated with hell (175). These are the proverbial choices of 
death. Later, Orfeo enters the Fairy King’s hall and is told that 
none has ever entered without first being requested — that is, 
required — to come. No one, but Orfeo, chooses death. 
                                                                                  
6 Anonymous, Sir Orfeo, in Codex Ashmole 61: A Compilation of 
Popular Middle English Verse, ed. George Shuffelton (Kalamazoo: 
Medieval Institute Publications, 2008), ll. 95–96 [pp. 386–99]. All 
following citations from this poem will be indicated, by line 
numbers, within the text. 
7 Anonymous, Sir Orfeo, in The Middle English Breton Lays, ed. Anne 
Laskaya and Eve Salisbury (Kalamazoo: Medieval Institute Publica-
tions, 1995), l. 376. 
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Orfeo’s sorrow at his beloved’s departure is put in terms of his 
wanting to die, of having lived too long. When given the 
chance, upon seeing her a decade later, he promptly follows 
her, as if to his own end. Indeed, upon his return to 
Winchester/Thrace later, an incognito Orfeo tells a story to 
his former steward about King Orfeo’s supposed death, which 
is expressed in terms of his having been torn to pieces by 
lions, paralleling what his wife did to herself before her 
departure from the land of the living (528). Both Orfeo and 
Heurodys have experienced a death through dismemberment 
made possible only through art.  
 The enforced transformation of the effectively-dead in 
Sir Orfeo is performed by another supernatural artist, this 
time the Fairy King playing the role of Chaucer’s Morpheus in 
his manipulation of Heurodys’ body, which upon its 
abduction is no longer her own. Her permanent suspension 
between life and death is observed, ten years after she has been 
taken to the Fairy Kingdom, by Orfeo when he follows her to 
the castle of the Fairy King, presents himself to the porter as a 
minstrel, and is led to the King via a hall where he observes 
the following: 
 
Than lokyd he aboute the walle,  
And saw it stond over alle 
With men that were thyder brought,  
And semyd dede and were nought.  
Som ther stod withoutyn hede,  
And some armys non hade, 
And som ther bodys had wounde  
And som onne hors ther armyd sette,  
And som were strangyld at ther mete  
And men that were nomen wyth them ete;  
So he saw them stonding ther.  
Than saw he men and women in fere  
As thei slepyd ther undryntyde;  
He them saw on every syde.  
Among them he saw hys wyve  
That he lovyd as hys lyve,  
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That ley ther under that tre full trew;  
Be hyr clothys he hyr knew. (378–395) 
 
Orfeo’s encounter with his wife's suspended animation recalls 
Seys’ nighttime appearance to Alcyone; in this case, the Fairy 
King’s abductees — among them Orfeo’s wife Heurodys 
whom he has transformed into a work of art — are trapped in 
their moment of abduction in a kind of grotesque tableau. 
Both poems turn hopefully to art but find it infused with 
death rather than sustaining life. Orfeo’s art, functionally 
competing against the Fairy King’s art in a sort of Battle of the 
Bands, is his tool in a rescue fantasy that, as Fradenburg 
explains via Freud in “A Special Type of Choice of Object 
Made by Men,” is a “renegotiatio[n] of mortality: the fantasy 
is that if we can save someone, we might perhaps have power 
over life and death.”8  
 During the preceding decade in the wilderness, Orfeo 
has lived among the animals and used his art, his harping, as 
an artistic expression that had the opposite effect of the Man 
in Black’s lament of his own spousal loss, for Orfeo “temperyd 
hys herpe with a mery soune, / And harpyd after hys wane 
wylle” (274–275). Art is for Orfeo distraction from, rather 
than expression of, sorrow. The effect is that “The wyld bestys 
that ther were, / They com aboute hys harpe to here . . . meke 
and myld” (277–280). When he is harping is also when fairies 
are closest, when Orfeo can see their courtly excursions for 
hawking and hunting. Art thus seems to be associated with 
stillness and also with that which is beyond life, at the edges of 
life (285 ff.). Art’s association with peril is highlighted by the 
way the “strange, troubled catalogue of the undead is a 
catalogue of stories, trapped in the library of the fairy king.”9 
                                                                                  
8 Louise O. Fradenburg, “‘Fulfild of fairye’: The Social Meaning of 
Fantasy in the Wife of Bath’s Prologue and Tale,” in Peter G. Beidler, 
ed., Geoffrey Chaucer: Wife of Bath (Case Studies in Contemporary 
Criticism) (Boston: Bedford Books, 1996), 210 [205–220]. 
9 Ellen M. Caldwell, “The Heroism of Heurodis: Self-Mutilation and 
Restoration in Sir Orfeo,” Papers on Language & Literature [PLL] 
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The poem, like Book of the Duchess, reveals through this 
horrific image — emphasized in the poetic repetitions of art 
and suffering seen in this passage — art’s tendency to trap and 
fix, rather than to release and revive. 
 In these two poems, artistry is deployed to make the 
bodies of those who have been lost endure. In the classic 
William Hope Hodgson horror novel The Night Land, Eugene 
Thacker sees a tension between life and the human that 
applies to Seys’ artificial reappearance and to Heurodys’ 
appearance in the weird tableau: “unable to distinguish the 
living from the nonliving . . . everything appears to be alive, 
but none of it is alive in any naturalistic, let alone humanistic, 
sense of the term.”10  The contemporary equivalent would be 
the sus-pended animation of the zombie. Morpheus, not Seys, 
inhabits his body and speaks words of love to his wife, an 
imposter. The true horror of Heurodys’ dreamy courtly 
outings into the earthly forest, where she cannot speak and 
can only peer out from her physical shell and eventually 
recognize her husband, are witnessed by Orfeo when he enters 
the Fairy castle and sees her permanently bound in her 
moment of abduction. These two scenarios offer specimens of 
medieval supernatural horror, presenting — as Thacker says 
modern supernatural horror does — “a furtive, miasmatic 
unintelligibility that inhabits any ontology of life: the idea of a 
‘life’ that is not simply an anthropomorphic, human-centric 
idea of life.” The life witnessed here looks more like death, and 
yet is indiscernible from what we know of life. What results is 
“a concept of life that is itself, in some basic way, unhuman, a 
life without us.”11 Both scenes affirm Thacker’s observation 
                                                                                  
43.3 (2007): 305–306 [291–310]. 
10 Eugene Thacker, After Life (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2010), 267–268. See also E. R. Truitt, who analyzes the appearance of 
tomb automata in medieval literary texts in order to trace a range of 
“inorganic, artificial, magical objects [that] confound the simplistic 
binary of ‘life’ and ‘death’ by obscuring the boundaries between 
them, and by embodying a third category” (“Fictions of Life and 
Death,” postmedieval 1.1/2 [2010]: 197 [194–98]). 
11 Thacker, After Life, 268. 
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that “[w]hile human beings or human groups are obviously 
involved in such events, there is also a sense in which such 
events are beyond human comprehension.” For the duration 
of these experiences, with Orfeo and Alcyone we observe, even 
as with the dreamer of the Book of the Duchess we resist 
acknowledging, that “life is human-centered and yet un-
human-oriented.”12 
 Disconsolate art not only fails to console but refuses. In 
the process, it even rubs our faces in it, for the only 
transcendence presented in these poems is literal, not 
metaphysical. Seys hovers over Alcyone’s bed, in a dream but 
very real (literally, figurally textualized), completely present 
but simultaneously absent; Heurodys is already in the Fairy 
Kingdom as she tries to remove her earthly human body as if 
to escape to the fate she has not chosen but must take on, and 
then becomes part of an atemporal tableau of suffering even 
as she also inhabits the Fairy world and enters at times into 
the human realm. These lingering loci of darkness are central 
moments in two poems of lamentation that hypothesize art as 
a means of consolation. Each scene is one of endless depth, of 
timeless suspension, of unease, in a narrative interrogating the 
capacity of art to transcend — or at least disregard — such 
moments of recognition, in support of life. In Sir Orfeo, the 
music of Orfeo’s harp turns even wild animals still; in Book of 
the Duchess, poetry holds transcendent potential. Yet all fail to 
provide a panacea. Orfeo’s harping can’t prevent the removal 
of his beloved from earthly living and can’t return her there, 
either; its effects on the animals, stilling the active vitality 
within them, hint instead at art’s deadly potential. Heurodys’ 
husband tells her to “late be all this reufull crye” (102), just as, 
in Chaucer’s narrative, Alcyone’s encourages her to “Let be 
your sorwful lyf” (202), but the only way either can do this is 
through death. Orfeo’s response is to stop living: since he 
can’t quite kill himself literally, he kills his persona as king 
and as a member of the community and encourages in his 
mourning subjects the same recognition and acceptance 
                                                                                  
12 Thacker, After Life, ix.  
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Heurodys encouraged in him upon her departure: “Do wey . . . 
it schall be so” (228).  
 The living are urged by the dead to let them go, an 
impossible demand which is met instead with the griever’s 
departure from society and loss of individual identity, with 
each trapped in a locus amoenus become loathsome dream-
scape. This death calls for the “adieu” that, as Jean-Luc Nancy 
recounts, Derrida in a collection of memorial addresses (Each 
Time Unique, the End of the World), claimed “should salute 
nothing other than ‘the necessity of a possible non-return, the 
end of the world as the end of any resurrection’” so that it is a 
“definitive leave-taking, an irremissible abandonment — as 
much an abandonment of the deceased other to his 
effacement as an abandonment of the survivor to the rigorous 
privation of all hope in some kind of afterlife.”13 With 
Derrida, Nancy explains that, “We must say ‘adieu’ without 
return, in the implacable certainty that the other will not turn 
back, will never return.”14 Death, not Life, is human 
acceptance of the impossibility of producing a desired effect, a 
“letting be.” Only because he lacks true understanding can the 
dreamer-narrator of Book of the Duchess wake from his 
dream. The Man in Black and Alcyone are trapped (in art) by 
their own recognition. Art promises relief from suffering but 
instead serves only to remind us that living is suffering, a 
death in life.  Art offers us, like the figures throughout these 
two narratives, more reason to tremble than to rest — a 
disconsolate art.  
 
                                                                                  
13 Nancy, Dis-Enclosure, 98. See also Jacques Derrida, Chaque Fois 
Unique, La Fin du Monde, ed. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas 
(Paris: Éditions Galilée, 2003).  
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The inevitability of bad Fama worries a few of Chaucer’s 
heroines. Cresseid and Dido prefer that their shame not be 
spread about, while the Wife of Bath prefers to seize the 
means of narrative production.1 Each worries about what will 
be said about her; each justifies her actions; but none 
recognizes that, as a literary character, she could not have 
done other than she did.  
 This is where Custance, Virginia, and Emelye differ. It is 
the difference between saying, “I wish you wouldn't talk about 
me this way” and saying, instead, “why are you doing this to 
me?” or, more precisely, “Why are you making me do this?” 
For each one knows, if only for a moment, that the 
responsibility for what happens to her and through her lies 
elsewhere. Each experiences the precise opposite of self-
awareness, for each momentarily struggles against the 
narrative before realizing herself to be not a self but rather 
someone else's creature, destined to be rewarded or to suffer 
regardless of what she does, destined to be made to be 
satisfied with what happens, destined to be exemplary 
whether she wants to or not, because she comes to know that 
                                                                                              
1 See for example J. Stephen Russell, “Dido, Emily, and Constance: 
Femininity and Subversion in the Mature Chaucer,” Medieval 
Perspectives 1 (1988, for 1986): 66 [65–74]: “Dido is a woman 
incarcerated in the epic world of the Aenied.” 
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her wants are not her own. At once constituted and 
dispossessed by her tale, each implicitly repeats one of !i"ek’s 
favorite maxims, Deleuze’s “si vous êtes pris dans le rêve de 
l’autre, vous êtes foutu”2 [“if you're caught in the dream of 
another, you're fucked”]. One seeks death; another wants to be 
something other than a creature of her father; and the last 
tries to exempt herself from the tale’s political reconciliation. 
None gets what she wants: one forced to live, one to die, one 
to love, each gets just enough awareness of being in their 
stories to know that they want out. Then the door slams shut. 
 
§ CUSTANCE  
 
When a ship wrecks on the Northumbrian coast, a constable 
from a nearby castle scavenges it, and finds, amid the treasure, 
Custance. After a fashion, she begs to be freed from suffering: 
 
 In hir langage mercy she bisoghte. 
 The lyf out of hire body for to twynne, 
 Hire to deliver of wo that she was inne (II.516–518)3 
 
In a scene unique to Chaucer’s version of the story,4 Custance 
begs for death, partially in “a maner Latyn corrupt” (II.519), 
and partially, one must imagine, with gestures. Her motives 
are unclear, though if she thinks death mercy, then she must 
                                                                                              
2 For example, Violence: Six Sideways Reflections (New York: Picador, 
2008), 57. For the maxim's source (ultimately in a 1987 lecture, 
“Qu’est-ce que l’acte de création”), see Gilles Deleuze, Deux Régimes 
de Fous, textes et entretiens 1975–1995, ed. David Lapoujade (Paris: 
Minuit, 2003), 297; translation mine. 
3 All citations of Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales from The Riverside 
Chaucer, gen. ed. Larry D. Benson, 3rd edn. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1987), by fragment and line number. 
4 Robert M. Correale, “The Man of Law’s Prologue and Tale,” in 
Sources and Analogues of the Canterbury Tales, ed. Robert M. 
Correale and Mary Hamel, 2 Vols. (Woodbridge, Suffolk: Boydell 
and Brewer, 2006), 302–303, 332–333 [277–350]. 
Steel :: Kill Me, Save Me, Let Me Go 153 
!
be suffering terribly from being passed from one man to 
another.  
 Her death would interrupt this commerce. It would save 
her from another marriage, and save her, ultimately, from 
being returned to her Roman father, who, the Man of Law too 
earnestly assures us, lacks any incestuous desires. It would 
save her from continuing to be presented as a sanctified, 
perfectly submissive wife and daughter. She seeks death to 
exempt herself from this airtight exemplary narrative, for it is 
not just death she wants, but death for no clear reason. She 
wants it from someone who knows nothing of her, who wants 
nothing from her. The motiveless killing she seeks would 
grant her a senseless end, one that could not be interpreted 
within the constraints of the tale. The death she wants would 
be an event, an action from nowhere in the system as 
currently constituted, opening the sacrificial logic of female 
thralldom (II.286–87) to the otherwise unthinkable.5  
 Then the moment passes. In one of the very few critical 
assessments of her request, Kolve characterizes Custance as 
“experienc[ing] and express[ing] total despair,” from which 
“she soon recovers herself.”6 Kolve takes Constance as feeling 
something, and then deciding to feel something else more 
authentically in line with her true, holy self. He ends his 
attention to her despair as quickly as the tale itself does. But if 
we take the interruption of the despair seriously, if we stop the 
tale for a time to linger in it, we can watch Constance seeking 
an escape, and then see that escape taken from her. She is 
                                                                                              
5 I have Alain Badiou in mind. For a helpful explanation, see 
Christopher Norris: “events” are “those strictly unforeseeable and — 
as they appear at the time in question — wholly contingent irrup-
tions of the new that may turn out to exert a uniquely powerful and 
lasting effect but which elude ontological specification precisely 
insofar as they belong to no existing (i.e. up-to-now thinkable) order 
of things” (Badiou’s Being and Event: A Reader’s Guide [London: 
Continuum, 2009], 9). 
6 V. A. Kolve, Chaucer and Imagery of Narrative: The First Five 
Canterbury Tales (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984), 303. 
154 Dark Chaucer: An Assortment 
!
made to go on to show herself cleansed of despair by serving 
in the constable's household “withouten slouthe” (II.530), 
which is to say, without the acedia that might lead her once 
again to seek death.7 In short, the tale gives Constance a brief 
moment in which she might have escaped, and then compels 
her to be happy on its terms.8 Had she persisted in her 
unhappiness, had she refused to persist in her love for the 
beautiful and saintly body that so many others desire, had she, 
in short, ceased her constancy, who knows what would have 
happened? Perhaps nothing, in the sense that the narrative 
would have ended, or that the narrative that had been told 
after her death would be illegible within the legendary logic in 
which Custance suffers. This would have been a story ended 
by its subject’s life now “twynned” from her body, a life now 
nowhere, or elsewhere in ways impossible for the tale to think. 
 
§ VIRGINIA  
 
In Livy and the Roman de la Rose, Chaucer's most proximate 
source for the Physician's Tale, Virginius, not his daughter, is 
the focus of a tale less about a thwarted sexual crime than 
about political corruption and revolution; Virginius kills his 
daughter precipitously, in public; and Virginia has no chance 
to protest — and then to consent to — her father's plan to 
behead her.9 In Chaucer's wholly invented scene, the private, 
                                                                                              
7 For an efficient treatment of acedia and a guide to its scholarship, 
see Gregory M. Sedlack, Idleness Working: The Discourse of Love’s 
Labor from Ovid through Chaucer and Gower (Washington, D.C.: 
Catholic University of America, 2004), 171–174. 
8 For more on happiness and the status quo, see Sara Ahmed, The 
Promise of Happiness (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010). 
9 Kenneth Bleeth, “The Physician’s Tale,” Sources and Analogues, 
Vol. 2, 546 and 550 [535–564]. What follows is sympathetic to 
Michael Stugrin’s characterization of the scene as one in which father 
and daughter experience an “overwhelming sense of helplessness to 
effect any change in what they both recognize as their approaching 
fate[,which] goes beyond the plot of the tale and its moral 
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bereaved colloquy between father and daughter, Virginia asks 
for mercy (VI.231), begs for “grace” or a “remedye” (VI.236), 
and asks for time: 
 
 My deeth for to compleyne a litel space; 
 For, pardee, Japte yaf his doghter grace 
 For to compleyne er he hir slow, allas! (VI.239–241) 
 
Then she faints, rises from her swoon to declare “Blissed be 
God that I shal dye a mayde. / Yif me my deeth er that I have a 
shame” (VI.248–249), and faints again. Then her father 
beheads her. 
 The last decade's work on this scene has often tried to 
determine why Virginia's resistance collapses.10 Without 
aiming to displace these readings, I offer an answer that could 
not be more straightforward. Or circular. She consents to her 
death because she has to die. She consents to patriarchal 
authority, but, in a larger sense, she is consenting to the 
inevitability of the tale itself. Note Chaucer’s emphasis on the 
tale’s historicity. Its first line ascribes the events to “Titus 
Livius” (VI.1); amid Apius’s scheming, he assures us that “this 
is no fable / But knowen for historial thyng notable” (VI.155–
156); and Virginia herself is like a book (VI.108), offered up as 
an example in which “maydens myghten rede” (VI.107) what 
the logic of virginity would make them do or suffer. 
 Working with the book of history, Chaucer cannot rescue 
Virginia. He can just change Livy enough to give Virginia 
space to try, and to fail, to save herself from her own story. 
                                                                                              
implication”: “Ricardian Poetics and Late Medieval Cultural 
Pluriformity: The Significance of Pathos in the Canterbury Tales,” 
The Chaucer Review 15 (1980): 158 [155–167].  
10 For several good treatments, see Lianna Farber, “The Creation of 
Consent in the Physician’s Tale,” Chaucer Review 39.2 (2004) 151–
164; Holly A. Crocker, Chaucer’s Visions of Manhood (New York: 
Palgrave, 2007), 51–76; and Daniel T. Kline, “Jephthah’s Daughter 
and Chaucer’s Virginia: The Critique of Sacrifice in the Physician’s 
Tale,” Journal of English and Germanic Philology 107 (2008) 77–103. 
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When Virginia compares herself to Jephthah's daughter, she 
necessarily freights this comparison with the standard 
exegesis, which almost universally condemns Jephthah for, at 
best, his foolishness and at worst for the obscenity of human 
sacrifice.11 Wielding this exegesis through her comparison, she 
accuses her father and indeed the whole of the patriarchy of a 
bullheaded commitment to values that would better be 
abandoned. At the same time, she asks for a pause. During 
this time, had he granted it, her father might think rather than 
act. During this time out of time, or — more accurately — 
during this moment when time’s stream becomes a floodplain 
that might empty in any direction, history’s inevitability 
might cease, and something else might occur.  
 Her father does wait, a little. For the first time, Virginia 
faints, and her father does not act, not yet. It is a critical 
commonplace that Virginius thinks of his daughter as an 
aspect of himself; hence his otherwise ludicrous or 
contemptible lament, “O deere doughter, endere of my lyf” 
(VI.218). He might have continued to recognize her during 
her unconsciousness, and seen his own subjection to the 
historical narrative mirrored in his daughter’s passivity. 
Instead he waits only for her to rise and to accept what will 
happen. The tale’s exemplary logic requires that she come to 
long enough to agree to die, to prevent her death from being 
murder. Then the tale has her fall back into unconsciousness, 
unable to feel, unable to act, able only to be sacrificed. 
Virginia beheads her and goes out, thinking he has done right 
when all that he has done is to have done right by Livy’s 
script.12 
                                                                                              
11 Most recently, see Kline, “Critique of Sacrifice.” 
12 In writing this paragraph, I have had in mind !i"ek's reading of 
Melville's Bartleby the Scrivener as someone whose “gesture of pure 
withdrawal” refuses to perpetuate the dance of negation; see The 
Parallax View (Boston: MIT Press, 2006), 381–385. For a lucid 
exposition of these pages, see Jodi Dean, !i"ek’s Politics (New York: 
Routledge, 2006), 22–23, 130–131, 168–171, 197–199. 
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§ EMELYE  
 
At first glance, she does not quite belong in this set. She does 
beg the goddess Diana to rescue her from the obligation to 
marry the tournament's victor, and thus she, like Custance 
and Virginia, resists the tale for a time. But Chaucer adopts 
this scene almost entirely intact from Boccaccio’s Teseida; 
unlike the Man of Law’s and Physician’s Tale, he invents very 
little here.13 In the Knight’s Tale, Emelye reminds Diana of her 
devoted service to hunting; she alone of the tale’s characters 
wants peace between Palemon and Arcite; and she arrives at 
the shrine with a throng of “hir maydens” (I.2275), as if 
dramatizing her preference for female company, and as if she 
had carved out a kind of Amazonian autonomous zone within 
patriarchal Athens; all these points hold true as well for 
Boccaccio's Emilia.  
 Chaucer’s key change is in his heroine’s willingness to play 
the role that she must. Despite her protests, Boccaccio’s 
Emilia is open to love and hopes not so much to be rescued as 
to have Diana decide for her, since each one of her suitors 
pleases her equally (“tanto ciascun piacievole mi pare”14). 
Through Emelye’s protests, strident and protracted, and her 
bitterness when she realizes Diana has forsaken her, Chaucer 
signals a far more dedicated Amazon than the one Boccaccio 
provided. 
 To this Chaucer adds the text’s own resistance to Emelye’s 
prayer. Most obviously, he ends the scene with “ther is 
namoore to seye” (I.2366), at once concluding both Emelye’s 
hope and her voice. Once Emelye has had her say and found 
no response but that of the mechanistically advancing plot, 
she herself falls wordless. From here on out, she allows herself 
to be moved forward to meet the needs of the story, sloughing 
                                                                                              
13 William E. Coleman, “The Knight’s Tale,” in Sources and 
Analogues, Vol. 2, 129 and 177–183 [87–248]. 
14 Teseida VII.85, qtd. from Coleman, “The Knight's Tale,” in Sources 
and Analogues, Vol. 2, 181. 
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off her indifference to her suitors by weeping with Palamon 
when it is required (I.2817), and proving in the end to be a 
perfect, loving wife (I.3103).15 All that suggests Emelye’s 
continued resistance is the enjambment at I.3105–3106, where 
Palamon serves her so nobly “that nevere was ther no word 
hem bitwene / Of jalousi or any oother teene.” No word hem 
bitwene: for a moment, Chaucer allows a hint of the deadly 
silence of a match crafted not for love but for statecraft, 
concocted by a ruler unconcerned with canon law’s insistence 
on the importance of consent in validating a marriage.16 
When the tale adds “thus ended Palamon and Emelye” 
(I.3107), we might pity these two, condemned to play out the 
fantasy of an impossible peace between Athens and Thebes 
and between Athens and the Amazons, each rescued from one 
death and defeat only to be dragooned into the living death of 
Theseus's utopia. 
 Emelye’s compulsion runs still deeper than Theseus’s 
machinations. Towards the end of the scene, Boccaccio has 
Emilia ask Diana whether the gods had already decided by an 
                                                                                              
15 The second chapter of Angela Jane Weisl’s Conquering the Reign of 
Femeny: Gender and Genre in Chaucer’s Romance (Rochester: D. S. 
Brewer, 1995), which contrasts Emelye’s “balked desire to opt out of 
the romance” (59) to Canacee’s sabotage of the plot of the Squire's 
Tale, is very much in sympathy with my argument. For a compelling 
alternate reading of Emelye’s inconsistent behavior (and Diana’s 
otherwise inexplicable foreknowledge) as the tale’s sign of both 
feminine difference and adventure itself, see Susan Crane, Gender 
and Romance in Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1994), 173, 185. 
16 Elizabeth Robertson, “Marriage, Mutual Consent, and the 
Affirmation of the Female Subject in the Knight’s Tale, the Wife of 
Bath’s Tale, and the Franklin’s Tale,” in Wendy Harding, ed., Drama, 
Narrative and Poetry in The Canterbury Tales (Toulouse: Presses 
Universitaires du Mirail, 2003), 181–184 [175–193]. See also 
Elizabeth Fowler, “Chaucer’s Hard Cases,” in Barbara A. Hanawalt 
and David Wallace, eds., Medieval Crime and Social Control 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 136–137 [124–
142]. 
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eternal word (“con etterna parola”)17 that she must marry. 
Chaucer gives this line to the goddess herself, who proclaims 
that “among the goddes hye it is affermed, / And by eterne 
word writen and confermed” (I.2349–2350) that Emelye must 
marry. Emilia had asked a question, whereas Emelye gets an 
answer that, nonetheless, conceals from her precisely what 
will happen — no doubt in part because it hardly matters 
which suitor she marries.18 Furthermore, the orality of the 
term parola allows for a kind of deliberation, or at least 
suggests a subjective divine fiat, as in the creation story of the 
first chapter of Genesis. It allows for a decision to have 
occurred and thus suggests that it might have gone otherwise. 
For this parola, Chaucer substitutes a written commandment 
that can only be affirmed by the gods, a diktat inscribed by 
whom or to what end no one knows. All that Emelye can 
know is that what will happen has already been written. She 
has been fated to love and to live on for the benefit of Theseus, 
for the Knight, for Chaucer himself. She has been condemned 
to this plot as soon as Theseus conquered the Amazons and 
future writers decided on the necessity of getting it correct. 
 
§ CODA: THE MAN HIMSELF  
 
The above may seem perverse given Chaucer’s well-known 
freedom with his sources, particularly in these three tales. But 
his freedom could go only so far. Chaucer found his freedom 
in selecting his material, in rhetoric, trimming, pacing, and 
amplification, but he could not deny the larger logics of 
sanctity, political exemplarity, and romance. I present this 
chapter as an offering to the continuing conversations on 
Chaucer’s interest in fate and free will, and also as an implicit 
                                                                                              
17 Teseida VII.85, quoted from Coleman, “The Knight's Tale,” in 
Sources and Analogues, Vol. 2, 181. 
18 I say this against the frequent and to my mind misguided attempts 
in the criticism to characterize Palamon as more moral or deserving 
of life than Arcite. 
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exploration of what is being required of us when scholarship 
demands our faithfulness to our sources and history, when it 
tells us that proper scholars must let the text decide. Finally, I 
suggest that Chaucer turned to female characters — these and 
others (Griselda most notably) — to think through his own 
passivity in relation to a textual history that allowed him to go 
only so far. Like so many writers, he makes his female 
characters suffer. But to some of these, he gave a brief 
awareness of what he was doing to them, or what various 
conjoined patriarchal logics and received narratives made him 
do. Perhaps in his darker moods, or during fits of self-pity, he 
felt himself trapped by his own materials, moved by them 
against his other wishes, and he found a mirror in women he 
made to live, to die, to marry, he and they caught up in 
systems that required their obedience without giving them 












Adroit scholarly interpretation of the Physician’s Tale over the 
last half century has sought to rehabilitate what is perceived as 
one of Chaucer’s least satisfactory tales. Arguments have 
focused on the correlation of teller and tale; Chaucer’s 
manipulation of his sources; and the foregrounding of various 
key aspects of the tale, such as governance, virginity or the 
legal system. In seeking to round off the Tale, to give it 
cohesion and moral purpose, for example, Kirk L. Smith 
concludes his discussion about the judicial and medical 
elements with the opinion that “The tale offers this moral 
cure: abjuring the exploitation in which self-absorbed Apius 
indulges, the worthy practitioner would earn the public’s 
esteem by pledging disinterested service.”1 Similarly, in 
Jerome Mandel’s view, the careful structure of the Tale and its 
emphasis on death can be paralleled with The Pardoner’s Tale, 
with which it is paired in Fragment VI.2 Crafton’s recent 
judicious appraisal focuses on shared concerns between the 
Parson’s Tale and the Physician’s created by the use of 
preaching motifs, the Summa virtutem remediis anime and the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Kirk L. Smith, “False Care and the Canterbury Cure: Chaucer 
Treats the New Galen,” Literature & Medicine 27 (2009): 71 [61–81]. 
2 Jerome Mandel, Geoffrey Chaucer, Building the Fragments of the 
“Canterbury Tales,” (Madison, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University 
Press, 1972), 50–69, where, however, Mandel seems to imply that the 
Physician’s Tale acts primarily as a foil for the Pardoner. 
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theme of “false virginity.”3 Other critics have highlighted the 
use of hagiographic topoi in the Tale. In Lee Patterson’s clever 
and insightful Chaucer and the Subject of History, he judges 
the Tale as aspiring to “hagiographical authority,” as a “quasi 
hagiography” in which the heroine, Virginia, is a “helpless 
victim,” subordinated to her persecutors’ narrative domi-
nance.4 “In short,” states Patterson, the Physician’s Tale “is a 
fraudulent or ‘counterfeit’ hagiography . . . unable to trans-
cend its own fallen historicity.”5 
 Patterson’s illuminating reading of the Physician’s Tale is 
used principally to introduce the longer discussion of the false 
language of the Pardoner’s Tale, the work that has generally 
dominated discussion of this textual pair in Fragment VI. This 
brief essay will focus again on the Physician’s Tale as a “quasi-
hagiography,” but in order to speculate upon Chaucer’s 
deliberate critique of the prolific hagiographic genre in the 
medieval period. In the light of Chaucer’s frequent tendency 
to play with audience expectations of genre and of literary 
convention, this contribution will read the Tale as a deliberate 
clinical dismemberment of generic convention and a provo-
cative disembowelling of the corpus of virgin martyrs’ 
passions. 
 
§ MANIPULATING EXPECTATIONS: APPEARANCE AND REALITY 
 
Much of Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales functions as a dialogic 
text, demanding the interaction of the audience or reader. 
This writerly style is both engaging and challenging; 
ultimately, meaning inheres in the interpretative space 
between text and reception. If this were not the case, then 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 John Michael Crafton, “‘The cause of everiche maladye’: A New 
Source of the Physician's Tale,” Philological Quarterly 84 (2005): 259–
285. 
4 Lee Patterson, Chaucer and the Subject of History (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1991), 368–369. 
5 Patterson, Chaucer and the Subject of History, 370. 
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characters as diverse as the Knight or the Wife of Bath could 
not have elicited the very wide range of critical response that 
they have over the last six centuries. Similarly, Chaucer’s 
manipulation of generic convention opens up his text to 
reader speculation and scholarly debate. Thus, the Knight’s 
Tale, as a Romance, has the happy ending expected of the 
genre, but it is one profoundly overshadowed by the grimness 
of the gods and their temples, the objectification of Emelye, 
and the death of Arcite; the Parson’s Tale, as a learned and 
pious sermon, ought to cure the soul, but instead, its sturdy 
prose and considerable length seem to doom it to literary and 
spiritual obscurity; and the Reeve’s Tale has all the elements of 
the fabliau, but the verbal malevolence of its teller and the 
sinister implications of the Reeve’s portrait mean that what 
should simply be bawdy becomes overtly disturbing.  
 In the case of the Physician’s Tale, the formulae of 
hagiography are immediately apparent in the motifs 
introducing the female subject of the story, Virginia. She is 
described in terms familiar to virgin martyr narratives; that is, 
as an image only, a formula — one that typifies the Virgin 
Mary. Virginia is a “noble creature,” directly compared to “a 
lilie whit” and “reed a rose” (VI.31–34). This tells us very 
little, and, as if to underscore this, the Physician merely 
confirms twice that “excellent was hire beautee” (VI.7, 39). 
This emphasis on her whiteness and her beauty is illustrative 
of female virgin martyrs’ lives in general. Thus, for example, 
in the Second Nun’s Prologue, St. Cecilia is described simply as 
“faire Cecile the white” (VI.115),6 and in the earlier Life of St. 
Margaret in Cambridge, Corpus Christi College 303, Margaret 
is styled “wlitig and fæger,” using lexis often associated in 
medieval texts with Christ’s countenance (“naturally beautiful 
and fair”).7 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 All references are to the respective Tales from Larry D. Benson, gen. 
ed., The Riverside Chaucer, 3rd edn. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1987), by fragment and line numbers. 
7 Elaine Treharne, “The Life of St. Margaret,” in Old and Middle 
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 As with many of Chaucer’s other tales, then, in the 
Physician’s choice of hagiography, with this emphasis on 
Virginia’s saintly disposition and countenance, Chaucer 
appears to be adhering to the conventions of his selected 
genre. However, all is not as it seems and instead of the usual 
virgin martyr saint’s life, Chaucer’s subtle critique of the 
hagiographic begins to emerge on close examination of the 
lexis, imagery and historical setting. Notably, the inherent 
naturalness of the holy saint is deliberately undermined in the 
depiction of Virginia; indeed, as Patterson has pointed out in 
relation to the genre of hagiography in the mouth of the 
Physician, there seems to be significant emphasis in this Tale 
on the counterfeit.8 In addition to the points raised in 
Patterson’s discussion, this counterfeiting he identifies — a 
disparity between appearance and reality — also consciously 
extends to the lengthy opening passage that purports to 
describe Virginia (VI.4–71). Here, over the course of sixty-
seven lines, the Physician tells us very little that is not stock 
characterization of the saintly female, except that even this 
two-dimensionalized sequence of attributes is rendered, if not 
wholly redundant, then at least suspicious by the first twenty-
five lines. These focus repetitively on the manufactured 
artwork of an artisan, not the effusion of beauty one might 
expect from a divine creation, or, indeed, from Nature herself. 
Virginia is “formed” and “painted” (VI.12); her creation is 
compared in a succession of clauses to the work of classical 
sculptors, smiths, painters and engravers — Pygmalion (who 
created a statue so beautiful that he fell in love with it and 
married it when Venus made it human), Apelles (the Greek 
artist, famed for his life-like paintings), and Zeuxis, another 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
English: An Anthology, c. 890–1450, 3rd edn. (Oxford: Blackwell, 
2009), 309–323; and Mary Clayton and Hugh Magennis, ed., The Old 
English Lives of St Margaret, CSASE 9 (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994), 154. This Life of Margaret is used as an 
example of a typical medieval saint’s life. 
8 Patterson, Chaucer and the Subject of History, 368–369. 
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Greek painter, who composed a picture of Helen made up of 
images from other beautiful women. Each of these famous 
classical artists, then, makes more complex the allusions of 
Nature to the counterfeiter. This, coupled with Nature’s 
repetition of the creators’ skills of forging, beating, engraving 
and painting strengthens the theme here of a female subject 
being manufactured, rather than naturally created. Moreover, 
Nature acting vicariously for “the formere principal” (VI.19) 
forms and paints “erthely creaturis” (VI.21), reinforcing the 
persistence of artifice as a major aspect of this long passage. 
 In making evident the “erthely” as opposed to the 
heavenly, and the hand-made as opposed to the divinely 
created, it might be no surprise that Virginia, far from 
emerging as a perfect exemplum of a saint in human form as 
virgin martyrs and ultimately all saints are, becomes instead 
artificial, counterfeit, an ornament, a work of art.9 In this, and 
in the repeated emphasis on the manmade, Virginia becomes, 
in this initial descriptive passage, idol-like, an object to be 
venerated by those who know no better. And, as will happen 
to those who break the commandments (“Thou shalt not 
make to thyself a graven thing, nor the likeness of any thing 
that is in heaven above, or in the earth beneath, nor of those 
things that are in the waters under the earth”),10 the worship 
of Virginia results in death, both for her and for Apius, the 
lecherous false judge who lusts after her body. 
§ MANIPULATING EXPECTATIONS: TRUE AND FALSE 
In spite of being set within a classical, pagan world, 
Christianity is anachronistically introduced into a Tale that, as 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 One might compare, for example, the divinely inspired, innate and 
post-natal holiness of a saint like Nicholas, who fasted twice a week 
even as a newborn (Elaine Treharne, ed., The Old English Life of St 
Nicholas [Leeds, U.K.: Leeds Studies in English, 1995]). 
10 Exodus 20:4, The Holy Bible: Douay-Rheims Version (Charlotte, 
NC: St. Benedict Press, 2009). 
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a consequence, effectively plays with spiritual and practical 
tenets and mores, such as the maidenly preservation of 
virginity and the commandment to honor one’s father and 
mother. There are numerous pointers to a shared frame of 
reference between this Tale and a traditional Passio, like that 
of St. Margaret’s.11 The textual parallels serve initially to dupe 
the audience into believing that this Tale will unfold with the 
salvation of the subject saint, even if through that saint’s 
martyrdom. Thus, for example, in admonishing parents and 
guardians to protect their children and wards, the Physician 
warns that: 
Under a shepherde softe and necligent  
The wolf hath many a sheep and lamb torent. (VI.101–
102) 
 
An unprotected St. Margaret, when approached by her 
persecutor, the reeve Olibrius, similarly becomes the prey: 
Ac asænd me, leofa Drihten, !inne halga engel to 
fultume !æt Ic min gewitt and minne wisdom 
for"healdan mote, for!on Ic eom gesett betweonen 
!isum folce swa swa sceap betweonon wulfum, and Ic 
eam befangan eal swa spearwe on nette, and eall swa 
fisc on hoce, and eal swa hra mid rape. 
 
[But send me, dear Lord, your holy angel to help me so 
that I might hold fast my understanding and my 
wisdom, because I am set between these people just 
like a sheep between wolves, and I am entirely caught 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 For versions of the Life of St. Margaret circulating in the later 
Middle Ages, see Katherine Lewis, ‘The Lives of St. Margaret of 
Antioch in Late Medieval England: A Gendered Reading,” Studies in 
Church History 34 (1998): 129–142. We do not need to pinpoint a 
particular Life that Chaucer may have known, and I am not 
suggesting that Chaucer knew the twelfth-century English Life used 
as an example of the genre here. 
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like a sparrow in a net, and like a fish on a hook, and 
just as a body with rope.]12  
 
This metaphor of prey and stalker is as appropriate for 
Virginia in her plight as it is for Margaret in hers. Margaret is 
tormented, tortured and executed on Olibrius’s commands 
because she will not give herself physically to him. In the 
fullest accounts of her Passio, there is a significant emphasis, 
too, on the saint’s corporeality, specifically in sharp contrast 
to the sterility and insensibility of heathen idols and their 
pagan worshippers. This contrast between the sensate saint 
and the insensate false god is made obvious in traditional 
hagiography, but in Chaucer’s Physician’s Tale, the 
paradoxical integration of antithetical convention in the 
person of Virginia is, presumably deliberately, perplexing. 
The ‘puzzle’ or paradox is that Virginia is saint-like in 
demeanor and description, yet pagan in background — an 
apparent Christian (before Christianity existed) and thus the 
victim of a purposeless death. The narrative elements that we 
should expect to be true of a saint’s life (that the saint is saved, 
the persecutors damned; the saint taken heavenward, the 
demon defeated) prove to be false. Yet these hagiographic 
elements persist; Apius, for instance, becomes possessed by 
“the feend” that “unto his herte ran / And taught hym 
sodeynly that he by slyghte / The mayden to his purpose 
wynne might” (VI.130–132). The demon thus insinuates the 
idea that Virginia can be Apius’ for the taking. Demonic 
possession is a common phenomenon in saints’ lives,13 where 
it functions as a mechanism to demonstrate the saint’s ability 
to cure the possessed through exorcism of the devil; as God’s 
grace works through the saint, so the devil’s hold of the victim 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 Treharne, “The Life of St. Margaret,” 312–313. 
13 Regarding demonic possession, the Lives of St. Giles and Swithun 
are representative examples. See Peter Brown, The Cult of the Saints: 
Its Rise and Function in Latin Christianity (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1981), 106–112. 
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is lessened. At this point, the medieval audience, listening to 
the Physician tell his Tale, might have felt certain that 
Virginia would be permitted to demonstrate her saintly 
potentia and cast out this fiend inhabiting Apius. That this 
does not happen, that she has no power at all, disturbs a motif 
common in hagiographic narration and unequivocally 
intimates that God does not work through Virginia, despite 
her tragic exclamation, “Blissed be God that I shal dye a 
mayde!” (VI.248). She might bless God, but he surely does not 
reciprocate. More poignant still are her words to her father, 
Virginius, when he has declared that he must kill her:  
“Goode father, shal I dye? 
Is there no grace, is there no remedye?” (VI.235–236) 
 
Where a father would commonly protect his daughter, and 
where God the Father would commonly provide grace and 
remedy for his chosen, Virginia is abandoned, bereft of 
paternal care. The complexity of “remedye” here, with a 
polyvalence that ranges from “legal redress” to “relief from 
pain and trouble” to “help with a problem” to “deliverance 
from damnation,” is especially pertinent to the pseudo-legal 
and spiritual dilemma with which Virginia is faced.14 Of 
particular note, too, is the quotation provided in the Middle 
English Dictionary from Ancrene Wisse (Cambridge, Corpus 
Christi College, 402), 94/22:  “We schulen nu speoken of !e 
uttre [temptation], 7 teachen !eo !e habbe" hire hu ha mahen 
wi" godes grace ifinde remedie.” Here, it is God’s grace that 
will lead to the remedy of avoidance of sin and ultimately, 
then, salvation. Virginia lacks grace, lacks remedy, and, 
ultimately, lacks salvation. The Physician’s final Christian 
truth, “Forsaketh synne, er synne yow forsake” (VI.286), 
underscores the need for his pilgrim audience to seek grace 
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14 Middle English Dictionary, s.v. “remedie,” http://quod.lib.umich. 
edu/m/med/.  
Treharne :: Hagioclasm 169 
!
and remedy, in a way that was not possible for the heroine of 
his narrative. 
§ MANIPULATING EXPECTATIONS: AUTHORITY AND CHAOS 
Throughout the Physician’s Tale, then, Chaucer undermines 
the chosen genre of hagiography, problematizing its 
conventions and usurping the audience’s expectations of a 
saintly reward for saintly behavior. In addition, Chaucer 
focuses upon the theme of authority within hagiography, or 
rather, in this Tale, the absence of it. Those who are in 
authority — Apius and Virginius — behave perversely 
(Patterson’s description of Viriginius as “delinquent” seems 
particularly satisfactory15), acting precisely contrary to their 
prescribed roles as upholder of the law and caretaker of the 
child. The Physician seeks to emphasize control and authority 
in his mini-sermon on the duties of governesses and parents 
(VI.72–104) and in his sequence of potential moral readings 
(VI.277–286), but as the teller of the Tale he resigns control by 
failing to provide a satisfying denouement. Instead, what the 
Physician’s Tale effects is momentary chaos, virtual madness, 
as the Host 
gan to swere as he were wood; 
“Harrow!” quod he, “by nayles and by blood! 
That was a fals cherl and a fals justice.” (VI.287–289) 
 
The Host understands the dominance of the “false” (the 
counterfeit) in this Tale; he apprehends the reprehensibility of 
the lies of Claudius and Apius, and he knows that for Virginia 
“Hire beautee was hire death, I dar wel sayn” (VI.297), but the 
significance that should pertain to a hagiography — the 
sacrifice of the saint, the fortitude in the face of persecution, 
the salvation that results from perseverance in God’s name — 
is completely lost in the Physician’s telling, effectively 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 Patterson, Chaucer and the Subject of History, 389. 
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destroying the generic signifier. The Host, in a pair of 
antithetical statements, sums up the paradox: 
This is a pitous tale for to heere. 
But nathelees, passe over; is no fors. (VI.303–304) 
 
The Tale is simultaneously pitiful and of no consequence. The 
phrase “is no fors” is, in itself, easy to dismiss (“it doesn’t 
matter”), and self-reflexively guides the reader to ignore the 
Tale and its rag-bag of morals, but it can be rendered more 
meaningful if the multivalent potential of “fors” as “value,” 
“authority,” and “spiritual strength” are recognized as part of 
the playfulness here.16  
 The absence of moral and spiritual force in the Tale is, 
arguably, to be expected, if the Physician’s own lack of 
understanding of the Bible is taken into account (“His studie 
was but litel on the Bible,” Canterbury Tales Prologue, line 
438). He might control life and death for his patients, but he 
clearly cannot control the spiritual outcome of his patients’ 
lives, and especially so, given his own lack of religious 
authority. He also cannot control the outcome of his Tale, or 
rescue his female subject from not mattering a jot, despite her 
saintly piety and virginity. The telling of saints’ lives — their 
narration in church services or when privately read in pursuit 
of Christian exempla by which to live — should open the way 
for salvation, and should matter. Here, however, the whole 
function of the hagiography is occluded and its validity 
(perhaps specifically in the mouth of the ignorant) 
questioned. The convergence in this Tale of the hagiographic 
topoi littering the narrative with the pagan setting together 
with the ironic depiction of fatherly protection and legal 
process creates a response in readers of puzzlement, of a 
feeling of dissatisfaction.  
  This dissatisfaction arises from the combination of 
hagiographic topoi ill employed and the usurpation of generic 
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16 Middle English Dictionary, s.v. “force.”  
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convention. The dismemberment of a Christian saint (Marga-
ret, Agnes, Juliana, Catherine, Cecilia), her decapitation in the 
pursuit of salvation that is always explicitly assured in the 
narrative, renders effective the sign of the Saint as a means of 
demonstrating the efficacy of God’s grace. In this Tale, the 
sign of sanctity is itself dismembered, fractured. Semioclasm 
— the breaking of the sign — occurs elsewhere, and literally, 
in the Canterbury Tales, when the least saint-like of the female 
pilgrims, the Wife of Bath, deliberately rips three leaves from 
her husband’s Book of Wicked Wives and then makes him 
burn the book (III.790–791, 815). Here, the literal semioclastic 
act involves the destruction of the words the Wife finds so 
offensive. In the Physician’s Tale, the beheading of an 
apparently saintly female by her own father, and the text’s 
inability to save her soul, or make of her death any “fors,” 
renders the genre of hagiography that this Tale employs 
redundant. Chaucer’s hagioclasm, his breaking of the saintly 
paradigm, rightly causes consternation and calls into question 
the genre, its tropes, and its usefulness as a model for the 
behavior. As so often, then, Chaucer insists on filling the 
space between text and reader response with questions and 
reflection, insightfully critiquing the cultural and religious 
commonplaces of his day and demanding the same critical 














Pandare’s role in Chaucer’s Troilus and Criseyde has been one 
of much debate among Chaucerian scholars and critics: Is he 
friend or is he foe, and what is his purpose either way? He is at 
once friend, foe, and I would argue, the character with whom 
readers most identify. Readers of Troilus and Criseyde realize 
that they read to discover characters exactly like Pandare; 
characters whom he or she wishes they could be, and ones 
whose motives are sprinkled with hints of darkness and 
mischief. Pandare represents the private thoughts in our 
minds, the kind we know we cannot, and will not, act upon in 
the way Pandare has, but which we desire to pursue 
vicariously. Pandare is a charismatic trickster figure. 
 The trickster figure is a mythical character found in almost 
every culture throughout history and is included by Carl Jung 
among his archetypes.1 The trickster and its tendencies exist 
in all of us; the degree to which they surface depends on the 
individual. Usually a male, tricksters can be identified by 
many common traits such as stubbornness, chicanery, 
duplicity, and the ability to evoke laughter. Classic trickster 
characters range from Prometheus, known as one of the first 
tricksters, to Uncle Remus’s Brer Rabbit.2 The trickster 
                                                                                  
1 See Carl G. Jung, The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche: The 
Collected Works of C.G. Jung (New York: Pantheon, 1970). 
2 See Joel Chandler Harris, Uncle Remus: His Songs and Sayings (New 
York: D. Appleton and Company, 1881). 
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typically preys on weaker characters and remains confident 
until the end. The story surrounding the trickster and its 
result or lesson is often used to satirize the darkest 
conventions of the culture in which the story takes place. 
Their mischievous, self-serving actions can often have the 
trickster backtracking and succumbing to fate or fortune, and 
through their blunder knowledge can be gained.  
 Although Pandare is not sinister and is not out to harm 
Troilus or Criseyde, he embarks on the task of bringing them 
together not so much for their sake as for his own. He takes 
pleasure in living vicariously through Troilus while acting as 
the go-between, the messenger. His stated purpose is dubious 
at best. The explanation that Pandare is acting purely out of 
the good of his own heart is entirely too simplistic for this 
character.   
 Chaucer creates the setting for Troilus and Criseyde during 
the Trojan War. The war is in full swing, and Troilus, one of 
Troy’s great warriors and son of the King, is discussing his 
distaste for love. The people of Chaucer’s time were all 
familiar with the war, its stories and its characters. This shows 
us that from the very start the reader most likely knew this 
was a tale of inevitable doom.  
 Book I begins with the narrator telling us of Troilus’s 
“double sorwe” (I.1).3 Not only does Troilus suffer the pain of 
being in love, but he is also afflicted by a lover who leaves him 
for another. The reader, of course, is not aware of this yet. We 
are introduced to Pandare for the first time in line 548. The 
narrator tells us that he is Troilus’s friend. Pandare is also 
Criseyde’s uncle and her only male relative in all of Troy. As a 
verb, “pander” means to “minister to the immoral urges or 
distasteful desires of another, or to gratify a person with such 
desires,” and also to “indulge the tastes, whims, or weaknesses 
of another.”4 This term’s etymology is derived from Pandarus 
                                                                                  
3 All citations of Chaucer’s Troilus and Criseyde are from The 
Riverside Chaucer, gen. ed. Larry D. Benson. 3rd edn. (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1987), cited by book and line numbers. 
4 Oxford English Dictionary, v. “pander.” 
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himself (as a literary character in Latin, Greek, Italian, and 
English literature) and falls right in line with many of the 
characteristics of the classic trickster who was previously 
discussed. We even see this when Pandare asks Troilus, “What 
unhap may this meene?  Han now thus soone Grekes maad 
yow leene?” (I.552–53). This line precludes two very 
important points. First, that Pandare is invoking the ruling 
force of fortune already, and second, that he believes fortune 
is playing a trick on Troilus. This is not the first time fortune 
has been referenced in Book I, for the narrator remarks that, 
“and thus Fortune on lofte and under eft gan hem to whielen 
bothe aftir hir course, ay whil that thei were wrothe” (I.138–
140). Fickle Fortune will eventually lead Troilus to his 
undoing and thwart Pandare’s selfish plan. 
 Pandare struggles to discover the reason for Troilus’s 
weeping, and finally convinces Troilus to divulge that he has 
fallen in love with a beautiful woman named Criseyde. 
Pandare proclaims that this Criseyde is his niece and that he 
will devote himself to bringing about their union. Pledging his 
support, Pandare declares, “In this affair, I’ll take the strain 
and stress, and yours be all the joy of my success” (I.1042–
1043). We are led to believe in Book I that Pandare sincerely 
wants to help Troilus and his niece, Criseyde, because he is 
fond of both of them and would like to see them enjoy each 
other as he believes they could. Pandare, however, hints 
towards his selfish motives when he refers to “oure bothe 
labour shende, I hope of this to maken a good ende” (I.972–
973). Pandare has already made this his conquest to 
undertake, a conquest that will, upon its attainment, be cause 
for his own happiness by creating a dramatic romantic 
narrative currently lacking in his own life, and that will 
require the slippery workings of a skilled trickster.  
 Book II begins with the first meeting of Pandare and 
Criseyde. Pandare pays her a visit at her palace. He uses the “I 
have a secret, but I can’t tell you” approach to pique 
Criseyde’s curiosity. He plays on her every emotion, for he 
knows she is vulnerable. The sign of a successful trickster is 
his ability to manipulate, and his manipulation can reach its 
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peak when he has the ability to read his subjects well and play 
off of what he knows. In this case, Pandare knows Criseyde 
has recently been widowed, and her father has become a 
traitor in the war, leaving her alone in Troy. Pandare explains 
to Criseyde that the news he has to tell her is better than news 
of the war ending, which of course would be the greatest news 
that Criseyde could ever imagine. After much back and forth, 
Pandare finally tells Criseyde that it is Troilus who loves her. 
He follows this news by telling Criseyde, 
 
that , but ye helpe, it wol his bane be.  Lo, here is al! 
What sholde I moore seye?  Doth what yow lest to 
make hym lyve or deye.  But if ye late hym deyen, I wol 
sterve – have here my trouthe, nece, I nyl nat lyen – al 
sholde I with this knyf my throte kerve.” (II.320–325)  
 
Pandare is essentially giving Criseyde an ultimatum: Either 
she will love Troilus, or she will be responsible for two deaths. 
He plays her emotions, in this case love and guilt, like a violin, 
knowing exactly which notes to play at the precise moment, 
and the ensuing song belongs entirely to him. 
 We also see Pandare employing fear tactics in Book II. 
Criseyde’s greatest trouble at this time is the war, and she has 
already made it clear that the war worries her greatly by 
remarking, “I am of Grekes so fered that I deye” (II.124). 
Pandare knows this, and makes up a story about Poliphete 
bringing charges against Criseyde. Her family also fears such a 
situation, and Pandare is hoping that this fear will force 
Criseyde to seek protection, the kind that only a soldier such 
as Troilus could give her.  
 As was mentioned before, laughter and the ability to make 
others laugh are two key components in the trickster’s 
repertoire. We certainly see Pandare in this light. Pandare 
jokes about food when he refuses her invitation to eat with 
her. He quips, “I have so gret a pyne for love, that everich 
other day I faste” (II.1165–1166), which plays off of Troilus’s 
inability to eat because he is so lovesick. This causes Criseyde 
to laugh so hard that she “for laughter wende for to dye” 
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(II.1169). Pandare jokes to endear himself to others and to 
break any tension that might be building or already exist, 
which allows him greater freedom of manipulation and 
voyeurism, drawing him closer to filling the dramatic 
narrative void in his life.  
 The final trickster action worth noting in Book II begins 
when Pandare invokes the god Mars in line 988. We saw 
earlier in Book I Troilus aligning himself with Venus, and we 
now see Pandare aligning himself with Mars, the god of war. 
Mars is also known for having been caught with Venus by her 
husband, Vulcan. This can be viewed as a foreshadowing of 
Criseyde’s unfaithfulness. That Pandare should choose an ally 
such as Mars when trying to start a love affair is rather 
curious. A god of war has a rightful place on the battlefield 
and could be appropriate if Troilus were attempting to win 
Criseyde’s heart through a feat of arms, but that is not this 
case here. Venus, the goddess of beauty and love, is a much 
more appropriate choice. We can conclude that Pandare’s 
intentions may not be in alignment with Troilus’s, and the 
foreshadowing casts a dark cloud over the potential romance.  
 Book III brings to light Pandare’s barren love life as a 
possible reason for his trickery. The narrator mentions a few 
times that Pandare has an object of his affection, but has had 
no luck in his pursuit. Out of this failure is born a potential 
explanation for his involvement with Troilus and Criseyde. If 
he can bring the two of them together, it will be a personal 
triumph, a way to show the world that he “still has it.” A 
successful union of Troilus and Criseyde as a result of 
Pandare’s deft maneuvering could be just the dramatic 
narrative void-filling ego-boost that Pandare is seeking, and 
that, however dark, we all seek in various ways. He stands to 
gain little else from their courtship. He can prove to himself 
and Troilus that he knows the ways of women and the ways of 
love. Troilus’s recognition and receipt of the benefits of this 
would serve to validate Pandare’s viability; his ever-important 
male ego would remain intact. At one point, Troilus even 
offers to provide one of his sisters for Pandare as a “thank 
you” compensation for all of his work, granting that he is 
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successful in his quest. He is a very likeable character because 
the reader gets to walk in Pandare’s shoes without suffering 
the potential consequences. This appealing side of Pandare fits 
well with the trickster type.  
 To further the selfish theme that Pandare is cultivating for 
the reader, Book III also finds Pandare climbing into bed with 
Criseyde. At this point in the poem, Pandare has begun to 
associate himself with Troilus and is almost unable to separate 
himself from Troilus. It is their quest, and Criseyde is the 
object of their affection, not simply Troilus’s. Both men will 
suffer if Criseyde rejects love, not just Troilus. This 
inseparability points to Pandare’s vicarious desires, and 
perhaps also a desire to always be joined to Troilus in some 
fashion. He has maneuvered his way into this situation by 
preying on weaknesses and emotions, and he is hoping to 
regain his swagger once the union is set. Pandare wants more 
than just a successful relationship between his friend and his 
niece; he wants the success to fill the void in his own life. 
Unfortunately for Pandare, he has left fortune out of his 
equation.  
 In Book III we also find that Criseyde has become upset 
upon discovering that Troilus is having some jealous feelings. 
She interprets his jealousy as distrust, but he tries to spin it as 
his love goes so deep that he can’t help but worry. His whole 
life would fall to pieces if Criseyde were to be unfaithful. This 
marks the beginning of the end for Pandare’s quest.  
 Book IV brings us Pandare advising Troilus to take 
another woman since the situation is beginning to look bleak 
with Criseyde. This is a shallow suggestion, and serves to 
further exemplify Pandare’s selfish manner. He again refers to 
Criseyde as “ours” when speaking with Troilus, and advises, 
much to Troilus’s dislike, that Troilus should follow in the 
steps of Paris and flee with Criseyde regardless of the 
consequences. This would serve Pandare just fine, for his 
quest would be complete, even though the lovers may meet 
uncertain and compromising circumstances. Troilus rejects 
this idea, electing instead to trust his partner and wait for her 
promised return. 
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 Book IV also provides three stark instances highlighting 
Pandare’s selfish, rather than selfless, motivation.  First, when 
Pandare visits Troilus after learning of Criseyde has been 
summoned to the Greek camp, he gazes upon Troilus’s sad 
state and the narrator remarks that this “Seyng his friend in 
wo, whos hevynesse his herte slough, as thought hym, for 
destresse” (IV. 363–364).  Second, Troilus notes Pandare’s 
love life’s troubled past when he say to Pandare, “thou hast 
has in love ay yet myschaunce and kanst it not out of thyn 
herte dryve” (IV. 491–492).  Lastly, Pandare attempts to steer 
Troilus away from his own selfless line of thinking by 
extolling him to “Devyne nat in resound ay so depe ne 
preciously, but help thiself anon” (IV 589–590).  By the end of 
Book IV, by including these clear markers of selfish intent, 
Chaucer illuminates the reader’s deviant connection to 
Pandare. 
Book V, the final Book, includes the last contact between 
Troilus and Pandare. Chaucer nearly silences Pandare in the 
final scene, striking a significant contrast to his normally 
loquacious and effusive personality. At this point, Troilus’s 
heart has been broken and Pandare is aware of the circum-
stances. Pandare’s failure is actually highlighted by Troilus’s 
broken heart, yet he reader focuses not on Troilus’s pain, but 
instead on Pandare’s missed opportunity.  Troilus is not upset 
at Pandare despite his elaborate plan causing Troilus so much 
pain (double sorrow). Had Troilus been furious, the reader 
may feel differently toward him and Pandare both.  Pandare 
tells Troilus that he will never forgive Criseyde for what she 
has done, and we believe Pandare. Criseyde proved through 
her infidelity that no human being could control fate and 
fortune, even with the best-laid plans. To count on this union 
to validate his self-worth was a foolish undertaking by 
Pandare, but the reader still feels for Pandare rather than 
Troilus. This misdirected empathy lifts the light for the 
reader, revealing a darkness in them in a way that few literary 
characters succeed in revealing. 
We learn a lesson from Pandare’s error in judgment, just 
as we do from most trickster tales. The trickster exists to teach 
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us lessons about life and ourselves. We learn from Pandare 
that there are certain aspects of life that we can control, and 
many that we cannot. In his case, attempting to control the 
emotions of others for his own personal satisfaction is his 
grave error. Pandare lives on though, as most tricksters do. 
Pandare fails, and like any good trickster, he can be expected 
to strike again, just as readers will continue to seek characters 
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In modern psychological parlance rumination names a 
neurotic brooding, a persistent, relentless mental replaying of 
a bad memory. In a more medieval context rumination is the 
practice of “chewing over” a well-known and constantly re-
read text to achieve insight into the nature of God and the 
universe. What follows here is, in a way, a cross-temporal 
rumination or (to alter the alimentary metaphor a little) a 
worrying of a text of a text that worries me. 
 The Prioress’s Tale’s narrative of the Litel Clergeon’s 
death, partial resurrection and second death is a text that I for 
one have never satisfactorily digested. The story is an (alas) 
familiar medieval reflex of the blood-libel: a pious young child 
is murdered by Jews as he walks the ghetto singing a Christian 
hymn. But the lurid details of this narrative replay themselves, 
I expect, in many a reader’s memory: the slaughtered child 
hidden in shit; the frantic, weeping mother; the abbot, 
astounded and confounded by the miraculous discovery of the 
corpse; the outraged Christian crowd caught up in anti-
Semitic rhetoric and bloody vengeance; and especially, at the 
center of it all, the grotesque body of the Litel Clergeon itself. 
For it is not, after all, a living seven-year-old boy who sings: it 
is, rather, his corpse that will not shut up. Nor is that corpse 
merely moaning or shrieking:  that it sings a hymn like O 
Alma Redemptoris Mater, and might (theoretically) sing it 
forever unless re-murdered, makes the dark grotesquerie of 
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the spectacle of this undead child all the more pervasive. 
Throat slit, as the Litel Clergeon says, “unto my nekke boon” 
(VII.649),1 the child’s body serves as an eloquent witness to 
the power of God, yes, but hardly to anything like the mercy 
or love proclaimed in the hymn. For that ghastly singing body 
is stuck, zombie-like, forever on the verge of dying, a victim of 
violence producing future violence and propagating further 
victims. 
 “Zombie-like” is, of course, my early twenty-first century 
intervention into the late fourteenth-century text. Chaucer’s 
Litel Clergeon is by no means literally one of the shambling, 
decaying hulks that seem to be our monster-du-jour. Nor 
indeed even is he quite one of the mindless revenant slaves 
who, in Afro-Caribbean folklore and early films like Jacques 
Tournour’s 1943 film I Walked with a Zombie, horrify us 
because we might any of us fall victim (as they have) to 
malicious voodoo — at least if we (like them) venture into an 
exoticized and atavistic Haiti. Although by no means 
sundered from their (post)colonial origin, our current 
zombies are more fully at home in the contemporary (or near 
future) Anglo-American world. Our zombies — the zombies 
of films from George A. Romero’s seminal 1968 Night of the 
Living Dead through 28 Days Later (2002) and Zombieland 
(2009), of graphic novels like Robert Kirkman’s The Walking 
Dead (begun in 2003) and novels like Max Brodsky’s World 
War Z (2006), and even of the Center for Disease Control’s 
online Zombie Apocalypse Survival Guide2 — have become, 
too, more the villains than the victims of their stories. Their 
voracious and mindless appetite turns those they do not 
completely devour into more of their own mutant species, 
swelling their legions of decaying flesh on the march. Indeed, 
                                                                                  
1 All citations of Chaucer’s Prioress’s Tale are from The Riverside 
Chaucer, gen. ed. Larry D. Benson, 3rd edn. (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin, 1987), by fragment and line numbers. 
2 See “Preparedness 101: Zombie Apocalypse,” Public Health Matters 
Blog, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, May 16, 2011: 
http://blogs.cdc.gov/publichealthmatters/2011/05/preparedness-101 
-zombie-apocalypse/. 
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in our popular culture they hunger most specifically for 
brains: they consume, that is, the organ most symbolic of what 
distinguishes their victims from themselves. The original 
victim of the outbreak — Zombie Zero, if you will — may be a 
“pure” victim of a virus either natural or engineered, but any 
compassion soon fades into fear, or is at the very least 
complicated by that victim’s new role as a threat that must be 
exterminated. As the protagonist of the 2010 cable series The 
Walking Dead (based on the graphic novel) explains to a 
crawling torso that is severed (not at all neatly) at the waist, 
she probably didn’t deserve this fate. And he is sorry. But the 
most charitable thing he can do is to blow her brains out. 
Lacking any inner life beyond their instinct to consume, our 
zombies express our anxieties — sometimes about invasions 
and plagues of various sorts, political as well as biological; 
sometimes about conformity or mob violence; sometimes 
about our own mindless consumption and global scarcity of 
resources. The symbolic resonances are all the more fraught 
because (especially in each of these last instances) our zombies 
both are and are not our selves.  
The Litel Clergeon is, of course, a zombie only by the most 
basic definition: one of the living dead, suspended between 
both life and death, and personhood and thingness, an object 
of both fear and compassion. And yet, despite the 
anachronism of my analogy, our modern pop-cultural 
obsession with creatures neither living not dead, neither fully 
part of our domestic present nor of some exotic place and 
time, can inform our reading and rumination of Chaucer’s 
text of a body similarly neither-nor and both human and 
thing, a body between categories. After all, for many today the 
Medieval period is itself inherently zombie-like, neither fully 
foreign nor domesticated, incompletely dead and past. And 
recent exhibitions like “Treasures of Heaven” (which has 
traveled between the Cleveland Museum of Art, the Walters 
 
  
184 Dark Chaucer: An Assortment 
 
Art Gallery, and the British Museum)3 witness a modern 
fascination with the most characteristically medieval form of 
living death, the “quaint” and “weird” veneration through 
relics of neither/nor both/and dead saints and martyrs. 
 More significantly, perhaps, the Litel Clergeon’s elective 
mindlessness and denial of rationality even before his death is 
as dangerously fraught as that of our contemporary brain-
eating Evil Dead, particularly in its ability to infect its world 
by exemplifying and provoking unthinking violence in the 
face of troubling uncertainty. As nameless as any Zombie 
Zero, the anonymous Litel Clergeon shows a devotion not 
associated with any understood faith per se so much as it is an 
artificially induced instinct. Having been taught by his 
widowed mother to say his Ave Maria and to venerate the 
Virgin, he does so to the exclusion of all else, learning the 
Alma redemptoris mater “al by rote” (VII.522), clueless as to 
what the Latin might mean. But the Litel Clergeon’s extreme 
reverence is a matter only of degree: even the older child who 
teaches him the song can only tell him that it praises the 
Virgin and invokes her aid on the day of our death. “I kan 
namoore expounde in this mateer,” he says; “I lerne song. I 
kan but small grameere” (VII. 535–536). Actively (or passively 
aggressively) ignoring the very lessons that might help him to 
understand the words he mindlessly but reverently repeats, 
and vowing to learn the hymn even though he should be 
beaten three times an hour for neglecting his studies, the Litel 
Clergeon is the more completely innocent and his faith is the 
more perfect because it is willfully and utterly unsullied by 
understanding. 
 To the Prioress the Litel Clergeon constitutes both an 
object of obsession and a model subject. Like the Litel 
Clergeon she sings her song to the Virgin, performing her 
“laude” (VII.455, 460) and praising Divine “bountee” 
(VII.436, 466, 474). Her ability, she demurs or maybe boasts, 
                                                                                  
3 See, for example, “Treasures of Heaven: Saints, Relics, and Devotion 
in Medieval Europe,” The Walters Art Museum, http://thewalters. 
org/exhibitions/treasures-of-heaven/. 
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is no greater than that of a year-old child, a child even 
younger (and therefore even more innocent of intellectual 
understanding) than the seven-year-old Clergeon. She aspires 
to be the saintly child who praises God even “on the brest 
soukynge.” (VII.458) She aspires, that is, to exceed her hero’s 
uncomprehending mindlessness: she aspires to intellectual 
zombie-nature. She desires, that is, a faith as “pure” as his, 
unencumbered by the complexities of ontological and ethical 
uncertainty, and as “innocent,” too, as untroubled by the 
moral responsibilities of thought. The Prioress’s inability to 
achieve that goal creates a dilemma: her willful narrative 
construction of this ideal faith depends fully on an even more 
willful choice of emotional over rational behavior — and on 
the instantiation of the most violent of regimes of control. For 
the Prioress, that the Litel Clergeon courts violence in his 
devotion by singing his Marian hymn as he walks through the 
ghetto only makes him all the more attractive as a hero. In the 
“logic” of the tale, perfect faith requires and implies perfect 
(mindless) victimhood. 
 The Prioress’s narration is peppered with effusive and all 
but ecstatic impositions of interpretation in the service of 
emotion and instinctive violence. Nowhere is this more 
apparent than in her repetition of the most lurid details of the 
child’s death: “I seye that in a wardrobe they him threwe,” she 
insists,” whereas thise Jewes purgen hire entraille” (VII.573–
574). She harangues her villains: 
 
O cursed folk of Herodes al newe, 
What may youre yvel entente yow availle? 
Mordre wol out! Certeyn, it wol nat faile, 
And namely, ther th’onour  of God shal sprede. 
The blood out crieth on youre cursed ded!  
(VII.575–578) 
 
Just as they replicate Herod’s ordering of the Massacre of the 
Innocents, so also must they replicate his ironic failure. If 
blood cries out, so does, quite literally, the child’s bloody 
body. Her images and her appeal to proverbial wisdom serve 
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to naturalize and make inevitable anti-Semitic violence like 
that which follows. 
 Her consequent construction of the child as a virgin 
martyr represents an incongruous confusion of hagiographic 
genres: 
 
O martir sowded to virginitee, 
Now maystow syngen, folwynge evere in oon 
The white Lamb celestial, quod she, 
Of which the grete evaungelist Seint John 
In Pathmos wroot, which seith that they that goon 
Biforn this Lamb and synge a song al newe 
That nevere fleshly women they ne knewe.  
(VII.579–585) 
 
Her vision confuses the meaningful heavenly praise of the 
Book of Revelations with the meaningless song of the corpse. 
The lines also, of course, confuse the circumstances of this 
male child’s secret murder with the sexualized judicial torture 
and public execution of normatively female virgin martyrs.4 
(Interestingly, a number of my students these days make the 
same cognitive swivel: perhaps because they live in a culture 
where child abuse by strangers is so often portrayed as child 
sexual abuse, they do not see this praise of the boy’s bodily 
virginity as entirely out of place. Some even assume child rape 
in this instance.) The Prioress’s further praise of “this gemme 
of chastite, this emeraude / And eek of martyrdom the ruby 
bright” (VII.609–610) prefigures the later management of the 
singing corpse as spectacle ritually contained by procession, 
mass and (after the child’s second death) his burial in a white 
                                                                                  
4  The earliest exemplars of virgin-martyrdom, girls like Agatha, 
Agnes and Lucy, were (according to legend) denounced to Roman 
persecutions of Christianity by thwarted pagan suitors. Roman law 
did not permit the execution of virgins; before final death the girls 
are subjected to attempted sexual violation (both Agatha and the 
twelve-year-old Agnes were dragged to brothels) as well as exposure 
and gruesome torture (Agatha’s breasts are severed and Lucy’s 
beautiful eyes gouged out). 
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marble tomb. In the Prioress’s language the Litel Clergeon is 
already a relic, holy and unearthly matter, both dead and alive. 
His now silent body remains on earth a crystallized history of 
the violence inherent in his tale; his soul soars to the Heavenly 
Jerusalem envisioned by Saint John, where it shall sing 
forever. 
 Despite such valiant rhetorical efforts to decree a happy 
ending and to contain the tragic miracle (or miraculous 
tragedy) of the Litel Clergeon’s murder and partial resur-
rection, however, the universe of the Prioress’s Tale ultimately 
remains a dark and capricious one, a world as cruel and 
inscrutable as that of any twenty-first century zombie. It is a 
world defined by the emoticon pathos of bereft mothers and 
the schadenfreude of abused and murdered children. More, as 
much as in the world of any twenty-first century zombie, in 
the world of the Prioress’ Tale mindlessness defends against 
awareness of a cruel and ultimately inhuman universe. In 
contemporary horror tales that inhumanity may be that of 
Lovecraftian entities in deep space or of a godless military-
corporate complex at home. In the Prioress’ Tale the 
inhumanity is exactly that of a God both immanent and 
distant, whose power is expressed in obscure hierarchies and 
motivations. 
 The tale is set in an anonymous town in a far off Asye 
(VII.488) even as it also evokes memory of Little Saint Hugh 
of Lincoln in the final stanza.5 This town is ruled by an anony-
                                                                                  
5 The body of nine-year-old Hugh was discovered in a well on 29 
August 1255, a month after he had disappeared; under torture a local 
Jew admitted to killing the child, and was subsequently executed. 
Shortly afterwards, however, ninety other Jews were arrested and 
charged with involvement in ritual murder; eighteen of them were 
eventually hanged and their property confiscated by King Henry III. 
Lincoln Cathedral also profited from the erstwhile martyrdom, as 
pilgrims began to flock to the child’s shrine. The later date and the 
executions distinguish Hugh from a small group of mostly twelfth 
century English saints, William of Norwich (d. 1144), Harold of 
Gloucester (d. 1168) and Robert of Bury (d. 1181), all young boys 
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mous and apparently absentee lord, whose justice is 
administered by an equally anonymous provost. The abbot — 
“an hooly man, as monkes been or eles oghte be,” (VII.642–
643) a telling ambiguity — pronounces the appropriate 
prayers over the singing corpse but cannot either explain or 
adequately contain the miracle and its aftermath. The most he 
can do is remove the mysterious greyne the Virgin had placed 
on the murdered boy’s tongue, and thereby silence the corpse, 
and then weep and fall prostrate on the ground before the 
bier.  
 Beyond these human rulers, the world is subject to 
cosmological control vested in the ostensibly compassionate 
Virgin and opposed in an almost Manichaean way by the 
malicious Sathanas. It is Sathanas, “oure firste foo, the serpent 
Sathanas” (VII.557), who out of his own inherent malignity 
incites the Jews to murder the Little Clergeon for his innocent 
hymn-singing, an act that he rhetorically inflates to a 
conscious attack on our laws reverence (VII.564). The 
language here ironically replays the primal Fall of Man, with 
Sathanas both tempter and representative of Law. But the Jews 
— a vague and (as ever in this tale) anonymous collective — 
do not act directly upon his urging with either visceral rage or 
legal outrage. Instead they hire a “homicide” (VII.367), a paid 
assassin. To the Prioress and the outraged Christian 
townspeople he may be “this cursed Jew” (VII.570), but 
although this phrase neatly collapses the agent and his 
employers, it cannot fully disguise the fact that his motive is 
money, not faith. Later, although the very existence of a ghetto 
in this town is underwritten by the Christian lord’s “foul 
usure and lucre of vilenye” (VII.491), when the child’s murder 
is discovered the lord’s provost responds to the mob by 
arresting not just the one killer but (all?) “the Jewes” and 
sentencing them to be drawn by wild horses and hanged. The 
specificity of the execution is typical of this narrative’s 
fascination with violence, but in this case it also reveals 
                                                                                  
whose unsolved murders were popularly attributed to Jewish ritual 
murder.  
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beneath seemingly simple (if not exactly innocent) emotional 
motivations a less palatable because more cynically calculating 
layer of economic self-interest.  
 It is, perhaps, to deny this political reality that the 
narrative offers up the Litel Clergeon as the perfect victim. His 
radical, Edenic innocence is, after all, oblivious to the fallen 
world of greed and homicide. A child, he cannot (and after his 
fortunate demise will never) know the adult world of 
authorities both secular and ecclesiastical, the world in which 
the Prioress (by reason of her office as much as her maturity) 
must operate. Unlike her, the child will never have to endure 
the world of knowledge, and therefore of sin and guilt. 
Childish innocence, preserved through his willful ignorance, 
makes him the ultimate martyr. To imitate and sustain this 
innocence the Prioress’s Tale deploys a pervasive and strategic 
denial. Sathanas and the Virgin, whose maliciousness and 
compassion are both recognizably (and understandable) 
human emotions, act within the tale itself. Behind them and 
allowing the conflict between them to play out, stands an 
inscrutable God even more effectively absent than the 
nameless town’s absentee lord. Denial of knowledge is the 
Prioress’ response to such a cosmos and such a God, a God 
who is inaccessible and, ultimately, unmoved by such things 
as either the child’s life or death or non-life. Or even by the 
purest and most innocent faith. And this last possibility is 
perhaps what the narrating Prioress takes most pains to deny.  
 In the face of such fundamental, denied realities, any 
reassurance about the Litel Clergeon’s purity, about his 
fortunate escape from the perils of adult sexuality, about his 
martyr’s crown, and his merited reception into heaven is 
futile. None of these “happy endings” can really redeem the 
horror of the divine revealed in a miracle that prolongs the 
child’s grisly non-life and provokes further tortures and 
judicial murders. That kind of horrifying miracle finally 
confounds both emotion and intellect.  The singing corpse 
confuses categories and consequently disrupts all attempts, by 
emotion or intellect, to discern any sort of essential, ultimate 
Good. 
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 In a world where corruption is rampant and where death 
and failure are so inevitable, the tale’s apparent anti-
intellectualism, skepticism/distrust of authority, and its willful 
ignorance may represent the only (failed) way of remaining 
innocent. And that may be what we today find the most 
tragically recognizable in Chaucer’s text. Like the Prioress, we 
too require the Litel Clergeon’s suffering and especially his 
second death and transformation into an overcoded sign, 
something we can force to mean what we want (need?) it to 
mean. We too sometimes aspire to the faith of zombies. In the 
face of the latest disaster so luridly displayed on the evening 
news, some traumatized survivor is sure to give witness: “I still 
hope, because I believe in a benevolent God Who loves us.” 
The otherwise incomprehensible event is thereby given 
meaning: it offers an opportunity for faith and “proves” the 
existence of a paradoxically “cruel to be kind” God. But what 
if that God is too far beyond human emotions like love, too 
far beyond human labels like “benevolent,” to be intelligible? 
Be careful, the Prioress’s Tale suggests, when you pray to such 
a God. Because if you ask for a miracle, a sign from (and of) 














X  The Dark is Light Enough 





Sir Thopas — Chaucer’s “rym” (VII.709) that so disappoints 
the Host — is not generally discussed in terms of dark 
moments or abyssal themes. In fact, in its wilful and relentless 
ineptitude, Chaucer’s parody of the tail-rhyme romance 
represents one of the most sustained comic moments in all of 
the Tales, culminating in Harry’s uncompromising 
interruption. However, beneath the surface of Chaucer’s 
parody of the likes of “Ypotas,” “Bevys” and “sir Gy” (VII.898–
899), the repeated elision of a specific paratextual feature of 
Thopas in both a large proportion of the fifteenth-century 
manuscripts of the Tales as well the vast majority of printed 
editions points toward the potential inscrutability not only of 
medieval textual records but also early-modern and modern 
records as well.1 This paratextual feature — Chaucer’s use and 
subtle amplification of the traditional tail-rhyme verse layout 
— forms part of a focus in Fragment VII of the Tales on both 
the resources available to the English poet writing at the close 
of the fourteenth century and, more generally, the very act of 
reading and the problematic nature of interpretation itself.  
Gerard Genette has examined at length the function of 
                                                                                  
1 References to Chaucer’s Tale of Sir Thopas are from The Riverside 
Chaucer, gen. ed. Larry D. Benson, 3rd edn. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1988), by fragment and line number.  
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various types of paratexts, emphasising that whilst they often 
occupy a problematic interpretative position as to whether 
they can be said to “belong” to the text, “in any case they 
surround it and extend it, precisely in order to present it, in 
the usual sense of this verb but also in the strongest sense: to 
make present, to ensure the text’s presence in the world.2 
Genette discusses ways in which authors might exploit the 
“‘undefined zone’ between the inside and the outside” 
constituted by the paratext, and it is this impulse that seems 
central to Chaucer’s use of the traditional tail-rhyme layout.3 
But precisely its status as a paratext — as “a zone not only of 
transition but also of transaction” — marks the Thopas-layout 
with a sense of precariousness.4 In those manuscripts and 
printed editions in which the layout is not reproduced, it is 
“outside” of the text in an obviously fundamental way, whilst 
in many manuscripts this “transaction” takes the form of the 
layout’s reproduction in a partial, reduced or erroneous 
manner.    
However, though there is clearly a general connection 
between the concept of darkness and the inscrutability or 
absence of textual-historical records from the medieval period 
(cf. the “dark ages”), this essay seeks not to lament the 
absence(s) of this layout as an unrecoverable failure of textual 
transmission. Instead, I aim to acknowledge both how the 
Thopas-layout can be read as an important part of the form of 
Thopas, as well as the way in which its paratextual status 
produces numerous examples of the partiality and textual 
instability that characterises literary production not just in the 
Middle Ages but also in the early modern and modern 
periods. That is, the darkness of an imperfect or inscrutable 
textual record is not necessarily a kind of loss but rather an 
opening up of a range of interpretive spaces, speculative entry 
                                                                                  
2 Gerard Genette, Paratexts: Thresholds of Interpretation, trans. Jane 
E. Lewin (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 1.  
3 Genette, Paratexts, 288.  
4 Genette, Paratexts, 2.  
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points into considerations of the ways manuscripts and books 
are “caught up by (or lost to) new systems of reference . . . 
‘forgotten’ at times, and at other times ‘transformed.’”5 
In some ways, therefore, the following discussion mirrors 
the movement of “Chaucers Wordes unto Adam,” in which he 
foregrounds a stable and authoritative “nature” for books as 
“my making,” only to immediately let them go, reminding us 
that each time they are “wryten newe” any “imaginary order” 
is “vulnerable to error and susceptible to ‘rape.’“6 It is not just 
in his “Wordes unto Adam” that Chaucer seems concerned 
with issues of authorial self-definition and the often 
disaggregated and distributable nature of intention in the 
production of literary meaning: in the prologue to Thopas 
itself there is a strange coherence between considerations of a 
necessarily fragmentary Chaucerian textual record and his 
self-representation as an “elvyssh” (VII.703) figure frequently 
caught staring at the ground. 
 
§ “MY MAKING” 
 
The distinctive layout of the tail-rhyme stanza was a 
development of the relatively common medieval practice of 
bracketing lines in order to show rhyme scheme: it was 
employed by Anglo-Norman scribes in manuscripts dating 
from the close of the twelfth century and was inherited by 
                                                                                  
5 Alexandra Gillespie, “Books,” in Oxford Twenty-First Century 
Approaches to Literature: Middle English, ed. Paul Strohm (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009), 91 [86–103]. The following 
discussion also owes much to D. Vance Smith’s critical stance in The 
Book of the Incipit: Beginnings in the Fourteenth Century 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001) and “Medieval 
Forma,” in Reading for Form, eds. S. J. Wilson and M. Brown (Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 2006), 66–79, particularly his 
emphasis on form not as an “exclusive intellectual formation, 
resistant to the material, to the deviant, and to difference,” but rather 
as a way of describing “what [a] poem does artefactually” (69).   
6 Gillespie, “Books,” 89.     
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scribes of Middle English tail-rhyme verse.7 The layout is a 
diagrammatic representation of the tail-rhyme stanza’s 
common rhyme scheme of aabccbddbeeb.8 The couplets and 
following tail-line are copied in separate columns, with 
brackets linking the tail-line to the preceding couplet, with 
rhyming tail-lines often linked by brackets as well.     
The presence of this layout in the Ellesmere, Hengwrt, and 
Cambridge University Library MS Gg 2.27 and Dd 4.24 copies 
of Thopas suggests that its use is authorial.9 Furthermore, 
Chaucer accentuates its potentially confusing effect through 
the addition of bob-lines that are without precedence in any 
surviving tail-rhyme romances.10 These lines require an 
additional third column and set of brackets, potentially 
obscuring the correct reading order of the tale even further 
[see Appendix 1]. Medieval readers would likely have been 
more familiar with this layout than their modern 
                                                                                  
7 Rhiannon Purdie has dubbed this layout “graphic tail-rhyme” in 
“The Implications of Manuscript Layout in Chaucer’s Tale of Sir 
Thopas,” Forum for Modern Language Studies 41 (2005): 263–273. See 
also Purdie’s Anglicising Romance (Cambridge: D.S. Brewer, 2008) for 
a detailed history of the tail-rhyme stanza form, the English tail-
rhyme romance, and the origins of the graphic tail-rhyme layout.   
8 Of course, there is often variation from this basic form: Amis and 
Amiloun, Horn Childe, The King of Tars, and the first forty-five 
stanzas of the tail-rhyme Guy of Warwick all rhyme aabaabccbddb. 
Other tail-rhyme romances, such as Percyvell of Gales, Sir Degrevant 
and The Avowing of King Arthur, extend the couplets to triplets to 
produce a sixteen-line stanza. Others, such as Thopas, use stanzas of 
only six lines.  
9 The unique copy of Sir Ferumbras in the holograph manuscript 
Oxford, Bodleian Library Ashmole 33 — dating from around 1380 — 
is copied in graphic tail-rhyme, further suggesting it was a feature 
used by authors as well as scribes.  
10 There are texts copied in graphic tail-rhyme that utilise bob-lines, 
such as the The Pistel of Susan, but Chaucer is the first to add them to 
the tail-rhyme romance. See E.G. Stanley, “The Use of Bob-Lines in 
Sir Thopas,” Neuphilologische Mitteilungen 73 (1972): 417–426, for a 
survey of the use of bob-lines in graphic tail-rhyme texts. 
White :: The Dark is Light Enough 195 

counterparts, but for both the inconvenience of the reading 
process it demands is undeniable. The layout is obviously part 
of the tale that is not available to Harry Bailey or the other 
pilgrims, although for readers it seems to be an element that 
Chaucer uses to keep them constantly aware of their 
navigation through the tale, in turn producing a repeated 
disruption of an imaginative submersion in the tale-telling 
contest itself, a fundamental violation of the “continuity of the 
poetic imagination.”11 As such, recapitulation — a recurring 
thematic trope during the Tales — is here manifested at the 
level of the page itself, as the reader attempts to reassemble the 
lines into a workable reading order. The sense of the lines 
gives an idea as to the order in which they should be read, 
though the vacuity and conventionality of many of the stock 
phrases of romance that Chaucer uses complicate this process: 
reading the tale column by column, for example, certainly 
does not obscure the narrative to any great extent. 
This effect is heightened in those stanzas in which Chaucer 
inserts his additional bob-lines: the diagrammatic layout 
appears logical enough, but in fact produces numerous 
reading sequences and the potential for multiple combinations 
and recombinations of lines.12 Chaucer’s extension of the tail-
rhyme romance stanza with the addition of his own anti-
climactic bob lines and his placement of the layout in the 
context of an examination of generic and poetic forms in 
Fragment VII of the Tales seem part of a broader concern with 
the act of reading itself, as well as an important aspect of 
                                                                                  
11 Robert M. Jordan, Chaucer’s Poetics and the Modern Reader 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 17. 
12 Purdie, “Implications,” 267. The fourth bob-line stanza (VII.817–
826) goes on to exploit the potentially confusing effect of the three 
preceding stanzas: “Thy mawe” (VII.823) is like the other bob-lines 
in that it is a two-stress line placed in the third column, but rather 
than providing an anti-climactic rhyme at the end of the line, it is the 
object of the following “Shal I percen if I may,” producing a subtle 
syntactic and rhythmic jolt precisely at one of the more disquieting 
moments of the tale.  
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Chaucer’s “further attempt…to define both the kind of writing 
that constitutes The Canterbury Tales and, more tellingly, the 
kind of person who wrote it.”13  These issues are revisited in 
Melibee and The Nun’s Priest’s Tale, and in fact throughout his 
works, as Chaucer asks again and again “Who are my ideal 
readers? Who are my real readers? How do my readers read? . 
. . Do my readers invent my authorial intent? Are my readers 
my own best fictions? What, in fact is the act of reading?”14  
George Edmondson suggests that part of Chaucer’s intent 
in Thopas in adopting a form that differs so markedly from his 
usual poetic voice was to “[preserve] a native literary form by 
mortifying it: subjecting it to one form of violence, parody, in 
order to protect it from another, the juridical violence at the 
heart of natural history.”15 However, literary appropriation 
looks not only back to the tradition it seeks to question, but 
also forward to “future readers who have been preshaped by 
its dynamic presence;”16 in the junctures of periods of cultural 
transition, parody offers tools for both deconstruction and 
reconstruction, criticism and creativity.17 The tail-rhyme 
stanza, the uniquely English tail-rhyme romance and the 
graphic tail-rhyme layout articulate a sense of tradition, and 
its fallibility, which is clearly central to the parody of Thopas. 
However, these elements are couched in a tale that exploits the 
fluid, non-systematic medieval conceptions of genre: Thopas 
                                                                                  
13 Lee Patterson, ““What man artow?”: Authorial Self-Definition in 
The Tale of Sir Thopas and The Tale of Melibee,” Studies in the Age of 
Chaucer 11 (1989): 120 [117–75].  
14 Peter W. Travis, Disseminal Chaucer: Rereading The Nun’s Priest’s 
Tale (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2011), 14.  
15 George Edmondson, “Naked Chaucer,” in The Post-Historical 
Middle Ages, eds. Elizabeth Scala and Sylvia Federico (New York: 
Palgrave McMillan, 2009), 154 [139–160]. 
16 Karla Taylor, “Chaucer’s Volumes: Toward a New Model of Literary 
History in the Canterbury Tales,” Studies in the Age of Chaucer 29 
(2007): 47 [43–85]. 
17 Linda Hutcheon, The Politics of Postmodernism (London: 
Routledge, 1989), 98.  
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is in fact much more complex than its “drasty” surface initially 
suggests, including narrative aspects without precedence in 
the English romance tradition and other subtle modulations 
of romance tropes and themes.18 Both in its content and form, 
therefore, Thopas is not simply a romance, or a heartless 
parody thereof, but also “about romance, and the roles of 
author and audience in its telling.”19 As such, the parodic 
elements of the tale seem intended not simply to mock 
medieval ways of knowing, but — through a complex play 
with genre, constant undercutting of expectation and revoking 
of poetic imaginative continuity — to reveal, and in some 
senses even to revel in, the problematic nature of 
interpretation itself.  
As Peter Travis writes, “One reason Chaucer’s poetry is so 
patently open to reader-response criticism is that it is highly 
conscious of itself as linguistic artifice and of its readers’ role 
as conspirators in the art of making fiction.”20 However, by 
considering the Thopas-layout’s particular paratextual effect, 
Travis’ observation can be re-embedded in a conception of the 
form of Thopas that is, following Christopher Cannon, 
“uniquely comprehensive,” amounting to  
                                                                                  
18 See Patterson, “What man artow?” 124–35, and Christopher 
Cannon, “The Spirit of Romance,” in The Grounds of English 
Literature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 172–209. As 
John Burrow originally noted, even the incomplete state of Thopas in 
actual fact belies a structural unity: the number of stanzas in each of 
the three fitts (eighteen, nine, and four and a half) accords with the 
ratio 4:2:1. In the Middle Ages this ratio, known as the diapason, was 
the numerical expression of the mathematical proposition thought to 
govern the universe as a whole (see John Burrow, “Sir Thopas: An 
Agony in Three Fits,” The Review of English Studies 22.85 [1971]: 54–
58).  
19 Melissa Furrow, Expectations of Romance (Cambridge: D.S. 
Brewer, 2009), 36.  
20 Peter Travis, “Affective Criticism,” in Medieval Texts and 
Contemporary Readers, eds. Laurie Finke and Martin Shichtman 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 205 [201–215].   
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[an] insistence that the form of a text not only 
consists of all the structural levels we traditionally 
anatomize when we refer to “literary form” (. . . 
metre, rhyme scheme, or style . . . metaphors or 
patterns of imagery . . . generic affiliations or plot), 
but of the integration of all those levels, along with 
any other aspect of a particular text which may seem 
to structure it.21 
 
§ “WRYTEN NEWE” 
 
Whilst Cannon’s formalism is useful in considering the 
“poetic activity”22 of the Thopas-layout in the context of 
Fragment VII of the Tales, the various incomplete and partial 
realisations of the layout suggest a greater sense of the 
inseparability of literary meaning and the physicality of the 
manuscript page. Each manuscript or printed version of the 
text provides additional literary nuance, or at least 
information on conditions of literary production rather than 
simple context, to the extent that it is perhaps more accurate 
to talk of not one form but multiple forms of the tale.  
In the Delamere manuscript, for example, the scribe 
started copying the tale in the two-column layout but quickly 
abandoned that in favour of a single column with rhyming 
lines still linked by overlapping brackets. Even in this reduced 
form the tail-rhyme stanza and its layout clearly caused the 
scribe some problems: the third bob-line stanza is bracketed 
wrongly, producing an overlapping and confusing sequence of 
brackets. The bob-lines “With mace” and “Thy mawe” 
(VII.813, 823) are copied to the right of the main column of 
text but are misplaced. As such, the recapitulative and 
potentially erroneous reading process the manuscript is only 
supposed to stage becomes a more intrinsic part of its 
individual textual materiality. In British Library, Royal MS 
                                                                                  
21 Cannon, “Form,” 178 (italics mine).      
22 Cannon, “Form,” 179. 
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17.d.xv the original scribe copied the first and second fitts of 
the tale in a single column without brackets. A later scribe 
then copied the third fitt in the full graphic tail-rhyme layout 
and also added brackets to the couplets and paraph marks to 
the end of the b-lines in the first and second fitts. The Royal 
manuscript therefore provides an insight into ways 
manuscripts can preserve differing levels of interest in 
paratextual features between scribes, as well as how they 
approached the works they copied as never entirely finished, 
even if by accruing additional paratextual information they 
might disrupt the original design of the manuscript.23   
In manuscripts such as British Library, Egerton 2863, the 
layout’s meaning is unraveled even further as it is omitted 
almost entirely: the bob-lines are separated from the preced-
ing line by a virgula suspensiva, but the more disjunctive effect 
of the multiple columns and brackets is elided. The reduced 
form of the layout in Egerton 2863 is a precursor to the 
printed editions of the Tales. William Caxton, whose deluxe 
editions were intended primarily for aristocratic patrons, did 
not reproduce the layout in any of his editions, an editorial 
decision perhaps based on the perception of popular metrical 
romances as somewhat unprestigious by the close of the 
fifteenth century.24 Wynken de Worde reproduced the layout 
in his fourth edition of the Tales after consulting a now lost 
manuscript similar to Hengwrt,25 but Caxton’s elision of the 
                                                                                  
23 Another significant trend in the copying of the tale and its layout is 
represented by Royal College of Physicians Manuscript 388, in which 
the scribe retains the two column layout with brackets linking the a-
lines, but the bob-lines are either omitted or conflated with the 
preceding line. This is also the case in the heavily edited Cambridge 
University Library, Ii.3.26, in which the subsumption of the bob-lines 
into the preceding b-lines is but one aspect of an extensive rewriting 
of the tale. 
24 Purdie, “Implications,” 269–270.  
25 See Stephen Partridge, “Wynkyn de Worde’s Manuscript Source 
for the Canterbury Tales: Evidence from the Glosses,” The Chaucer 
Review 41 (2007): 326–359. 
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layout was consolidated by later editions that used his Tales as 
their sole exemplar, such as Richard Pynson’s 1492 edition. De 
Worde’s remains the only printed edition to reproduce the 
layout: modern editions of the Tales are marked by a reticence 
to an aspect of the tale that is present in those manuscripts 
commonly relied upon for their textual authoritativeness, and 
as Helen Cooper observes, it is this type of treatment that has 
led modern readers to tend to think of Thopas as “a narrow 
poem” when, in fact, its realisation in the Ellesmere, Hengwrt, 
Gg and Dd manuscripts, amongst others, intimates towards 
the potential for a somewhat different reading process.26  
 
§  “FOR EVERE UPON THE GROUND I SE THEE STARE”   
 
The examples above, though brief, articulate ways medieval 
texts survive not simply as part of “a rarified history of 
literature or an intangible history of ideas,”27 but also as 
inherently unstable objects, “the material result[s] of inevitably 
imperfect human labour . . . further disordered by time.”28 In 
Chaucer’s canon, his “Wordes unto Adam” is clearly the most 
explicit examination of the tension between stabilised 
authorial meaning and the potential for any text to be 
“myswriten.” However, his self description in the Thopas 
prologue stages a disavowal of his own presence that, in its 
intimations towards simultaneous authorial absence and 
presence, functions in a strangely similar way to his “Wordes.” 
Discussions of Chaucer’s brief self-description commonly 
focus on his short stature and bulging “waast.” However, in the 
images of his averted gaze — “Thou lookest as thou woldest 
fynde an hare, / For evere upon the ground I se thee stare”” 
Harry tells him (VII.696–697) — and “elvyssh” appearance in 
                                                                                  
26 Helen Cooper, Oxford Guides to Chaucer: The Canterbury Tales 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 300. 
27 Jessica Brantley, “The Prehistory of the Book,” PMLA 124.2 (2009): 
632 [632–639]. 
28 Gillespie, “Books,” 87.  
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the Thopas prologue we are presented with a self-
representation incongruous to that of the General Prologue, 
where Geoffrey intimates a rather more outgoing personality 
(“And shortly . . . hadde I spoken with hem everichon / That I 
was of hir felaweshipe anon” [I.30–32]). Maybe his hidden 
face is more than just a sudden bout of shyness, though: in 
medieval thought the head and face were imbued with 
complex representational values, the face not only signifying 
the intellect but also regarded, as in the now proverbial saying, 
as a window to the soul. The expressiveness of gargoyles and 
other faces in art, sculpture, and the marginalia of books, as 
well as the large number of reliquaries of hair and facial 
features, also attest to this symbolic significance,29 and it 
therefore seems noteworthy, even strangely disconcerting, that 
we cannot see Chaucer’s. 
This sense of a figure not entirely knowable, or at least 
somehow apart, is accentuated in the second part of Chaucer’s 
self-description as “elvyssh.” The Riverside Chaucer’s gloss of 
“elvyssh” as “mysterious, not of this world,” lacks the sense of 
terror that figured in many medieval encounters with elves or 
fairies, who were often portrayed as intent on committing 
murder or sexual violence of some kind, taking the form of 
lamiae or incubi.30 The term was also more expansive in its 
temporal dimensions: elves, though closely associated with 
children in medieval thought, are also what some medieval 
writers referred to as the longaevi, the spectre-like “longlivers” 
who reside both in the air and on Earth; their age 
indeterminate, they may be generations old, or perhaps even 
                                                                                  
29 In periods of unrest, statues and sculptures — such as the 
thirteenth-century King of Judah, from Notre-Dame, Paris — were 
often beheaded in iconoclastic acts that mirrored the fate of those 
they represented or were associated with. See, for example, “The Face 
in Medieval Sculpture,” The Metropolitan Museum of Art, http:// 
www.metmuseum.org/toah/hd/face/hd_face.htm.  
30 Patterson, “What man artow?” 132.  
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already dead.31 Like the “litel clergon” of The Prioress’s Tale 
who, though his throat is “kut unto [the] nekke boon,” 
reminds us that “I sholde have dyed, ye, longe tyme agon” 
(VII.649–651), there is a sense of the Chaucer-pilgrim as 
somehow out of time, not just mysterious but perhaps more 
profoundly incomprehensible. He appears at once young and 
old (or even already dead), part of the tale-telling contest but 
also strangely separate from it. So whilst it is obviously 
potentially hazardous to read too much of Chaucer into his 
pilgrim persona, this self-description seems apt in its 
placement prior to the Melibee-Thopas section: at the moment 
he is about to tell/write his own tales he provides us with a 
self-description that seems to intimate towards just how 
imaginary any contact with an author must be: we cannot look 
him in the eye, for he will not share our temporal window.32  
The abyss between stabilised authorial meaning and the 
inherent instability of any discursively formed knowledge 
clearly produced a certain amount of creative tension for those 
authors, like Chaucer, who recognised that “litel book[s]” 
(Troilus and Criseyde V.1789) inevitably stand in place of their 
authors and in doing so are open to having their meaning 
unraveled or defiled.33 However, this is an abyss shot through 
with the light of scribal and editorial responses that represent 
how any work of literature is necessarily liable to change. As 
such, whilst I would not elide the potentially destructive force 
of the type of textual inscrutability suggested by the various 
                                                                                  
31 C.S. Lewis, The Discarded Image (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge 
University Press, 1964), 122.   
32 Chaucer's self-description at this point always invokes, in my mind 
at least, Michel Foucault’s dramatized closing comments to the 
Introduction of The Archaeology of Knowledge, in which he writes of 
preparing “underground passages . . . in which I can lose myself and 
appear at last to eyes I will never have to meet again. I am no doubt 
not the only one who writes in order to have no face. Do not ask who 
I am and do not ask me to remain the same” (London: Routledge, 
2002), 19. 
33 Gillespie, “Books,” 87. 
White :: The Dark is Light Enough 203 

forms of the Thopas-layout, such examples serve to force us 
into history, to acknowledge that manuscripts and books 
never “contain” texts, but rather exist in an uneasy and 
complex state of reciprocity with them, through which 












Appendix 1. Diplomatic edition (by the author) of the layout 
of Chaucer’s Sir Thopas as it appears in Christ Church College 
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